5,471 research outputs found
Replication Data for: Gender, Beliefs and Coordination with Externalities
No full textzTree code, experimental data, and analysis code for Journal of Public Economics publication
Replication Data for: Investment Incentives in Tradable Emissions Markets with Price Floors
No full textzTree code, experimental data, and analysis code for JAERE publicatio
Common value auctions with voluntary and qualified entry
No full textWe study auctions under different entry rules. In the field, individuals self-select into auctions and regulations often require them to meet specific qualifications. In this experiment we assess the role of voluntary entry and financial requirements on the incidence of severe overbidding and bankruptcies, which are widespread in common value auctions. We show that voluntary entry amplifies overbidding and increases bankruptcy rates. Qualified entry has only modest impacts on overbidding. This study adds new insights to existing experiments where all subjects are usually placed exogenously into auctions
Replication Data for: Spatial Coordination and Joint Bidding in Conservation Auctions
No full textData files and Stata .do files for analyzing data, as well as the zTree program for conducting the experimen
What Can Laboratory Experiments Teach Us About Emissions Permit Market Design?
No full textThe laboratory provides a test bed to inform many design choices for emissions permit markets. Experiments are sometimes strongly motivated and structured by specific theoretical models and predictions, but in other cases the experiment itself can be the model of the market and regulatory environment. We review specific experimental applications that address design issues for permit auction rules, permit expiration dates and banking, liability rules, and regulatory enforcement.cap-and-trade, auctions, liability, regulation, compliance, banking, Environmental Economics and Policy, Institutional and Behavioral Economics,
Variations on the Author
No full text“Variations on the Author” discusses two of Eduardo Coutinho’s recent films (Um Dia na Vida, from 2010, and Últimas Conversas, posthumously released in 2015) and their contribution to the general question of documentary authorship. The director’s filmography is characterized by a consistent yet self-effacing form of authorial self-inscription: Coutinho often features as an interviewer that rather than express opinions propels discourses; an interviewer that is good at listening. This mode of self-inscription characterizes him as an author who is not expressive but who is nonetheless markedly present on the screen. In Um Dia na Vida, however, Coutinho is completely absent form the image, while Últimas Conversas, on the contrary, includes a confessional prologue that moves the director from the margins to the center of his films. This article examines the ways in which these works stand out in the filmography of a director who offers new insights into the notion of cinematic authorship
Do Community Characteristics Determine Environmental Outcomes? Evidence from the Toxics Release Inventory
No full textThis research uses neighborhood characteristics (at the zipcode level) to explain changes in toxic releases between 1990 and 1993. It combines the Toxics Release Inventory data with demographic data from the 1990 US Census. We first analyze the location of manufacturing facilities in a particular neighborhood using a sample selection model, and then attribute changes in the level of emissions between 1990 and 1993 to the demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the neighborhood in 1990. The results indicate that variables likely to affect the propensity for communities to engage in political action significantly influence environmental performance. Economic characteristics of neighborhoods (such as income levels and unemployment) also affect changes in releases. Release changes in the Southeastern US exhibit a pattern consistent with racial injustice.
A Market with Frictions in the Matching Process: An Experimental Study
No full textWe construct a laboratory market with the structure of the theoretical model of Burdett, Shi, and Wright (2001). The model is a simple and natural way to represent a market in which there is a friction in the matching process between buyers and sellers. Sellers first simultaneously post prices at which they are willing to sell their single unit of a good. Buyers then simultaneously choose a seller from whom to attempt to purchase a unit. If more than one buyer chooses the same seller, the good is randomly sold to one of the buyers. If a seller is not chosen by any buyer, his unit is not sold. Our experimental results show a broad consistency with the model of Burdett et al. and less support for an alternative model, which is analogous to the model of Montgomery (1991), and which has different assumptions on the strategic interaction between sellers. The main departures that we observe from the Burdett et al. model are that (a) price dispersion exists and is slow to decay, (b) prices exceed the equilibrium level when there are only two sellers, and (c) buyers’ purchase probabilities are insufficiently responsive to price differences when there are two sellers.
The strategy method lowers measured trustworthy behavior
No full textIn a trust game experiment, we elicited choices using either the so-called game or strategy method. While yielding similar rates of trust, the strategy method reveals a significantly lower rate of trustworthiness
Money piece by Timothy P. Agnew, chief executive officer of the Finance Author
No full textMoney piece by Timothy P. Agnew, chief executive officer of the Finance Authority of Maine, about the increased availability of credit for Maine\u27s small businesses
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