119,383 research outputs found
Valutazione rapida della qualità della pappa reale mediante spettroscopia NIR D. Agrelli, C. Zannella, L. Ruggiero, C. Amalfitano, E. Caprio
No full textUpdate dei risultati relativi alla metodica sono stati presentat
Finance and its reform : beyond laissez-faire
No full textThat the financial sector should be liberalized was the orthodox view in the mid-1970s, during a pendulum swing toward reliance on the free market. In the early 1980s, the pendulum swung back to the left, based partly on evidence - especially from Latin America - that overly rapid reform had real costs, and partly on an increased appreciation of financial market failure. Blind adherence to free market principles was no longer appropriate. Now a counter-counterrevolution is in sight, with some swing back toward the view that the market makes a mess of it, but the government makes it even worse. The authors agree that market-oriented financial systems appear to do a better job than systems with extensive government involvement, but contend that the assumption that perfect competition will solve all problems in finance - especially in banking - can be dangerous. Information problems, implicit or explicit government guarantees associated with the payments system make banks unique. Governments implicitly recognize banking's uniqueness - few allow just anyone to enter banking - but public pronouncements and observers'recommendations often favor a move to more competition. Perfect competition, however, is optimal under the assumption, among others, of no government guarantee. In fact, most governments differ only in how explicit they are about their deposit insurance schemes. The financial reforms most likely to succeed are those that give banks an incentive to engage in safe and sound banking. When excessive competition is allowed, the charter value of banking diminishes to the point that it is no longer profitable for bankers to behave prudently. A consideration of finance's role, and a look at how reforming economies have fared, suggest also that gradual reform is often to be preferred in this domain. Deregulation of credit markets and interest rates can be counterproductive in unstable macroeconomic conditions and when banks are unsophisticated or have weak balance sheets. And changes in the charter value may evolve only slowly after reform. Faster progress and greater efforts should be made, however, in bank supervision and regulation and in institutional development, including accounting, auditing, legal and judicial reform, and training (of bankers and other finance professionals). In sum, many economies would benefit from less government intervention in financial markets, but the prescription should not be abrupt or total government withdrawal from the financial sector. Rather than intervening heavily in credit allocation decisions, governments should focus on doing what only they can do: providing an enabling environment for the private financial and nonfinancial sectors, and ensuring that financial operations are safe and sound.Environmental Economics&Policies,Banks&Banking Reform,Financial Intermediation,Economic Theory&Research,Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring
Money, politics and a future for the international financial system
No full textIn developing the architecture for a financial system, the challenge is to combine deregulation and safety nets against systemic failure with effective prudential regulation and oversight. The author analyzes three approaches to choosing an adequate regulatory framework for a financial system. a) Those most worried about panic and herd behavior tend to favor relatively extensive controls on financial institutions'activities, including controls on interest rates and on the volume and direction of lending. b) Those most concerned about moral hazard advocate abolishing controls and safety nets, seeing the solution is stronger market discipline and reduced powers and discretion for regulators. c) Mainstream opinion advocates a mix of measures, to both strengthen market discipline and improve regulatory oversight. The approach a county opts for depends on 1) which monetary and exchange rate regime it chooses, 2) whether it is more concerned about moral hazard or about panic and herd behavior, and 3) how the politics of reform shape its solutions. The author suggests a scenario for development of the global financial system over the next two or three decades that assumes that the final outcome will resemble the market solution - not because that is the optimal policy choice but because of how political weakness will interact with advances in settlement technology. In the author's scenario, the world moves toward a monetary system in which fixed exchange rate systems or de facto currency competition limit the power of central banks. This limits options for discretionary and open-ended liquidity support to help deal with systemic financial crises. The costs of inflexible exchange rates are moderated by new types of wage contracts, using units of account that are correlated with the shocks a particular industry or kind of contract faces -- thus maintaining the positive aspects of monetary systems with flexible nominal exchange rates. Mistrust in monetary authorities and the emergence of private settlements lead to a return of asset-backed money as the means of payment. The disciplines on financial systems come to resemble somewhat those of historical"free banking"systems, with financial institutions requiring high levels of equity and payments systems protected only by limited, fully funded safety nets.Banks&Banking Reform,Fiscal&Monetary Policy,Financial Intermediation,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Economic Theory&Research,Banks&Banking Reform,Economic Theory&Research,Macroeconomic Management,Financial Intermediation,Financial Economics
Il consiglio di amministrazione, la rotazione degli amministratori e la performance dell'impresa: l'esperienza italiana in una prospettiva comparata
No full textL’effetto del controllo familiare sulla performance delle imprese: una sintesi dell’evidenza empirica internazionale
No full textThe Effect of Family Control on Firm Value and Performance: Evidence from Continental Europe
No full text"We investigate the relation between ownership structure and firm performance in Continental Europe, using data from 675 publicly traded corporations in 11 countries. Although family-controlled corporations exhibit larger separation between control and cash-flow rights, our results do not support the hypothesis that family control hampers firm performance. Valuation and operating performance are significantly higher in founder-controlled corporations and in corporations controlled by descendants who sit on the board as non-executive directors. When a descendant takes the position of CEO, family-controlled companies are not statistically distinguishable from non-family firms in terms of valuation and performance." Copyright 2006 The Authors Journal compilation (c) 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Lo studio della ceramica archeologica e il manuale tecnico di Ninina Cuomo di Caprio
No full textAnalisi dell'opera della Cuomo di Caprio sulla ceramica in Archeologia, vista nell'ambito del grande sviluppo dell'interesse per questo tipo di manufatto in relazione alla ricostruzione storica
Finance for Growth: Policy Choices in a Volatile World
No full textUnderstanding just how finance contributes to development—and how good policy can help guarantee its contribution—has been the focus of a major research effort in recent years. This research has included systematic case-study analyses of the experiences of specific countries, as well as more recent econometric analyses of extensive cross-country data sets. Finance for Growth draws on this research and uses it to develop an integrated view of how financial sector policy can be used to foster growth, maintain stability and bring about poverty reduction.Financial sector development; financial regulation; globalization of finance; finance in developing countries
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