560 research outputs found
Coalition formation in simple Games. the semistrict core
No full textDimitrov D, Haake C-J. Coalition formation in simple Games. the semistrict core. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. Vol 378. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld; 2006.We consider the class of proper monotonic simple games and study coalition formation when an exogenous share vector and a solution concept are combined to guide the distribution of coalitional worth. Using a multiplicative composite solution, we induce players' preferences over coalitions in a hedonic game, and present conditions under which the semistrict core of the game is nonempty
Dividing by Demanding: Object Division through Market Procedures
No full textHaake C-J. Dividing by Demanding: Object Division through Market Procedures. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. Vol 359. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld; 2004.We discuss a model, in which two agents may distribute finitely many objects among themselves. The conflict is resolved by means of a market procedure. Depending on the specifications, this procedure serves to implement bargaining solutions such as the discrete Raiffa solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution and the Perles-Maschler solution. The latter is axiomatized using the superadditivity axiom, which in the present context is readily interpreted as resolving a specific source of conflict potential
Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets
No full textHaake C-J. Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. Vol 366. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld; 2005.We discuss two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution in the context of an object division problem involving two agents. Allocations of objects resulting from strategic interaction are obtained as a demand vector in a specific market. For the first support result games in strategic form are derived that exhibit a unique Nash equilibrium. The second result uses subgame perfect equlibria of a game in extensive form. Although there may be multiple equilibria, coordination problems can be removed
An axiomatic approach to composite solutions
No full textDimitrov D, Haake C-J. An axiomatic approach to composite solutions. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. Vol 385. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld; 2006.We investigate a situation in which gains from cooperation are represented by a cooperative TU-game and a solution proposes a division of coalitional worths. In addition, asymmetries among players outside the game are captured by a vector of exogenous weights. If a solution measures players' payoffs inherent in the game, and a coalition has formed, then the question is how to measure players' overall payoffs in that coalition. For this we introduce the notion of a composite solution. We provide an axiomatic characterization of a specific composite solution, in which exogenous weights enter in a proportional fashion
Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples
No full textHaake C-J, Klaus B. Stability and Nash implementation in matching markets with couples. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. Vol 399. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld; 2008.We consider two-sided matching markets with couples. First, we extend a result by Klaus and Klijn (2005, Theorem 3.3) and show that for any weakly responsive couples market there always exists a "double stable" matching, i.e., a matching that is stable for the couples market and for any associated singles market. Second, we show that for weakly responsive couples markets the associated stable correspondence is (Maskin) monotonic and Nash implementable. In contrast, the correspondence that assigns all double stable matchings is neither monotonic nor Nash implementable
Trading bargaining weights
No full textErvig U, Haake C-J. Trading bargaining weights. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. Vol 350. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld; 2003
On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules
No full textHaake C-J, Trockel W. On Maskin monotonicity of solution based social choice rules. Working Papers. Institute of Mathematical Economics. Vol 393. Bielefeld: Universität Bielefeld; 2007.Howard (1992) argues that the Nash bargaining solution is not Nash implementable, as it does not satisfy Maskin monotonicity. His arguments can be extended to other bargaining solutions as well. However, by defining a social choice correspondence that is based on the solution rather than on its realizations, one can overcome this shortcoming. We even show that such correspondences satisfy a stronger version of monotonicity that is even sufficient for Nash implementability
Dividing by Demanding: Object Division through Market Procedures
No full textHaake C-J. Dividing by Demanding: Object Division through Market Procedures. International Game Theory Review. 2009;11(1):15-32.We discuss a model, in which two agents may distribute finitely many objects among themselves. The conflict is resolved by means of a market procedure. Depending on the specifications, this procedure serves to achieve bargaining solutions such as the discrete Raiffa solution, the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution and the Perles-Maschler solution. The latter is axiomatized using the superadditivity axiom, which in the present context is readily interpreted as resolving a specific source of conflict potential
Two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution in small object division markets
No full textWe discuss two support results for the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution in the context of an object division problem involving two agents. Allocations of objects resulting from strategic interaction are obtained as a demand vector in a specific market. For the first support result games in strategic form are derived that exhibit a unique Nash equilibrium. The second result uses subgame perfect equilibria of a game in extensive form. Although there may be multiple equilibria, coordination problems can be removed.support result, object division, market, Kalai-Smorodinsky solution
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