8,298 research outputs found
Spillovers, Product Innovation and R&D Cooperation: a Theoretical Model
No full textThe paper analyzes the impact of post-innovation knowledge
spillovers on private firms’ R&D investment decisions, considering
the case of stochastic product innovation. We propose a theoretical
model where we compare two scenarios: not cooperation in
R&D versus Research Joint Ventures (RJV); our analysis extends
the results of the literature to the context of product innovation,
confirming the general result that the presence of spillovers reduces
private incentive to invest and may stimulate cooperation.
Moreover, in terms of social welfare, our analysis suggests that
cooperation may not be optimal and, as a consequence, subsidizing
any form of R&D cooperation is not efficient. We show
that cooperation in R&D leads always to the efficient allocation;
however there are cases where cooperating emerges spontaneously
as SPNE, and cases where cooperating does not emerge without
subsides. Finally, when we assume that cooperating firms collude
in the production stage, the increasing of the private incentive to
cooperate reduces the cases where firms need public subsides to
invest: when subsidies are costly, cooperation-collusion may be a
second best solution
Carlo Scarpa per il paesaggio
No full textSaggio sul contributo di Carlo Scarpa alla cultura italiana del progetto di paesaggi
"How Many Roads" n. 158 di Rassegna e Urbanistica
No full textCome recita l'editoriale di Maria Argenti "Rassegna si volge indietro a vedere la strada stavolta, quella percorsa e quella che abbiamo davanti, attraverso le orme del cammino, dei tanti cammini, che andiamo tracciando. Per dire una cosa soprattutto: che essi segnano la qualità della nostra vita urbana; che il tempo percorso a piedi nei tragitti cittadini è un tempo guadagnato alla bellezza di una relazione". Il numero raccoglie riflessioni e progetti sullo spazio della strada nella città contemporanea con scritti di: I. Aquilé, M. Argenti, C. Bianchetti, G. Canto Moniz, A. Capuano, G. Celestini, I. Cortesi, F. Di Carlo, B. Di Donato, A. Ferlenga, I. Ferreira, Gaeta & Springall, S. Rueda Palanzuela, F. Tonucci, A. Valeriani, P. Viganò, E. Roca, M. Sansica, F. Toppetti, C. Zucca
The evaluation of policies to implement innovative networks: the case of Italy
No full textThe aim of the paper is to analyse a nationwide systems of public grants to joint R&D projects realized by firms, R&D centers, and universities involved in the Italian Technological Districts (TDs) launched in 2002
Patent Protection and Threat of Litigation in Oligopoly
No full textIn recent years, the increasing awarding of patents has captured
the attention of scholars operating in different fields. The
economic literature has studied the causes of this proliferation;
we propose an entry game focusing on one of the consequences,
showing how an incumbent may create a patent portfolio in order
to control market entry and to collude. The incumbent fixes
the level of patent protection; the threat of denunciation reduces
the entrant’s expected profits; moreover, if the entrant deviates
from collusion, the incumbent can strengthen punishment suing
the competitor for patent infringement, reducing her incentive to
deviate. Our analysis suggests that antitrust authorities should
pay attention to the level of patent protection implemented by
the incumbent and note whether the holder of a patent reacts to
entry by either suing or not suing the competitor. In the model,
we use reduced form per-period profits and this allows us to obtain
general results not depending on the assumptions about the
kind of oligopolistic competition
Abuse of Competitive Fringe
No full textThe purpose of this article is to analyze how the presence of a competitive fringe, composed by price taker firms, can affect the sustainability of collusive equilibria. Our starting point is that there exists a diffused misunderstanding about its strategical role as collusive minus factor. We deny that. In fact, if it is true that in single dominance cases the presence of a competitive fringe significantly reduces the price increasing profitability and the leader market power, when we consider collective dominance cases the deviation profitability and the punishment mechanism become crucial. In this paper after introducing a minimal structural and strategical framework needed for describing this kind of competition, we prove that not only the presence of a competitive fringe is a collusive plus factor, but also that there exists a critical dimension of the fringe such that collusion is a Nash equilibrium of the static game
How the presence of a competitive fringe affects the sustainability of collusion and collective dominance
No full text- …
