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Quantum Monism. An Assessment
Full text linkMonism is roughly the view that there is only one fundamental entity. One of
the most powerful argument in its favor comes from quantum mechanics. Extant discussions
of quantum monism are framed independently of any interpretation of the
quantum theory. In contrast, this paper argues that matters of interpretation play a crucial
role when assessing the viability ofmonism in the quantumrealm. I consider four different
interpretations: modal interpretations, Bohmian mechanics, many worlds interpretations,
and wavefunction realism. In particular, I extensively argue for the following claim:
several interpretations of QM do not support monism at a more serious scrutiny, or do so
only with further problematic assumptions, or even support different versions of it
On the Possibility of Submergence
Full text linkIt is widely agreed that emergence is metaphysically possible. What about the
converse, that is, submergence? Is it metaphysically possible as well? This is
a substantive question that has been either utterly neglected (an exception is
Bohn 2012) or quickly answered in the negative (Schaffer 2010). This neglect
is not only significant in itself; the (im)possibility of submergence plays a
crucial role in hotly debated topics in metaphysics, for example, the debate
over Monism and Pluralism. This article is intended to prompt a discussion
about metaphysical submergence.
In particular I will (i) provide examples of submergent properties, (ii) argue
that these are metaphysically possible and finally (iii) propose a pluralist
argument from submergence
Composition Identity and Emergence
Full text linkComposition as Identity (CAI) is the thesis that a whole is,
strictly and literally, identical to its parts, considered collectively. McDaniel
[2008] argues against CAI in that it prohibits emergent properties. Recently
Sider [2014] exploited the resources of plural logic and extensional mereology
to undermine McDaniel’s argument. He shows that CAI identifies exten-
sionally equivalent pluralities he calls it the Collapse Principle (CP)
and then shows how this identification rescues CAI from the emergentist
argument. In this paper I first give a new generalized version of both the
arguments. It is more general in that it does not presuppose an atomistic
mereology. I then go on to argue that the consequences of CP are rather
radical. It entails mereological nihilism, the view that there are only mere-
ological atoms. I finally show that, given a mild assumption about property
instantiation, namely that there are no un-instantiated properties, this ar-
gument entails that CAI and emergent properties are incompatible after all
Failure or Boredom. The pendulum of Composition is Identity
Full text linkThis paper provides new arguments for the following claim: either (i) strong composition as identity cannot retain the full strength of both the logical principles of one-one identity (namely, Equivalence
and Leibniz’s law) and its semantical principles (namely, Coreferentiality) or (ii) it only delivers cases of boring composition in that it entails mereological nihilism
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