416 research outputs found
Finance and its reform : beyond laissez-faire
No full textThat the financial sector should be liberalized was the orthodox view in the mid-1970s, during a pendulum swing toward reliance on the free market. In the early 1980s, the pendulum swung back to the left, based partly on evidence - especially from Latin America - that overly rapid reform had real costs, and partly on an increased appreciation of financial market failure. Blind adherence to free market principles was no longer appropriate. Now a counter-counterrevolution is in sight, with some swing back toward the view that the market makes a mess of it, but the government makes it even worse. The authors agree that market-oriented financial systems appear to do a better job than systems with extensive government involvement, but contend that the assumption that perfect competition will solve all problems in finance - especially in banking - can be dangerous. Information problems, implicit or explicit government guarantees associated with the payments system make banks unique. Governments implicitly recognize banking's uniqueness - few allow just anyone to enter banking - but public pronouncements and observers'recommendations often favor a move to more competition. Perfect competition, however, is optimal under the assumption, among others, of no government guarantee. In fact, most governments differ only in how explicit they are about their deposit insurance schemes. The financial reforms most likely to succeed are those that give banks an incentive to engage in safe and sound banking. When excessive competition is allowed, the charter value of banking diminishes to the point that it is no longer profitable for bankers to behave prudently. A consideration of finance's role, and a look at how reforming economies have fared, suggest also that gradual reform is often to be preferred in this domain. Deregulation of credit markets and interest rates can be counterproductive in unstable macroeconomic conditions and when banks are unsophisticated or have weak balance sheets. And changes in the charter value may evolve only slowly after reform. Faster progress and greater efforts should be made, however, in bank supervision and regulation and in institutional development, including accounting, auditing, legal and judicial reform, and training (of bankers and other finance professionals). In sum, many economies would benefit from less government intervention in financial markets, but the prescription should not be abrupt or total government withdrawal from the financial sector. Rather than intervening heavily in credit allocation decisions, governments should focus on doing what only they can do: providing an enabling environment for the private financial and nonfinancial sectors, and ensuring that financial operations are safe and sound.Environmental Economics&Policies,Banks&Banking Reform,Financial Intermediation,Economic Theory&Research,Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring
Reforming finance in transitional socialist economies : avoiding the path from shell money to shell games
No full textIn the late 1980s, transitional socialist economies (TSEs) in Central and Eastern Europe were only somewhat more sophisticated than shell money systems: savings books or currency had to be used for most transactions and there was no risk assessment, information monitoring and acquisition, or portfolio management. The TSEs have moved toward a two-tiered banking system but they lag in the development of competitive, market-based financial systems. In several TSEs the financial system seems to be part of a shell game to hide the losses of the real economy. The authors argue that rapid, successful economic reform requires putting the shell game to an end. They review several contentious issues of financial reform in the TSEs, especially issues involving macrofinance, corporate finance, the internal debt problems, and the need to build efficient banks. The authors contend that the banks should be"cleaned up"when they are privatized, to prevent the quick reemergence of debt problems. They believe that either of the proposed alternatives for shaping financial systems in the TSEs - very highly capitalized banking or narrow banking - would minimize the need for future support. Either alternative would reduce leverage in the TSEs and provide more financial stability. But taking concerns about moral hazard to an extreme - prohibiting debt finance - could starve new firms for credit and limit economic growth.Economic Theory&Research,Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring,Environmental Economics&Policies,Banks&Banking Reform,Financial Intermediation
Safe and sound banking : a role for countercyclical regulatory requirements ?
No full textMost explanations of the crisis of 2007-2009 emphasize the role of the preceding boom in real estate and asset markets in a variety of advanced countries. As a result, an idea that is gaining support among various groups is how to make Basel II or any regulatory regime less pro-cyclical. This paper addresses the rationale for and likely contribution of such policies. Making provisioning (or capital) requirements countercyclical is one way potentially to address pro-cyclicality, and accordingly it looks at the efforts of the authorities in Spain and Colombia, two countries in which countercyclical provisioning has been tried, to see what the track record has been. As explained there, these experiments have been at best too recent and limited to put much weight on them, but they are much less favorable for supporting this practice than is commonly admitted. The paper then addresses concerns and implementation issues with countercyclical capital or provisioning requirements, including why their impact might be expected to be limited, and concludes with recommendations for developing country officials who want to learn how to make their financial systems less exposed to crises.Banks&Banking Reform,Access to Finance,Financial Intermediation,Debt Markets,Emerging Markets
Practical guidelines for effective bank resolution
No full textThis study adopts a practical approach in developing a set of guidelines on designing a bank resolution framework and implementing efficient bank resolution methods in Latin America. It identifies six pillars that are useful for establishing a bank resolution framework. The study aims to guide policymakers choose from a set of bank resolution methods, by outlining their advantages and disadvantages and establishing efficiency requirements. The focus is on the good-bank/bad-bank approach, which is a type of purchase and assumption mechanism that has increasingly become part of the newer legal frameworks in Latin America. The good-bank/bad-bank approach is an effective bank resolution method because it can be very successful in meeting certain efficiency criteria, including the minimization of contagion costs and preservation of business.Banks&Banking Reform,,Access to Finance,Debt Markets,Bankruptcy and Resolution of Financial Distress
Safe and sound banking in developing countries : we're not in Kansas anymore
