61 research outputs found
Capacitated Dynamic Programming: Faster Knapsack and Graph Algorithms
No full textOne of the most fundamental problems in Computer Science is the Knapsack problem. Given a set of n items with different weights and values, it asks to pick the most valuable subset whose total weight is below a capacity threshold T. Despite its wide applicability in various areas in Computer Science, Operations Research, and Finance, the best known running time for the problem is O(T n). The main result of our work is an improved algorithm running in time O(TD), where D is the number of distinct weights. Previously, faster runtimes for Knapsack were only possible when both weights and values are bounded by M and V respectively, running in time O(nMV) [Pisinger, 1999]. In comparison, our algorithm implies a bound of O(n M^2) without any dependence on V, or O(n V^2) without any dependence on M. Additionally, for the unbounded Knapsack problem, we provide an algorithm running in time O(M^2) or O(V^2). Both our algorithms match recent conditional lower bounds shown for the Knapsack problem [Marek Cygan et al., 2017; Marvin Künnemann et al., 2017].
We also initiate a systematic study of general capacitated dynamic programming, of which Knapsack is a core problem. This problem asks to compute the maximum weight path of length k in an edge- or node-weighted directed acyclic graph. In a graph with m edges, these problems are solvable by dynamic programming in time O(k m), and we explore under which conditions the dependence on k can be eliminated. We identify large classes of graphs where this is possible and apply our results to obtain linear time algorithms for the problem of k-sparse Delta-separated sequences. The main technical innovation behind our results is identifying and exploiting concavity that appears in relaxations and subproblems of the tasks we consider
A size-free CLT for poisson multinomials and its applications
No full textAn (n,k)-Poisson Multinomial Distribution (PMD) is the distribution of the sum of n independent random vectors supported on the set Bk={e1,…,ek} of standard basis vectors in ℝk. We show that any (n,k)-PMD is poly(k/σ)-close in total variation distance to the (appropriately discretized) multi-dimensional Gaussian with the same first two moments, removing the dependence on n from the Central Limit Theorem of Valiant and Valiant. Interestingly, our CLT is obtained by bootstrapping the Valiant-Valiant CLT itself through the structural characterization of PMDs shown in recent work by Daskalakis, Kamath and Tzamos. In turn, our stronger CLT can be leveraged to obtain an efficient PTAS for approximate Nash equilibria in anonymous games, significantly improving the state of the art, and matching qualitatively the running time dependence on n and 1/є of the best known algorithm for two-strategy anonymous games. Our new CLT also enables the construction of covers for the set of (n,k)-PMDs, which are proper and whose size is shown to be essentially optimal. Our cover construction combines our CLT with the Shapley-Folkman theorem and recent sparsification results for Laplacian matrices by Batson, Spielman, and Srivastava. Our cover size lower bound is based on an algebraic geometric construction. Finally, leveraging the structural properties of the Fourier spectrum of PMDs we show that these distributions can be learned from Ok(1/є2) samples in polyk(1/є)-time, removing the quasi-polynomial dependence of the running time on 1/є from prior work.Microsoft Research. New Faculty FellowshipNational Science Foundation (U.S.) (Award CCF-0953960 (CAREER))National Science Foundation (U.S.). Division of Computing and Communication Foundations (CCF-1551875)United States. Office of Naval Research (grant N0 0014-12-1-0999)Simons Award for Graduate Students in Theoretical Computer Scienc
Tight Hardness Results for Maximum Weight Rectangles
No full textGiven n weighted points (positive or negative) in d dimensions, what is the axis-aligned box which maximizes the total weight of the points it contains?
The best known algorithm for this problem is based on a reduction to a related problem, the Weighted Depth problem [Chan, FOCS, 2013], and runs in time O(n^d). It was conjectured [Barbay et al., CCCG, 2013] that this runtime is tight up to subpolynomial factors. We answer this conjecture affirmatively by providing a matching conditional lower bound. We also provide conditional lower bounds for the special case when points are arranged in a grid (a well studied problem known as Maximum Subarray problem) as well as for other related problems.
