1,721,019 research outputs found
The evaluation of policies to implement innovative networks: the case of Italy
No full textThe aim of the paper is to analyse a nationwide systems of public grants to joint R&D projects realized by firms, R&D centers, and universities involved in the Italian Technological Districts (TDs) launched in 2002
Abuse of Competitive Fringe
Full text linkThe purpose of this article is to analyze how the presence of a competitive fringe, composed by price taker firms, can affect the sustainability of collusive equilibria. Our starting point is that there exists a diffused misunderstanding about its strategical role as collusive minus factor. We deny that. In fact, if it is true that in single dominance cases the presence of a competitive fringe significantly reduces the price increasing profitability and the leader market power, when we consider collective dominance cases the deviation profitability and the punishment mechanism become crucial. In this paper after introducing a minimal structural and strategical framework needed for describing this kind of competition, we prove that not only the presence of a competitive fringe is a collusive plus factor, but also that there exists a critical dimension of the fringe such that collusion is a Nash equilibrium of the static game
How the presence of a competitive fringe affects the sustainability of collusion and collective dominance
No full text(Static) Non-cooperative Foreclosing or Collusive Equilibria in the Upstream Roaming Market are Sustainable Even If There Exist More Incumbents: A Model on the MVNOs Entry
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Demand growth, entry and collusion sustainability
Full text linkThe purpose of this paper is to represent in which way a stable and no negligible growth in demand can affect the level of sustainability of collusion. For the European Commission this assumption is seen as a factor that disincentives collusion and pushes to a competitive behavior. This fact maybe is not so obvious and I have shown that what is important is the final effect on entry in the market. In fact, expected oligopolistic profits are as the Faith Morgana that attracts competitors and disappears when they have come in. Entry is profitable if it is finite, i.e. one or very few entrants, and if prices above marginal cost are still successfully sustainable.Our result is that demand growth path is not a sufficient condition to neglect the risk of collective dominance, and in order to support our analysis we consider first some trigger strategy equilibria where deviation punishment is implemented by Nash Reversion for ever. After that, we consider Abreu's simple penal code (1986) and we have derived a non stationary optimal penal code that in our structural changing framework implement collusion before and after entry as a subgames perfect equilibrium. The final conclusion is that demand growth, ceteris paribus, is negative correlated with the critical discount factor necessary to substaines collusion
Consiglio Scientifico del Master di II livello in Concorrenza ed Economia della Regolamentazione (CER) della Facoltà di Economia dell'Università degli Studi di Napoli FEDERICO II
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