124,551 research outputs found
Reforming Cote d'Ivoire's cocoa marketing and pricing system
No full textCote d'Ivoire has historically taxed cocoa producers. Market reforms over the past 10 years have somewhat succeeded in making domestic and foreign marketing more transparent and competitive. But they have not done much to raise producer prices in real terms or as a share of the FOB (free on board) price. Maintaining fixed producer prices and marketing costs and margins has encouraged rent-seeking and led to efficiency losses. New reform will fully liberalize the country's export marketing system by eliminating public management of exports. This means the end of mandatory export authorization, of public forward sales, and of fixed minimum producer prices and marketing margins. The new reform is expected to improve producers'incomes. The authors find that the benefits from the new reform (in terms of lower implicit taxes, lower marketing costs and margins, and higher producer prices) will outweigh the costs from eliminating public forward sales and fixed producer prices. Results from a general equilibrium model indicate that reducing export taxes would have a small negative effect on aggregate income but would improve income distribution for poorer rural areas. The fact that Cote d'Ivoire has market power in the world cocoa market justifies a higher optimal export tax than the current one. But raising export taxes may eventually reduce its market share and worsen income distribution, at the expense of the poorer rural sector.Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,Markets and Market Access,Labor Policies,Consumption,Markets and Market Access,Access to Markets,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies
Cote d'Ivoire : competitiveness, Cocoa, and the real exchange rate
No full textThis paper explores competitiveness of Cote d'Ivoire's economy over a long period of 1960-2003 and its link with cocoa prices. The main conclusions are as follows. First, using four measures of real effective exchange rate (REER) for the 1960-2002 period, we track the evolution of REER and conclude, inter alia, that until 2003, REER remained well below its 1994 level. Second, we find that based on our measure of the multilateral REER with dynamic weights, which covers most recorded trade, France no longer dominates Cote d'Ivoire's trade. Instead, Cote d'Ivoire has diversified its set of trading partners. Unfortunately, it has also specialized in one export product, raw cocoa. This paper aims to contribute to the question to what extent do cocoa prices affect Cote d'Ivoire's competitiveness in world trade? Third, the answer to this question is that cocoa prices are an important determinant of Cote d'Ivoire's competitiveness. Similar to the case of a classic"Dutch Disease,"increases in the real world price of a"natural resource"(i.e., cocoa) tend to result in the appreciation of the CFA franc and a loss in competitiveness. Econometric tests further confirm that 1994 was a"break-point"not only for growth and productivity (as documented in the two related papers) but also for trade competitiveness. Recent productivity per worker trends versus wages also seem to indicate slow growth in 1996-2000, without major improvement in competitiveness.Economic Theory&Research,Currencies and Exchange Rates,Emerging Markets,Markets and Market Access,Macroeconomic Management
Rent-sharing, hold-up, and manufacturing wages in Cote d'Ivoire
No full textLabor costs in Francophone Africa are considered high by the standards of low-income countries, at least in the formal sector. Are they a brake on industrialization, or the result of successful enterprise development? Are they imposed on firms by powerful unions, or government regulations, or a by-product of good firm performance? The authors empirically analyze what determines manufacturing wages in Cote d'Ivoire, using an unbalanced panel of individual wages that allows them to control for observable firm-specific effects. They test the rent-sharing, and hold-up theories of wage determination, as well as some aspects of efficiency-wage theories. Their results lean in favor of both rent-sharing, and hold-up, suggesting that workers have some bargaining power, and that in Cote d'Ivoire workers can force renegotiation of labor contracts, in response to new investments.Economic Theory&Research,Public Health Promotion,Health Monitoring&Evaluation,Labor Policies,Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,Health Monitoring&Evaluation,Health Economics&Finance,Statistical&Mathematical Sciences
The lucky few amidst economic decline : distributional change in Cote d'Ivoire as seen through panel data sets, 1985-88
No full textCote d'Ivoire's economy declined drastically in the second half of the 1980s. The incidence of poverty climbed from 30 percent in 1985 to 35 percent in 1987, and jumped to 46 percent in 1988. But how widespread was the collapse in living standards? Did a lucky few escape the decline? Using panels of data from the Cote d'Ivoire Living Standards Survey (for 1985-86, 1986-87, and 1987-88) allowed the authors to track the level of living for the same households over successive years. These panels had not yet been used to examine the dynamics of poverty in the second half of the 1980s. They find that two-period poverty was generally less than poverty measured from single-period snapshots. Surprisingly, a significant number of the poorest of the poor improve their status over the two years of the panel, even though there was a downturn in the average fortunes of the poor. The authors find that thelucky few are not so few. They were wide-spread regionally - though in some socioeconomic groupings, the poor had a greater chance to escape poverty amidst the general decline in living standards. Finer investigation of the characteristics of these groupings is hampered somewhat by the small sample sizes of the panels.Poverty Assessment,Poverty Reduction Strategies,Services&Transfers to Poor,Safety Nets and Transfers,Rural Poverty Reduction
Distortions to Agricultural Incentives in Cote d’Ivoire
No full textDistorted incentives, agricultural and trade policy reforms, national agricultural development, Agricultural and Food Policy, International Relations/Trade, F13, F14, Q17, Q18,
Letter re: aerial demonstration
No full textLetter from Colonel N. L. Cote to Amon Carter inviting Carter to come to an Aerial Demonstration on June 2nd, 194
The welfare effects of private sector participation in Guinea's urban water supply
No full textIn 1989 the government of Guinea enacted far-reaching reform of its water sector, which had been dominated by a poorly run public agency. The government signed a lease contract for operations and maintenance with a private operator, making a separate public enterprise responsible for ownershipof assets and investment. Although based on a successful model that had operated in Cote d'Ivoire for nearly 30 years, the reform had many highly innovative features. It is being transplanted to several other developing countries, so the authors evaluate its successes and failures in the early years of reform. They present standard performance measures and results from a cost-benefit analysis to assess reform's net effect on various stakeholders in the sector. They conclude that, compared with what might have been expected under continued public ownership, reform benefited consumers, the government, and, to a lesser extent, the foreign owners or the private operator. Most sector performance indicators improved, but some problems remain. The three most troublesome areas are water that is unaccounted for (there are many illegal connections and the quality of infrastructure is poor), poor collection rates, and high prices. The weak institutional environment makes it difficult to improve collection rates, but the government could take some steps to correct the problem. To begin with, it could pay its own bills on time. Also, the legislature could authorize the collection of unpaid bills from private individuals.Water Conservation,Environmental Economics&Policies,Water and Industry,Economic Theory&Research,Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Environmental Economics&Policies,Water and Industry,Water Supply and Sanitation Governance and Institutions,Water Conservation,Town Water Supply and Sanitation
Alien Registration- Cote, Jean L. (Sanford, York County)
No full texthttps://digitalmaine.com/alien_docs/2960/thumbnail.jp
Alien Registration- Cote, Marie L. (Lewiston, Androscoggin County)
No full texthttps://digitalmaine.com/alien_docs/29279/thumbnail.jp
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