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Amodal Completion, perception and visual imagery
Full text linkAmodal completion typically occurs when we look at an object that is partially behind another object. Theorists often say that in such cases we are aware not only of the visible parts, but also, in some sense, of the occluded parts, because otherwise we could not have a perceptual experience of the object as continuing behind its occluder. Since
no sense modality carries information about the occluded parts, this information is provided by other means. Amodal completion raises two questions. First, what is the mechanism involved? Second, what kind of experience do we have of the occluded parts?
According to Nanay, the so-called Imagery Theory answers both questions. For this theory, information about the occluded parts is the product of a low level, vision specific,neural mechanism that takes place in the early vision processing areas of the brain. This
mechanism provides a representation of the occluded parts and, as a result, the observer enjoys a quasi-sensory or quasi-perceptual conscious experience that is phenomenally similar to seeing those parts (as purportedly Perky has proved). In this paper I criticize
Nanay’s answer to the second question
Filosofia della percezione
No full textThe book is an opinionated introduction to the philosophy of perception, with an emphasis on visual perception
Cats! Michotte's new enigma of perception
No full textMost of the objects around us are partially hidden from our view by other objects. If they are three-dimensional objects, their backs, too, are hidden by their front side. Even if they are so obscured, we do not see just surfaces or parts of surfaces, but rather complete objects partially hidden from view by other objects or some of their own parts. Consider the following familiar example. You stand before a woman seated at her writing desk, and her visible parts, from a certain viewpoint, are her head, arms, and torso. There is ample light, you have good eyesight, and you are neither drunk nor under the influence of drugs. There is nothing within you or outside of you interfering with the information that the light transmits. If I ask you what you see, you will likely answer that you see a person sitting at her writing desk. This is also what I would say about you: I would say that you see a person sitting at her writing desk. What we both say is true: there is a person at her writing desk, and you see her.
But naturally you do not see all parts of this woman; rather you see only some parts, namely those that are visible. Thus, a first question arises:
Q1) Under what conditions can we claim to see an object, when that object is not entirely in view?
(Q1) is about the conditions under which the assertion “S sees D” is true. We usually raise such a question if we have epistemological worries, that is, when we want to distinguish between veridical and falsidical experiences, or when we consider seeing veridical and want to know when seeing occurs. However, one might have phenomenological worries as well, that is, one might be interested in identifying the contents of these experiences. For example, does your experience of the woman amount to the experience of the visible parts of the woman only, or does it involve also some kind of experience of her non-visible parts as well? More generally:
Q2) How can we qualify the experience we have when it seems to us that we see an object that is not entirely in view?
Finally, there is a third sense in which perception of occlusion is enigmatic. Indeed one can ask:
(Q3) What is the mechanism underlying this type of experience?
(Q3) concerns the psychological mechanism underlying the experience described. My main task in this paper is to provide an answer to (Q1), which will in turn bring me to take a position on (Q2)
Perceptual Illusions : Philosophical and Psychological Essays
No full textThings often go awry. Indeed, things can go awry in our beliefs, our actions, our emotions, and, of course, our perceptions. When things go awry in our perceptions, illusions occur. One popular philosophical theory argues that illusions are discrepancies between the world as it is and how it appears: although objects have certain properties, they nevertheless appear to have others. For example, they seem to have shapes that they do not; their manifest colors, sizes, and weights are not their actual ones; and their perceived locations are at odds with their real ones. The claim that illusions are discrepancies between objects in the world and their respective appearances can be questioned .Notions of apparent and real property are not quite clear; moreover myriad examples have been put forward to show that a discrepancy between an appearance and reality is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for a perception to count as illusory. The notion of perceptual illusion is among those that philosophers are not prepared to relinquish. And so, they argue, although the popular theory of perceptual illusions has gone awry, it can be amended
Giuditta, Oloferne, un’ancella che passa di lì e un motociclista spericolato. Vedere una cosa in parte nascosta
No full textNella letteratura psicologica le occlusioni sono tutti quei fenomeni rispetto ai quali un oggetto è in parte nascosto alla vista da un altro oggetto oppure la parte davanti di un oggetto nasconde all’osservatore la sua parte di dietro. Il problema che affronterò è questo: a quali condizioni possiamo asserire che un soggetto S vede un oggetto D, quando D è parzialmente nascosto
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