1,720,986 research outputs found
The role of monitoring of corruption in a simple endogenous growth model
No full textThis article analyzes the relationship between economic growth and the monitoring
of corruption. In our theoretical model, we derive a nonlinear relationship between the level of monitoring and economic growth, as well as between corruption and economic
growth. At low monitoring levels, the economy experiences widespread corruption and
medium growth rates, whereas no corruption occurs at intermediate monitoring levels,
but low growth rates are recorded. At high monitoring levels, no corruption takes
place and high growth rates are observed. The model is estimated using a dynamic
panel data approach for Italy. Empirical results support the theoretical mode
Non-compliant behaviour in public procurement: an evolutionary model with endogenous monitoring
Full text linkIn recent years, the study of the evolution of non-compliant behaviour in public procurement has been widely developed due to the growing economic relevance of this phenomenon. When such a question is formalized in terms of a dynamical model, new insights can be pursued, related to the possible evolution from a situation with low dishonesty level to high dishonesty level or vice versa. The present model considers an evolutionary adaptation process explaining whether honest or dishonest behaviour prevails in society at any given time by assuming endogenous monitoring by the State. We will distinguish between a scenario in which firms converge to monomorphic configurations (all honest or all dishonest) and a scenario in which firms converge to polymorphic compositions (that is with coexistence of both groups), depending on the relevant parameters. By making use of both analytical tools and numerical simulations, the present work aims at explaining the effectiveness of economic policies to reduce or eliminate non-compliant behaviour. Social stigma is found to play a key role: if the “inner attitude toward honesty” of a country is not strong enough, then dishonesty cannot be ruled out. However, increasing both the fine level attached to dishonest behaviour and the monitoring effort by the State can reduce asymptotic dishonesty levels and escape form the dishonesty trap
Non-compliant behaviour in public procurement: an evolutionary model with endogenous monitoring
Full text linkn recent years, the study of the evolution of non-compliant behaviour in public procurement has been widely developed due to the growing economic relevance of this phenomenon. When such a question is formalized in terms of a dynamical model, new insights can be pursued, related to the possible evolution from a situation with low dishonesty level to high dishonesty level or vice versa. The present model considers an evolutionary adaptation process explaining whether honest or dishonest behaviour prevails in society at any given time by assuming endogenous monitoring by the State. We will distinguish between a scenario in which firms converge to monomorphic configurations (all honest or all dishonest) and a scenario in which firms converge to polymorphic compositions (that is with coexistence of both groups), depending on the relevant parameters. By making use of both analytical tools and numerical simulations, the present work aims at explaining the effectiveness of economic policies to reduce or eliminate non-compliant behaviour. Social stigma is found to play a key role: if the "inner attitude toward honesty" of a country is not strong enough, then dishonesty cannot be ruled out. However, increasing both the fine level attached to dishonest behaviour and the monitoring effort by the State can reduce asymptotic dishonesty levels and escape form the dishonesty trap
The role of grandparents in grandchildren's education for human capital accumulation in an overlapping generations model
Full text linkWe develop an overlapping generations model to explore the role of grandparents in grandchildren's education and its impact on human capital growth. We examine the quantity-quality (Q-Q) trade-off faced by parents in choosing the number and education of children, incorporating an active role for grandparents. Findings underscore the significance of the elderly in human capital accumulation, fertility, and economic growth. When grandparents invest more time, resources are freed, fostering greater human capital growth and mitigating the effects of the Q-Q trade-off
Revealing bifurcation mechanisms in a 2D nonsmooth map by means of the first return map
No full textIn this work, our goal is to show how a properly constructed first return map can help
to describe the dynamics of a two-dimensional piecewise smooth map. In particular,
to understand some formation principles of the bifurcation structure of its parameter
space. The considered map is important from the applied point of view: it models
the effects of fraud in a public procurement procedure and allows one to investigate
whether honest or dishonest behavior prevails in society. We present the bifurcation
structure of the map formed by the periodicity regions associated with attracting cycles
of different periods. By means of the first return map, we show that the boundaries of
these regions are related to border collision bifurcations typical for nonsmooth maps, as
well as standard fold and flip bifurcations. The main economic result is related to the
emergence of unexpected changes in qualitative non-compliant behavior over time
Industrial structure and evasion dynamics, is there any link?
No full textWe propose a model to describe the link between industrial structure and evasion dynamics in a heterogeneous setting, in which the monitoring efforts put in place by the State to fight evasion of firms depend on the market share of each firm. More precisely, while the convenience to evade taxes is determined as a Nash solution of an incomplete information game, a differentiated monitoring activity related to market concentration represents the original contribution of this work w.r.t. previous studies on the topic. As empirical evidence shows, high dimensional firms are more likely to be monitored, hence, when dynamics are considered, evasion and industrial structure evolution are strictly related. In fact, by combining analytical findings and simulation results, our work shows that: (1) firms with a sufficiently large market share, that is, larger than a certain dimensional threshold, comply with fiscal rules, thus confirming empirical evidence; (2) this dimensional threshold changes with the competition level between firms in a nonlinear way; (3) evasion affects the market structure, so that markets with high (low) competition tend to increase (decrease) their concentration over time; (4) evasion is affected by market structure and is minimum in moderately concentrated markets
Size-Dependent Enforcement, Tax Evasion and Dimensional Trap
No full textSize-dependent tax enforcement is quite widespread worldwide, but the literature on its effects over firms’ behaviour is very scarce. By assuming different audit probabilities for small and large firms, we propose a dynamic model to study the consequences of size-dependent monitoring level on a firm’ fiscal compliance and its decision to invest and grow in a single-firm perspective. By combining analytical findings and simulation results, we show that: (1) under certain conditions, a dimensional trap may emerge, as
small firms have no advantage in growing and prefer to remain small to avoid stronger enforcement; (2) audit activity and fine levels are important tools available to the State to fight evasion, but a careful calibration is required not to incur undesired effects
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