28,778 research outputs found
Some forgotten equilibria of the Bertrand duopoly!?
No full textThis note analyzes the Bertrand duopoly with constant but asymmetric marginal costs on a market with homogenous products. It is shown that there exist some equilibria that are ignored in the literature on IO. In addition, in this setting (perfectly or nearly perfectly) competitive equilibria exist.
Marguerite / peint par M. J. Bertrand. Gravé par C. A. Deblois
No full textMARGUERITE / PEINT PAR M. J. BERTRAND. GRAVÉ PAR C. A. DEBLOIS
Marguerite / peint par M. J. Bertrand. Gravé par C. A. Deblois (1)
Marguerite (1
Fonds Louis Bertrand. Fonds numérisé. Correspondance de Louis Bertrand. [Lettre manuscrite de Schlesinger à Louis Bertrand]
No full textNumérisation effectuée à partir d'un document original : LBC0856.Appartient à l'ensemble documentaire : 3M000Appartient à l'ensemble documentaire : 3M007Description : Réponse du traducteur vis-à-vis du refus de L. BertrandSchlesinger, C..Bertrand, Louis (1866-1941).Pays-Bas.Lieu de copie : Valkenburg (Hollande
Endogenous Timing of Moves in Bertrand-Edgeworth Triopolies
No full textWe determine the endogenous order of moves in which the firms set their prices in the framework of a capacity-constrained Bertrand-Edgeworth triopoly. A three-period
timing game that determines the period in which the firms announce their prices precedes the price-setting stage. We show for the non-trivial case (in which the Bertrand-Edgeworth triopoly has only an equilibrium in non-degenerated mixedstrategies) that the firm with the largest capacity sets its price first, while the two other firms set their prices later. Our result extends a finding by Deneckere and Kovenock (1992) from duopolies to triopolies. This extension was made possible by Hirata's (2009) recent advancements on the mixed-strategy equilibria of Bertrand-Edgeworth games
THE COURNOT-BERTRAND PROFIT DIFFERENTIAL : A REVERSAL RESULT IN A DIFFERENTIATED DUOPOLY WITH WAGE BARGAINING
No full textThis paper compares Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in a downstream differentiated duopoly in which the input price (wage) paid by each downstream firm is the outcome of a strategic bargain with its upstream supplier (labour union). We show that the standard result that Cournot equilibrium profits exceed those under Bertrand competition - when the differentiated duopoly game is played in imperfect substitutes - is reversible. Whether equilibrium profits are higher under Cournot or Bertrand competition is shown to depend upon the nature of the upstream agents’ preferences, on the distribution of bargaining power over the input price and on the degree of product market differentiation. We find that the standard result holds unless unions are both powerful and place considerable weight on the wage argument in their utility function. One implication of this is that if the upstream agents are profit-maximising firms, then the standard result will obtain.differentiated duopoly ; wage bargaining ; Cournot ; Bertrand.
Comparing Cournot and Bertrand Competition in a Unionized Mixed Duopoly
No full textWe investigate a differentiated mixed duopoly in which private and public firms can choose to strategically set prices or quantities by facing a union bargaining process. For the case of a unionized mixed duopoly, only the public firm is able to choose a type of contract irrespective of whether the goods are substitutes or complements in the equilibrium. Thus, we show that social welfare under Bertrand competition is always determined by the public firm's dominant strategy, wherein the Bertrand competition entails higher social welfare than the Cournot competition. Moreover, there are multiple Nash equilibria in the contract stage of the game. Finally, our main results hold irrespective of the nature of goods, with the exception of when a sufficiently large parameter of complements is employed, the ranking of private firm's profit is not reversed, which is contrast to the standard findings.Wage Bargaining, Union, Cournot-Bertrand Competition, Mixed Duopoly.
Cournot-Bertrand competition in a unionized mixed duopoly
No full textWe investigate a differentiated mixed duopoly in which private and public firms can choose to strategically set prices or quantities by facing a union bargaining process. For the case of a unionized mixed duopoly, only public firm is able to choose a type of contract based on the degree of substitutability in the equilibrium. Focusing on the case of substitute goods, we show that Bertrand (respectively, Cournot) competition entails higher social welfare than Cournot (respectively, Bertrand) competition if the degree of substitutability is relatively small (respectively, large). Thus, there are multiple Nash equilibria in the contract stage of the game. As a result, Singh and Vives' ranking of social welfare is reversed in a range of substitution values for which it is a dominant strategy for public firm to choose either quantity or price contracts.Wage Bargaining; Union; Cournot-Bertrand Competition; Mixed Duopoly
Bertrand competition with non-rigid capacity constraints
No full textWe examine a model of Bertrand competition with non-rigid capacity constraints, so that by incurring an additional per unit cost of capacity expansion, firms can produce beyond capacity. We find that there is an interval of prices such that a price can be sustained as a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if and only if it lies in this interval. We then examine the properties of this set as [a] the number of firms becomes large and [b] the capacity cost increases.Bertrand competition, capacity constraint
On stability of Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in a simple model of the labour market
No full textWe examine a Bertrand-Edgeworth model of competition in a labour market where the workers simultaneously set wages disregarding any influence their current decision may have on opponents' future decisions. The iterated best response process is shown to converge in finite time to a Bertrand-Nash solution, where wages are set at the market-clearing level. This convergence result is also shown to hold when the assumption of static expectations is replaced by milder restrictions on beliefs about opponents'' wages.
En forêt : souvenir de Triaucourt : valse pour piano / par C. Bertrand
No full textTitre uniforme : Bertrand, C. (18..-19.. ; compositeur). Compositeur. [En forêt. Piano]Valses (piano) -- +* 1800......- 1899......+:19e siècle:Piano, Musique de -- +* 1800......- 1899......+:19e siècle
- …