All our lower bounds are based on assumptions that the best known algorithms for the All-Pairs Shortest Paths problem (APSP) and for the Max-Weight k-Clique problem in edge-weighted graphs are essentially optimal
Does Information Revelation Improve Revenue?
No full textWe study the problem of optimal auction design in a valuation model, explicitly motivated by online ad auctions, in which there is two-way informational asymmetry, in the sense that private information is available to both the seller (the item type) and the bidders (their type), and the value of each bidder for the item depends both on his own and the item's type. Importantly, we allow arbitrary auction formats involving, potentially, several rounds of signaling from the seller and decisions by the bidders, and seek to find the optimum co-design of signaling and auction (we call this optimum the "optimum augmented auction"). We characterize exactly the optimum augmented auction for our valuation model by establishing its equivalence with a multi-item Bayesian auction with additive bidders. Surprisingly, in the optimum augmented auction there is no signaling whatsoever, and in fact the seller need not access the available information about the item type until after the bidder chooses his bid. Suboptimal solutions to this problem, which have appeared in the recent literature, are shown to correspond to well-studied ways to approximate multi-item auctions by simpler formats, such as grand-bundling (this corresponds to Myerson's auction without any information revelation), selling items separately (this corresponds to Myerson's auction preceded by full information revelation as in [Fu et al. 2012]), and fractional partitioning (this corresponds to Myerson's auction preceded by optimal signaling). Consequently, all these solutions are separated by large approximation gaps from the optimum revenue.United States. Office of Naval Research (grant N0 0014-12-1-0999)National Science Foundation (U.S.) (Award CCF-0953960 (CAREER))National Science Foundation (U.S.). Division of Computing and Communication Foundations (CCF-1551875)National Science Foundation (U.S.). Division of Computing and Communication Foundations (CCF-1408635)Simons Award for Graduate Students in Theoretical Computer Scienc
Strategyproof Facility Location for Concave Cost Functions
No full textWe consider k-Facility Location games, where n strategic agents report their locations on the real line and a mechanism maps them to k facilities. Each agent seeks to minimize his connection cost, given by a nonnegative increasing function of his distance to the nearest facility. Departing from previous work, that mostly considers the identity cost function, we are interested in mechanisms without payments that are (group) strategyproof for any given cost function, and achieve a good approximation ratio for the social cost and/or the maximum cost of the agents. We present a randomized mechanism, called Equal Cost, which is group strategyproof and achieves a bounded approximation ratio for all k and n, for any given concave cost function. The approximation ratio is at most 2 for Max Cost and at most n for Social Cost. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first mechanism with a bounded approximation ratio for instances with k ≥ 3 facilities and any number of agents. Our result implies an interesting separation between deterministic mechanisms, whose approximation ratio for Max Cost jumps from 2 to unbounded when k increases from 2 to 3, and randomized mechanisms, whose approximation ratio remains at most 2 for all k. On the negative side, we exclude the possibility of a mechanism with the properties of Equal Cost for strictly convex cost functions. We also present a randomized mechanism, called Pick the Loser, which applies to instances with k facilities and only n=k+1 agents. For any given concave cost function, Pick the Loser is strongly group strategyproof and achieves an approximation ratio of 2 for Social Cost.AlgoNo
Graph Connectivity with Noisy Queries
No full textGraph connectivity is a fundamental combinatorial optimization problem that arises in many practical applications, where usually a spanning subgraph of a network is used for its operation. However, in the real world, links may fail unexpectedly deeming the networks non-operational, while checking whether a link is damaged is costly and possibly erroneous. After an event that has damaged an arbitrary subset of the edges, the network operator must find a spanning tree of the network using non-damaged edges by making as few checks as possible.
