1,721,051 research outputs found
Los derechos en el Estado constitutional
No full textIl volume fornisce un quadro complessivo dell’insieme dei diritti fondamentali – in generale, dei diritti, principi e valori costituzionalmente sanciti – negli odierni Stati costituzionali, e dei problemi concettuali, teorici e normativi che essi suscitano. In particolare il loro essere eterogenei, largamente indeterminati, sovente confliggenti o reciprocamente incommensurabili, rende necessario, in sede di applicazione, determinazione e bilanciamento
Lezioni di filosofia del diritto. Costituzionalismo, stato di diritto, codificazione, positivismo giuridico
No full textManuale di filosofia del diritto
¿Hay algo que los planes puedan hacer por la teoría del derecho?
No full textWhat can plans
In his book, Legality (2011), Scott Shapiro puts forward what he claims to be "a new, and hopefully better" (better, namely, than the ones given so far) answer to "the overarching question of ‘What is law?’ - The central claim of this new account - the "Planning Thesis" - is that "legal activity is a form of social planning" -. "Legal institutions plan for the communities over which they claim authority, both by telling members what they may or may not do, and by identifying those who are entitled to affect what others may or may not do. Following this claim, legal rules are themselves generalized plans, or planlike norms, issued by those who are authorized to plan for others. And adjudication involves the application of these plans, or planlike norms, to those to whom they apply”.
The relevant notion of a plan is the notion moulded, in his work in the philosophy of action, by M. E. Bratman. It is resort to this concept of a plan, and to Bratman’s way of understanding human agency as planning agency, that, according to Shapiro, makes substantial progress in legal theory possible.
What, then, can (Bratmanian) plans do for legal theory? Does resort to Bratman’s concept of a plan - lovg the lines followed by Shaping - in fact provide new and special insight into the nature of law? I argue that the answer is negative.
TRADUZIONE IN CASTIGLIANO DI UN ARTICOLO GIA' PUBBLICATO IN LINGUA INGLES
Col senno di poi: Perplessità, elucubrazioni, ritrattazioni (poche, non molto importanti, tranne una) e repliche
No full textSi tratta del secondo volume, comprendente le mie repliche, di un'opera in due volumi (i cui dati bibliografici completi si trovano qui di seguito) celebrativa del sottoscritto, il cui primo volume contiene 21 saggi di autori italiani, spagnoli, sudamericani, statunitensi (1), aventi ad oggetto le mie opere precedentemente pubblicate.
P. Luque, M. Maldonado Muñoz (a cura di), Discutendo con Bruno Celano, ISBN 978-84-9123-745-7, Marcial Pons, Madrid 2020
Lezioni di filosofia del diritto. Costituzionalismo, stato di diritto, codificazione, diritto naturale, positivismo giuridico
No full textQuesto libro è una introduzione alla filosofia del diritto, pensata anzitutto per studenti di Giurisprudenza, ma anche per lettori curiosi e intelligenti che non hanno competenze specialistiche in questa materi
Razonamiento jurídico e interpretación del derecho. Problemas abiertos en la teoría de los ordenamientos jurídicos
No full textRaccolta di saggi, tradotti in castigliano, già pubblicati in altra lingua. Include anche la traduzione del libro: "Due problemi aperti della teoria dell'interpretazione giuridica", Mucchi Editore
Potere disciplinare e norme incorporate
Get PDFThe problem I discuss is whether the behaviors which are the product of the exercise of disciplinary power may be characterized as “normative”, and if so in what sense of the word “normative”. Disciplinary power is, I will say, the “inscription of norms” in the body of those who are subject to it. I distinguish two ways (“indirect” and “direct” inscription) in which norms may be inscribed, through the exercise of disciplinary power, in the body of the subjects, which I dub, respectively, “automatic execution (of norms)” and “normative automatisms”. Automatic execution of norms is a well-known phenomenon. Normative automatisms are odd entities: in the case of normative automatisms, the norm is the body itself, as moulded by the exercise of disciplinary power
Reasons, Rules, Exceptions. Towards a Psychological Account
No full textIn this paper we defend a psychological account of rule-based reasoning,
specifically of the relationship between rules and exceptions. The topic of our
inquiry are the relations between rules, the reasons underlying them, and exceptions.
In analysing these relations, first, we outline an apparent paradox, the
“paradox of rules”, and a related problem, the “problem of reconsideration”.
Then, we propose a solution to, or better dissolution of, the paradox, grounded
in an account of the psychological processes underlying rule-application and
reconsideration. We claim, that is, that the problem of reconsideration should
be answered by appealing to matters of sheer psychological fact. The upshot of
this argument is a psychologistic conception of rules and of rule-based reasoning.
We will explain what we mean by “psychologism” and why, to our minds, a
psychologistic theory of rules and of rule-based reasoning is on the right track
Eight Questions for the Speakers
No full textIn this paper, we raise a few questions for Bartosz Brozek, Monica Bucciarelli and Philip Johnson-Laird. The questions we ask to Bucciarelli and Johnson-Laird concern the nature of the “sense of correctness” which is at the heart of our normative judgments and reasoning, and the status of the laws of logic relating to mental models. Our questions to Brozek concern the distinction he traces between rudimentary and abstract rules, the role of language in normative behaviour, and the role of mental simulation in the understanding of abstract rules
Constitutive Rules: The Symbolization Account
Get PDFOur aim is to provide an account of constitutive rules in terms of (1) the acceptance of regulative norms, and (2) a cognitive process we call “symbolization” (in an altogether different sense from what J. R. Searle means by this word). We claim, first, that institutional facts à la Searle boil down to facts concerning the collective acceptance of regulative norms in a given community. This, however, does not exhaust what institutional facts are. There is a residue, symbolization. Symbolization, as we understand it, involves a transfer of cognitive models from one domain to another. We introduce this notion by exploring different sorts of games, taking our cue from games of pretend play. In the context of this exploration, we introduce the idea of the significance—a matter of degree—of symbolization for a given institutional concept. In particular, we claim, symbolization may play, vis-à-vis a given institutional concept, a properly constitutive or a merely auxiliary role. We further argue that, in most legal concepts as conceived in our legal culture, symbolization plays a merely auxiliary role. A possible exception is the concept of political representation, at least on some understandings of it
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