63,811 research outputs found
Delusional beliefs and reason giving
Full text linkDelusions are often regarded as irrational beliefs, but their irrationality is not sufficient to explain what is pathological about them. In this paper we ask whether deluded subjects have the capacity to support the content of their delusions with reasons, that is, whether they can author their delusional states. The hypothesis that delusions are characterised by a failure of authorship, which is a dimension of self knowledge, deserves to be
empirically tested because (a) it has the potential to account for the distinction between endorsing a delusion and endorsing a framework belief; (b) it contributes to a
philosophical analysis of the relationship between rationality and self knowledge; and (c) it informs diagnosis and therapy in clinical psychiatry. However, authorship cannot provide a demarcation criterion between delusions and other irrational belief states
What’s wrong with ‘mental’ disorders? : a commentary on ‘What is a mental/psychiatric disorder? : from DSM-IV to DSM-V’ by Stein et al
Full text linkThe editorial by Stein et al. (2010) is timely and
relevant given the development of DSM-V and the
likely impact that such a development will have on
mental health services in the USA. The revision of the
DSM will also affect international psychiatric research
and global practice thanks to the interplay between the
development of DSM and ICD (Fulford & Sartorius,
2009). The editorial by Stein and colleagues is very rich
and there are many themes suitable for further examination
and discussion. For this response, however,
we have chosen to focus on two themes: the use of the
term ‘mental’ and the idea of psychiatric disorders
being ‘in’ an individual
Self-interpretation and meaning-making processes: re-humanizing research on early psychosis
No full textAffective dimensions of the phenomenon of double bookkeeping in delusions
No full textIt has been argued that schizophrenic delusions are "behaviourally inert." This is evidence for the phenomenon of "double bookkeeping," according to which people are not consistent in their commitment to the content of their delusions. The traditional explanation for the phenomenon is that people do not genuinely believe the content of their delusions. In the article, we resist the traditional explanation and offer an alternative hypothesis: people with delusions often fail to acquire or to maintain the motivation to act on their delusional beliefs. This may be due to avolition, to emotional disturbances, or to the fact that, given the peculiar content of some delusions, the surrounding environment does not support the agent's motivation to act. © 2012 The Author(s)
Psychopathology as the basic science of psychiatry
No full textWe argue that psychopathology, as the discipline that assesses and makes sense of abnormal human subjectivity, should be at the heart of psychiatry. It should be a basic educational prerequisite in the curriculum for mental health professionals and a key element of the shared intellectual identity of clinicians and researchers in this field
Delusions and Responsibility for Action: Insights from the Breivik Case
Full text linkWhat factors should be taken into account when attributing criminal responsibility to perpetrators of severe crimes? We discuss the Breivik case, and the considerations which led to holding Breivik accountable for his criminal acts. We put some pressure on the view that experiencing certain psychiatric symptoms or receiving a certain psychiatric diagnosis is sufficient to establish criminal insanity. We also argue that the presence of delusional beliefs, often regarded as a key factor in determining responsibility, is neither necessary nor sufficient for criminal insanity. © 2013 The Author(s)
Phenomenology as a resource for translational research in mental health: methodological trends, challenges and new directions
Full text linkThis editorial reflects on current methodological trends in translational research in mental health. It aims to build a bridge between two fields that are frequently siloed off from each other: interventional research and phenomenologically informed research. Recent years have witnessed a revival of phenomenological approaches in mental health, often - but not only - as a means of connecting the subjective character of experience with neurobiological explanatory accounts of illness. Rich phenomenological knowledge accrued in schizophrenia, and wider psychosis research, has opened up new opportunities for improving prediction, early detection, diagnosis, prognostic stratification, treatment and ethics of care. Novel qualitative studies of delusions and hallucinations have challenged longstanding assumptions about their nature and meaning, uncovering highly complex subjective dimensions that are not adequately captured by quantitative methodologies. Interdisciplinary and participatory research efforts, informed by phenomenological insights, have prompted revisions of pre-established narratives of mental disorder dominated by a dysfunction framework and by researcher-centric outcome measures. Despite these recent advances, there has been relatively little effort to integrate and translate phenomenological insights across applied clinical research, with the goal of producing more meaningful, patient-valued results. It is our contention that phenomenological psychopathology - as the basic science of psychiatry - represents an important methodology for advancing evidence-based practices in mental health, and ultimately improving real-world outcomes. Setting this project into motion requires a greater emphasis on subjectivity and the structures of experience, more attention to the quality and patient-centredness of outcome measures, and the identification of treatment targets that matter most to patients
A role for ownership and authorship in the analysis of thought insertion
No full textPhilosophers are interested in the phenomenon of thought insertion because it challenges the common assumption that one can ascribe to oneself the thoughts that one can access first-personally. In the standard philosophical analysis of thought insertion, the subject owns the 'inserted' thought but lacks a sense of agency towards it. In this paper we want to provide an alternative analysis of the condition, according to which subjects typically lack both ownership and authorship of the 'inserted' thoughts. We argue that by appealing to a failure of ownership and authorship we can describe more accurately the phenomenology of thought insertion, and distinguish it from that of non-delusional beliefs that have not been deliberated about, and of other delusions of passivity. We can also start developing a more psychologically realistic account of the relation between intentionality, rationality and self knowledge in normal and abnormal cognition
Rhinotrichum globiferum Berk. & Broome, J. Linn. Soc., Bot.
