258 research outputs found
U.S. President Barack Obama introduces the Economic Recovery Advisory Board
No full textPresident Barack Obama introduces the Economic Recovery Advisory Board. President Obama opens the speech by referencing the record 600 thousand unemployed announced in the last month. Obama announces the Economic Recovery Advisory Board, saying "A historic crisis calls for a historic response." Obama will meet regularly with this informing counsel, which is to be lead by Paul Volcker
The Next Financial Crisis
No full textThe examination of U.S. crises reveals that the current financial crisis follows past patterns. An investment bubble creates excess demand for new financing instruments. During the railroad bubbles of the nineteenth century loans were issued at a pace higher than many companies could pay back. The current housing bubble originated from issuing sub-prime mortgages that assume that housing prices would only rise. The increased demand for credit induces financial innovations and instruments that circumvent existing regulations. Inevitably, the bubble bursts. The history of financial crises teaches that policy reforms and new regulations cannot prevent future financial crises.Financial Crises; Financial Regulations and Reforms; Banking Panics; Banking Runs; Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Crises; Bankruptcies; Federal Reserve Bank; Subprime Mortgage; Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP); Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDO); Mortgage Backed Securities (MBO); Glass-Steagall Act; J.P. Morgan Chase; Bear Stearns; Augustus Heinze; Timothy Geithner; Paul Volcker
Les vrayes centuries et propheties de maistre Michel Nosatradamus ... ; avec la vie d l'autheur.
No full textMode of access: Internet.Datos de edición preceden a "avec la vie d l'autheur"Sign.: a-b8, A-M8, N4, )a(-)b(8, )c(4
Three Great American Disinflations
No full textIn this paper, we examine three famous episodes of deliberate deflation (or disinflation) in U.S. history, including episodes following the Civil War, World War I, and the Volcker disinflation of the early 1980s. These episodes were associated with widely divergent effects on the real economy, which we attribute both to differences in the policy actions undertaken, and to the transparency and credibility of the monetary authorities. We attempt to account for the salient features of each episode within the context of a stylized DSGE model. Our model simulations indicate how a more predictable policy of gradual deflation could have helped avoid the sharp post-WWI depression. But our analysis also suggests that the strong argument for gradualism under a transparent monetary regime becomes less persuasive if the monetary authority lacks credibility; in this case, an aggressive policy stance (as under Volcker) can play a useful signalling role by making a policy shift more apparent to private agents.DSGE Model, Credibility, Deflation
Three great american disinflations
No full textIn this paper, we examine three famous episodes of deliberate deflation (or disinflation) in U.S. history, including episodes following the Civil War, World War I, and the Volcker disinflation of the early 1980s. These episodes were associated with widely divergent effects on the real economy, which we attribute both to differences in the policy actions undertaken, and to the transparency and credibility of the monetary authorities. We attempt to account for the salient features of each episode within the context of a stylized DSGE model. Our model simulations indicate how a more predictable policy of gradual deflation could have helped avoid the sharp post-WWI depression. But our analysis also suggests that the strong argument for gradualism under a transparent monetary regime becomes less persuasive if the monetary authority lacks credibility; in this case, an aggressive policy stance (as under Volcker) can play a useful signalling role by making a policy shift more apparent to private agents. JEL Classification: E31, E32, E5
Paul Volcker\u27s monetary policy in retrospect
No full textMonetary policy is a key factor in determining the course of economic history. Paul Volcker, who held the office of Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board from 1979-1987, left his mark by adamantly fighting inflation throughout his term. He amply filled his role as an inflation fighter by using tight monetary policy to tame the rampant inflation of the late 1970s. Then he led the country into prosperity by implementing an expansionary policy from mid-1982 until the end of his term, still without re-inflating the economy. He stepped down from his office on 1987, leaving Alan Greenspan to lead perhaps one of the most influential institutions in the country
Harmonising Basel III and the Dodd Frank Act through international accounting standards: reasons why international accounting standards should serve as “thermostats”