Motivated by such questions, we study the problem of finding a spanning tree in a network, when we only have access to noisy queries of the form "Does edge e exist?". We design efficient algorithms, even when edges fail adversarially, for all possible error regimes; 2-sided error (where any answer might be erroneous), false positives (where "no" answers are always correct) and false negatives (where "yes" answers are always correct). In the first two regimes we provide efficient algorithms and give matching lower bounds for general graphs. In the False Negative case we design efficient algorithms for large interesting families of graphs (e.g. bounded treewidth, sparse). Using the previous results, we provide tight algorithms for the practically useful family of planar graphs in all error regimes
Approximating Pandora’s Box with Correlations
No full textWe revisit the classic Pandora’s Box (PB) problem under correlated distributions on the box values. Recent work of [Shuchi Chawla et al., 2020] obtained constant approximate algorithms for a restricted class of policies for the problem that visit boxes in a fixed order. In this work, we study the complexity of approximating the optimal policy which may adaptively choose which box to visit next based on the values seen so far.
Our main result establishes an approximation-preserving equivalence of PB to the well studied Uniform Decision Tree (UDT) problem from stochastic optimization and a variant of the Min-Sum Set Cover (MSSC_f) problem. For distributions of support m, UDT admits a log m approximation, and while a constant factor approximation in polynomial time is a long-standing open problem, constant factor approximations are achievable in subexponential time [Ray Li et al., 2020]. Our main result implies that the same properties hold for PB and MSSC_f.
We also study the case where the distribution over values is given more succinctly as a mixture of m product distributions. This problem is again related to a noisy variant of the Optimal Decision Tree which is significantly more challenging. We give a constant-factor approximation that runs in time n^Õ(m²/ε²) when the mixture components on every box are either identical or separated in TV distance by ε
The complexity of optimal mechanism design
No full textThesis (S.M.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, 2013.Cataloged from PDF version of thesis.Includes bibliographical references (p. 63-64).Myerson's seminal work provides a computationally efficient revenue-optimal auction for selling one item to multiple bidders. Generalizing this work to selling multiple items at once has been a central question in economics and algorithmic game theory, but its complexity has remained poorly understood. We answer this question by showing that a revenue-optimal auction in multi-item settings cannot be found and implemented computationally efficiently, unless ZPP = P # p. This is true even for a single additive bidder whose values for the items are independently distributed on two rational numbers with rational probabilities. Our result is very general: we show that it is hard to compute any encoding of an optimal auction of any format (direct or indirect, truthful or non-truthful) that can be implemented in expected polynomial time. In particular, under well-believed complexity-theoretic assumptions, revenue-optimization in very simple multi-item settings can only be tractably approximated. We note that our hardness result applies to randomized mechanisms in a very simple setting, and is not an artifact of introducing combinatorial structure to the problem by allowing correlation among item values, introducing combinatorial valuations, or requiring the mechanism to be deterministic (whose structure is readily combinatorial). Our proof is enabled by a flow interpretation of the solutions of an exponential-size linear program for revenue maximization with an additional supermodularity constraint.by Christos Tzamos.S.M
Game Theory based Peer Grading Mechanisms for MOOCs
No full textAn efficient peer grading mechanism is proposed for grading the multitude of assignments in online courses. This novel approach is based on game theory and mechanism design. A set of assumptions and a mathematical model is ratified to simulate the dominant strategy behavior of students in a given mechanism. A benchmark function accounting for grade accuracy and workload is established to quantitatively compare effectiveness and scalability of various mechanisms. After multiple iterations of mechanisms under increasingly realistic assumptions, three are proposed: Calibration, Improved Calibration, and Deduction. The Calibration mechanism performs as predicted by game theory when tested in an online crowd-sourced experiment, but fails when students are assumed to communicate. The Improved Calibration mechanism addresses this assumption, but at the cost of more effort spent grading. The Deduction mechanism performs relatively well in the benchmark, outperforming the Calibration, Improved Calibration, traditional automated, and traditional peer grading systems. The mathematical model and benchmark opens the way for future derivative works to be performed and compared
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