1,720,983 research outputs found

    Conclusions

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    This book extends the literature on boards’ characteristics by focusing on family-listed companies. This book shows that family-controlled firms represent a characteristic and unique environment for studying the heterogeneity of the board; in fact, the first aim of the board in a family-controlled firm is to provide resources. Additionally, I introduced for the first time new variables such as the “heterogenous international experience” that, in today’s globalized world, should represent a source of competitive advantage for firms. I also showed that family-controlled firms use independent directors to import their heterogeneity knowledge; indeed, the heterogeneity ratio is positively affected by the increase of independent directors, while family members do not seem to affect the ratio

    Board Composition and Its Heterogeneity

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    In this chapter, I analyze the relation between board composition (with a focus on the role of heterogeneity) and performance. Specifically, I introduce the two main theories that support this relation: the agency theory and the resource dependency theory [In the following chapters, other theories are investigated, i.e., stewardship theory, entrenchment theory, and upper echelons theory (UET)]. I also highlight the potential benefits and costs associated with the heterogeneity in the composition of the board. In the final part of this chapter, I introduce an innovative approach to studying heterogeneity and I create a three-dimensional approach for measuring it. Precisely, I identify as the previous research on this topic can be classified on the basis of three levels of heterogeneity studied, namely, “gender,” “social,” and “global” heterogeneity. The global heterogeneity can be split into three parts. First, the “social heterogeneity” that considers three elements: gender, age, and ethnicity. Second, the “occupational heterogeneity” that is composed of all the elements that characterize the professional and educational experiences of the board members, such as work experiences in particular sectors. Third, the “global heterogeneity” that merges both social and professional elements, usually by using multidimensional indexes

    Family Firms’ Board Characteristics

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    In this chapter, I present the difference between “mandatory” and “not mandatory” variables and the methodology adopted for extracting it. I also present the methodology used to classify these variables in the two aforementioned categories and the importance of these variables in terms of the potential impact on a firm’s performance. In the second part of the chapter, after having introduced the main descriptive statistics of the variables collected and the expected impact on performance, I outline the methodology adopted to calculate the multidimensional indexes

    Why Corporate Governance Matters: Spectacular Defaults

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    In the following chapter, we concentrate our attention to specific banking crisis events to pass from the theory to the practice and identify concrete governance failure cases. Grant Kirkpatrick of OECD (Economic Co-operation and Development) (2009) analyzed, in his corporate governance lessons from the financial crisis, the relationship between weak corporate governance and failures on several banking crises highlighting the strong correlation. He underlined that the 2006–2008 financial meltdown was characterized by severe shortcomings in internal governance, in risk management, and in the role of the board in overseeing risk management. These failures ranged from the following

    Corporate Governance in the Banking Sector (CGBS): A Literature Review

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    This chapter investigates how researchers across the world are trying to disentangle the CGBS concept. It scrutinizes the main CGBS articles published from 2000 to 2020 and identifies the most studied CG areas, that is, risk appetite, board diversity, ownership structure, role of CEO, compensation, Islamic banking system, CSR (corporate social responsibility) and ESG (environmental, social, and corporate governance), and political connections. Finally, it identifies the main results and provides ad hoc tips and advice to regulators and researchers

    Directors’ Characteristics and Firm’s Performance: Research Design and Hypotheses

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    In this chapter, I analyze the main characteristics of family-controlled firms. In the first part of this chapter, I provide a literature review and the main definitions of family-controlled firms, and in the second part, I introduce the impact that family firms can have on the composition of the board of directors according to the literature. In particular, I highlight that recent studies indicate that family firms pursue different goals from nonfamily-controlled firms. To be precise, they select board members to import the knowledge that may be lacking among family members sitting on the board. In the final part of this chapter, I present the main characteristics of Italian family-controlled firms. I first focus on the geographical distribution and on the role of the industrial districts and then highlight the main sectors in which these firms operate

    Introduction

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    In the last few years, the board composition of listed companies has been strongly affected by new laws and social equality pressure from media, stakeholders, and investors. From a political perspective, the most important innovation is the gender quota, which has been introduced in eight countries starting with Norway in 2003. This quota has strongly changed the board composition in countries that have adopted it. This binding quota is intended to promote gender diversity to improve social equality and increase firm performance; however, the last relation, which has been studied in depth in the last few years and in different countries, has not highlighted a clear relationship. We must also consider that differences in terms of age and nationality are also an important source of heterogeneity. The last two elements have been studied thoroughly by researchers around the world, and in this case, the results are strongly in contrast. Researchers have also analyzed a different type of heterogeneity called “occupational heterogeneity.” This heterogeneity seems to be one of the most important sources of competitive advantage generated by a board of directors

    Corporate Governance (CG) Theories and the Banking Sector

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    This chapter aims to clarify the main CG theories. It begins with the agency theory, investigating how the agency costs change in the banking environment. Then, shareholder’s and stakeholder’s theories are described and compared. Finally, it explains other CG theories, that is, the resource dependency theory (RDT), the resource-based view theory (RBV), the stewardship theory, and the upper echelon theory (UET)

    The Meaning of Corporate Governance and its Role in the Banking Sector

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    This chapter aims to clarify the meaning of corporate governance (CG). The first part focuses on the main difficulties that regulators, practitioners, and the general public face when discussing CG. We identify four aspects that can exacerbate these difficulties. First, CG regulation is a recent topic and this is even more true in the banking sector. Second, CG looks at directors’ attributes and social aspects; these elements are very difficult to measure and operationalize. Third, the different types of ownership structures change and affect board’s goals and characteristics. Fourth, CG models differ according to the diverse forms of capitalism. Three main CG models are identified in literature: the Anglo-American model, the Continental European model, and the Japanese model. The second part defines CG with a focus on the banking sector

    Corporate Governance and Behavioral Finance

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    Board’s decision-making process and CEOs’ biases have been at the center of academic literature studies on behavior economics following the financial crisis in the first decade of 2000. We described some of the most common irrational beliefs or behaviors that can unconsciously influence board’s and CEOs’ decision-making process
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