No full textWhy should differences between regulatory and accounting policies be mitigated? Because mitigating such differences could facilitate convergence – as well as financial stability. The paper “Fair Value Accounting and Procyclicality: Mitigating Regulatory and Accounting Policy Differences through Regulatory Structure Reforms and Enforced Self Regulation” illustrates how the implementation of accounting standards and policies, in certain instances, have contrasted with Basel Committee initiatives aimed at mitigating procyclicality and facilitating forward looking provisioning. The paper also highlights how and why differences between regulatory and accounting policies could (and should) be mitigated. This paper focuses on how recent regulatory reforms – with particular reference to the Dodd Frank Act, impact fair value measurements. Other potential implications for accounting measurements and valuation, will also be considered. Given the tendencies for discrepancies to arise between regulatory and accounting policies, and owing to discrepancies between Basel III and the Dodd Frank Act, would a more imposing and commanding role for international standards not serve as a powerful weapon in harmonizing Basel III and Dodd Frank – whilst mitigating regulatory and accounting policy differences?financial stability; OTC derivatives markets; counterparty risks; disclosure; information asymmetry; transparency; living wills; Volcker Rule; Basel III; Basel II; pro cyclicality; international auditing standards; Dodd Frank Act; fair values
Does money matter for U.S. inflation? Evidence from Bayesian VARs
No full textWe use Bayesian estimation techniques to investigate whether money growth Granger-causes inflation in the United States. We test for Granger-causality out-of-sample and find, perhaps surprisingly given recent theoretical arguments, that including money growth in simple VAR models of inflation does systematically improve out-of-sample forecasting accuracy. This holds for a long forecasting sample 1960-2005, as well for more recent subperiods, including the Volcker and Greenspan eras. However, the contribution of money to inflation forecasting accuracy is quantitatively limited and tends to be smaller in recent subperiods, in particular in models that also include information on real GDP growth and interest rates. --Out-of-sample forecasting,granger causality,monetary aggregates,monetary policy,Volcker,Greenspan
The effect of regulations on financial system stability: an analysis of the impact of the Volcker rule on the US banking system
No full text1 online resource (iv, 45 leaves)Includes abstract and appendices.Includes bibliographical references (leaves 26-28).This paper seeks to evaluate the impact of the announcement of the Volcker rule on the performance of the stock prices /return on Bank Holding Companies in the US. In order to test the effect of this policy change, daily stock prices and trading assets of 415 Bank Holding Companies in the United States between 2009-2012 were obtained and were classified into three groups according to the value of their trading assets. An event study was carried out on the Cumulative abnormal returns of these companies on three different announcement dates which are considered vital to the implementation of the rule.
It was observed that U.S capital market reacted negatively to the announcement of the rule on those three dates but the effect was more pronounced in the prices of the securities that were exposed to proprietary trading (trading assets) and this was significant around the first announcement date at the 10% significance level. However, the market also reacted negatively on the other two dates, but was not as significant as the first time when the market was anticipating the announcement.
This evidence suggests that the Volcker rule had an adverse effect on the securities values of banks that engage in proprietary trading and could possibly curb their involvement in these speculative trading activities
U.S. Foreign-Exchange-Market Intervention and the Early Dollar Float: 1973 – 1981
No full textThe dollar’s depreciation during the early floating rate period, 1973 – 1981, was a symptom of the Great Inflation. In that environment, sterilized foreign exchange interventions were ineffective in halting the dollar’s decline, but showed a limited ability to smooth dollar movements. Only after the Volcker FOMC changed its monetary-policy approach and demonstrated a willingness to maintain a disinflationary stance despite severe economic weakness and high unemployment did the dollar begin a sustained appreciation. Also contributing to the ineffectiveness of the interventions was the Desk’s method of operation. The small, covert interventions, particularly prior to 1977, seemed inconsistent with an expectations channel of influence, and financing intervention with short-term borrowed funds seemed inconsistent with a portfolio-balance channel of influence. The Desk never clearly articulated an intervention transmission mechanism. The episode indicated the shortcomings of sterilized intervention and led to their cessation in April 1981.
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