No full textR. globiferum Berk. & Broome, J. Linn. Soc., Bot. 14(no. 74): 101 (1873)/ IF 210908 Typification Details: Holotype K(M), Gardner 61, On bark References: Berkeley & Broome (1873)Published as part of Wijayawardene, Nalin N., Dai, Dong-Qin, Premarathne, Bhagya M., Wimalasena, Madhara K., Jayalal, Udeni, Wickramanayake, Kawmini D., Dangalla, Hasanka, Jayathunga, Hashini, Brahmanage, Rashika S., Karunarathna, Samantha C., Weerakoon, Gothamie, Ariyawansa, Kahandawa G. S. U., Yapa, Neelamanie, Madawala, Sumedha, Nanayakkara, Chandrika M., Fan, Xin-Lei, Kirk, Paul M., Zhang, Gui-Qing, Ediriweera, Aseni, Bhat, Jayarama, Dawoud, Turki M. & Tibpromma, Saowaluck, 2023, Checklist, typification details, and nomenclature status of ascomycetous fungi originally described in Sri Lanka, pp. 1-105 in Phytotaxa 611 (1) on page 97, DOI: 10.11646/phytotaxa.611.1.1, http://zenodo.org/record/830873
Termitomyces microcarpus Berk. & Broome, J. Linn. Soc., Bot.
No full text<i> <i>A</i>.</i> <i>microcarpus</i> Berk. & Broome, J. Linn. Soc., Bot. 11 (no. 56): 537 (1871)/IF: 481834 <p> Current name: <i>Termitomyces microcarpus</i> (Berk. & Broome) R. Heim, C. r. Acad. Sci. Paris 213: 147 (1941) (New classification: <i>Lyophyllaceae, Agaricales, Agaricomycetes</i>)</p> <p>Typification Details: Thwaites, Sept. 1868, Sri Lanka</p> <p>Reference: Berkeley & Broome (1871)</p>Published as part of <i>Karunarathna, Samantha C., Priyashantha, K Hasith, Tibpromma, Saowaluck, Galappaththi, Mahesh C. A., Premarathne, Bhagya M., Wijayawardene, Nalin N., Wimalasena, Madhara K., Jayalal, Udeni, Wickramanayake, Kawmini D., Dangalla, Hasanka, Jayathunga, Hashini, Brahmanage, Rashika S., Weerakoon, Gothamie, Ariyawansa, Kahandawa G. S. U., Yapa, Neelamanie, Nanayakkara, Chandrika M., Ediriweera, Surani, Fan, Xin-Lei, Kirk, Paul M., Zhang, Gui-Qing, Ediriweera, Aseni, Bhat, Jayarama, Dawoud, Turki M., Kumara, Wasantha & Deng, Chun Ying, 2023, Checklist, typification details, and nomenclature status of Basidiomycota, originally described from Sri Lanka, pp. 1-86 in Phytotaxa 621 (1)</i> on page 13, DOI: 10.11646/phytotaxa.621.1.1, <a href="http://zenodo.org/record/10065102">http://zenodo.org/record/10065102</a>
- …