No full textDrawing on earlier work, the author reviews some of the salient facts about the boom in banking busts in developing countries. He then reviews policy responses taken by authorities in some of the"early"crisis countries, and considers a wider menu of responses -in particular the currently popular suggestion that promulgating an International Banking Standard would significantly improve the safety and soundness of banking systems in developing countries. Such a standard is not without appeal, but other approaches are probably necessary in developing countries where risks are usually greater, financial institutions are less diversified, markets are less transparent, supervision is weak, and other ingredients critical to sound banking are either missing or scarcer than in industrial countries. The author calls for a multi-pillar approach to safe and sound banking, one that would: (1) focus attention on factors that restrict banks'ability and willingness to diversify risk; and (2) Give three key groups -owners (and managers), the market (including uninsured debtholders and other possible co-owners), and supervisors- more incentive and ability to monitor banks and ensure their prudent corporate governance.Banks&Banking Reform,Labor Policies,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring,Financial Intermediation,Banks&Banking Reform,Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring,Financial Intermediation,Economic Theory&Research,Settlement of Investment Disputes
Beyond capital ideals : restoring banking stability
No full textThe authors examine why emerging markets, in particular, are susceptible to and affected by financial difficulties. They show that these difficulties have a richer, more complex structure than they are sometimes believed to have - with marked information asymmetries and substantial volatility. The sources of heightened regulatory failure in emerging markets in recent years include the volatility of real and nominal shocks, the difficulty of operating in uncharted territory after financial liberalization and other changes in regime, and the political pressures that can inhibit the enforcement of prudential regulation. The authors discuss what stronger regulation can and cannot accomplish, as well as options to improve the incentive structure for bankers, regulators, and other market participants. They probe the shortcomings of a regulatory paradigm that relies mainly on supervised capital adequacy and discuss the possible intermittent application of supplementary"blunt instruments"as an interim solution while longer-term reforms are being put in place. Certain well-worn messages remain valid, but are respected more in theory than in practice. There would be fewer problems, the authors say, if there were: 1) more diversification; 2) more balanced financial structures (for example, as between debt and equity); 3) more foreign banks in emerging markets'financial systems; and 4) better enforcement of both contracts and regulations. Participants in the financial sector will constantly try to get around rules that limit their profitability, so regulation must be seen as an evolutionary struggle. Prevention of financial failure is not costless, and a heavy repressive hand is not warranted. But a richer regulatory palette can be used to protect financial systems more successfully against crisis while preserving the systems'growth-enhancing effectiveness.Environmental Economics&Policies,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Financial Intermediation,Banks&Banking Reform,Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring,Economic Theory&Research,Banks&Banking Reform,Financial Intermediation,Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring,Environmental Economics&Policies
Financial regulation and performance : cross-country evidence
No full textCostly bank failures in the past two decades have focused attention on the need to find ways to improve the performance of different countries'financial systems. Belief is overwhelming that financial systems can be improved but there is little empirical evidence to support any specific advice about regulatory and supervisory reform. With scant cross-country comparisons of financial regulatory and supervisory systems, economists cannot decide how to correct incentives and moral hazard problems in developing economies--whether, for example, to require higher (and more narrowly defined) capital-to-asset ratios, to mandate stricter definition and disclosure of non-performing loans, to require that subordinated debt be issued, or to install world-class supervision. Proposed reforms usually involve changes in financial regulations and supervisory standards, but many pressing questions about reform remain unanswered. Making use of a new database, the authors come up with brief answers to three key questions: Do countries with relatively weak governments and bureaucratic systems impose harsher regulatory restrictions on bank activities? Yes. Do countries with more restrictive regulatory regimes have poorly functioning banking systems. No--or at least the evidence is mixed. Do countries with more restrictive regulatory systems have less probability of suffering a banking crisis? No. In fact, the reverse is true. In countries where banks'securities activities are restricted, the likelihood of a banking crisis is greater, other things being equal.Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Banks&Banking Reform,Financial Intermediation,Environmental Economics&Policies,Banks&Banking Reform,Financial Intermediation,Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring,Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research
Rethinking Bank Regulation – Till Angels Govern
No full textJames R. Barth – Gerard Caprio, Jr. – Ross Levine
Rethinking Bank Regulation – Till Angels Govern
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 200
Safe and Sound Banking: A Role for Countercyclical Regulatory Requirements?
No full textMost explanations of the crisis of 2007-2009 emphasize the role of the preceding boom in real estate and asset markets in a variety of advanced countries. As a result, an idea that is gaining support among various groups is how to make Basel II or any regulatory regime less procyclical. This paper addresses the rationale for and likely contribution of such policies. Making provisioning (or capital) requirements countercyclical is one way potentially to address procyclicality, and accordingly it looks at the efforts of the authorities in Spain and Colombia, two countries in which countercyclical provisioning has been tried, to see what the track record has been. As explained there, these experiments have been at best too recent and limited to put much weight on them, but they are much less favorable for supporting this practice than is commonly admitted. The paper then addresses concerns and implementation issues with countercyclical capital or provisioning requirements, including why their impact might be expected to be limited, and concludes with recommendations for developing country officials who want to learn how to make their financial systems less exposed to crises.Financial crisis, Securitization, Regulation and Supervision, Safety Nets
Financial Regulation in a Changing World: Lessons from the Recent Crisis
No full textThe current crisis is leading many to re-think the role of finance and how it snew. This paper reviews what was regarded as the conventional wisdom on financial regulation prior to the 2007 onset of the crisis, briefly recounts some of the main factors behind the events of the 2007-09 years, and then turns to lessons for regulatory reform. At some point in the 1990s, the financial systems of high-income countries seemed to be functioning well and withstood some significant shocks, yet by 2007 much had changed. However, the regulatory structure did not change in response, and in fact eased in such a way as to exacerbate the instability that was subsequently experienced. A key theme is that financial regulation needs to be more dynamic, taking account of financial innovations and how they affect the sector. No such approach to regulation seems possible without greater accountability for regulators and attention to the incentives for those in the sector and for those who regulate it.Financial crisis, Securitization, Regulation and Supervision, Safety Nets
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