1,720,975 research outputs found
Modelling and analysing belief manipulation in conciliation
No full textThe ordinary legislative procedure of the European Union concludes with an intercameral dispute settlement body, the Conciliation Committee. This final step of the procedure is crucial to understand the concessions that both the Parliament and the Council are able to extract during bicameral negotiations. In this paper, I develop a model of incomplete information that analyses decision making in the last two stages of the ordinary legislative procedure. The model assumes three actors – the European Parliament, its delegation and the Council – that, having Euclidean preferences with single-peaked utility functions, choose a proposal in the one-dimensional policy space. The incomplete information of the Council vis-à-vis the Parliament provides interesting findings about belief manipulation. It turns out that manipulation occurs when the moderate Parliament is located between the delegation’s ideal policy and the alleged Parliament’s acceptance threshold. Finally, I employ the analytic narrative approach to explaining unique historical events of case studies, drawing upon the model
Modelling and analysing belief manipulation in conciliation
No full textThe ordinary legislative procedure of the European Union concludes with an intercameral dispute settlement body, the Conciliation Committee. This final step of the procedure is crucial to understand the concessions that both the Parliament and the Council are able to extract during bicameral negotiations. In this paper, I develop a model of incomplete information that analyses decision making in the last two stages of the ordinary legislative procedure. The model assumes three actors – the European Parliament, its delegation and the Council – that, having Euclidean preferences with single-peaked utility functions, choose a proposal in the one-dimensional policy space. The incomplete information of the Council vis-à-vis the Parliament provides interesting findings about belief manipulation. It turns out that manipulation occurs when the moderate Parliament is located between the delegation’s ideal policy and the alleged Parliament’s acceptance threshold. Finally, I employ the analytic narrative approach to explaining unique historical events of case studies, drawing upon the model
La politica economica e fiscale europea
No full textThis article examines the (macro)economic policy of the European Union (EU) established by the Maastricht Treaty. In the decades since its adoption, European politicians have adopted several legislative measures and an ancillary international treaty designed to put into effect the provisions of this landmark treaty. These were followed by numerous recommendations and implementing decisions. Together, these measures are the result of an arduous balancing act – managing competing pressures arising from the economy, national politics, and supranational politics. The article begins by exploring the foundational ideas and political constraints that shaped the initial policy design. It then illustrates how these tensions have influenced the debates surrounding reform, including the substance, timing, and trajectory of policy changes; the negotiations over preventive surveillance; compliance with recommendations; and the application and effectiveness of procedures to address excessive fiscal deficits. The analysis concludes with an assessment of the most recent overhaul: the 2024 new economic governance framework, which seeks to improve these rules by enhancing fiscal sustainability and flexibility. The article also reflects on future challenges, underscoring the strategic importance of strengthening the EU’s fiscal capacity to support macroeconomic stabilization, resilience, and policy coordination in an increasingly demanding geopolitical and economic landscape
Delegation and control in the EU fiscal governance
No full textSince the Treaty of Maastricht European countries have provided tighter controls over national budgets and increased executive powers to supranational institutions, especially to the Commission. Although scholars have variously investigated the bargaining dynamics in the fiscal governance of the European Union, there are no relevant works on the competence distribution among decision-makers at national and supranational levels over time. To understand the design and development of the rules governing the EU fiscal policy, this paper complements the existing literature by the delegation and negotiation theories. It reviews, across a dataset including the major provisions of the EU fiscal governance rules, the pattern of delegation of executive power to the Council, the Commission and the national authorities. Preliminary results suggest that the EU fiscal policy, despite remaining Council-centred, displays an increasing role of the Commission and more stringent constraints on national budget over the past twenty years
Explaining negotiations in the conciliation committee
Full text linkThe conciliation committee is the ultimate inter-cameral dispute settlement mechanism of the ordinary (former codecision) legislative procedure of the European Union. Who gets what, and why, in this committee? Are the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers on an equal footing? We argue that the institutional set-up of the committee is bias in favour of the Council. We offer evidence in support of this proposition by estimating, through Wordfish, the similarity between the documents of almost all the dossiers that reached conciliation up to February 2012. This evidence suggests that, in almost seventy percent of times, the final agreement is more similar to the position of the Council. As expected, the Parliament has been more successful after the reform of the Treaty of Amsterdam and in dossiers where the Council decides by qualified majority voting. The Parliament also benefits if the rapporteur comes from a large party because a veto threat is more easily executable. In line with König et al. (2007), the support from the Commission is crucial to parliamentary success. Moreover, when national administrations are more involved in implementation than the Commission, parliamentarians are less accommodating than ministers because they value much more legislative design as control mechanism. Weaker or no support is found for other factors
Balancing Pressures : The Politics of Governing the European Economy
No full textBalancing Pressures analyses how the economy, national politics, and supranational politics shape economic policymaking in the European Union. Economic theories alert policymakers of the problems associated with policy initiatives. Economic uncertainties shape political positioning during negotiations, while actual economic conditions affect both negotiations and implementation. National pressures to win office and pursue policies systematically influence negotiating positions, implementation patterns, and outcomes. Supranational pressures are associated with membership in the euro area, the expected and actual patterns of compliance, or the context of negotiations. Spanning the period from 1994 to 2019, the book analyses how these pressures shaped the definition of the policy problems, the controversies surrounding policy reforms, the outcome, timing, and direction of reforms, the negotiations over preventive surveillance, the compliance with recommendations, and the use and effectiveness of the procedure to correct excessive fiscal deficits. The book concludes by assessing the effectiveness, fairness, and responsiveness of the policy
Explaining negotiations in the conciliation committee
No full textThe conciliation committee is the ultimate bicameral dispute settlement mechanism of the ordinary legislative procedure of the European Union. Who gets what, and why, in this committee? We argue that its institutional setup is biased in favour of the Council of Ministers. Employing the Wordfish algorithm, we show that the joint text is more similar to the Council common position than to the parliamentary reading in almost 70 percent of the dossiers that reached conciliation up to February 2012. The European Parliament is more successful in the post-Amsterdam period, when the Council decides by qualified majority voting, the rapporteur comes from a large party, the European Commission is supportive, and when national administrations are more involved in the implementation process than the Commission
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