1,720,988 research outputs found
Deliberation and group disagreement
No full textWe investigate to what extent it is epistemically advantageous and disadvantageous that groups whose members disagree over some issue use deliberation in comparison to voting as a way to reach collective agreements. Extant approaches in the literature to this ‘deliberation versus voting’ comparison typically assume there is some univocal answer as to which group strategy is best, epistemically. We think this assumption is mistaken. We approach the deliberation versus voting question from a pluralist perspective, in that we hold that a group’s collective endeavor to solve an internal dispute can be aimed at different, albeit not necessarily incompatible, epistemic goals, namely the goals of truth, evidence, understanding, and epistemic justice. Different answers to our guiding question, we show, correspond to different epistemic goals. We conclude by exploring several ways to mitigate the potential epistemic disadvantages of solving intragroup disagreement by means of deliberation in relation to each epistemic goal
Transparent desires and the uniformity of self-knowledge
No full textMàster en Filosofia Analítica (APhil), Facultat Filosofía, Universitat de Barcelona, Curs: 2023-2024, Director/Tutor: Fernando Broncano-BerrocalThe transparency method claims that we can gain knowledge of our own minds by considering the world. In particular, it says that a subject can know whether she believes that p by a world-directed question of the form “Is p true?”. Something similar could be tried regarding desires: I can know what I desire by considering the qualities of the intentional object of desire. Defending this last claim involves formulating a world-directed question for the method and defending that this method possesses a strong degree of epistemic warrant. The most prominent theories of the transparency method applied to desire are the bypass view (Fernández 2008), the desirability rule (Byrne 2018), and the conceptual approach (Andreotta 2020). This paper argues that none of these proposals apply successfully the transparency method to desires. Finally, I argue that the transparency method can be partially applied to desires if we take into consideration the distinction between passive and active self-knowledge (Boyle 2009)
The Epistemology of Group Disagreement
No full textThis book brings together philosophers to investigate the nature and normativity of group disagreement. Debates in the epistemology of disagreement have mainly been concerned with idealized cases of peer disagreement between individuals. However, most real-life disagreements are complex and often take place within and between groups. Ascribing views, beliefs, and judgments to groups is a common phenomenon that is well researched in the literature on the ontology and epistemology of groups. The chapters in this volume seek to connect these literatures and to explore both intra- and inter- group disagreements. They apply their discussions to a range of political, religious, social, and scientific issues. The Epistemology of Group Disagreement is an important resource for students and scholars working on social and applied epistemology; disagreement; and topics at the intersection of epistemology, ethics, and politics
The Epistemology of Group Disagreement
No full textThis book brings together philosophers to investigate the nature and normativity of group disagreement. Debates in the epistemology of disagreement have mainly been concerned with idealized cases of peer disagreement between individuals. However, most real-life disagreements are complex and often take place within and between groups. Ascribing views, beliefs, and judgments to groups is a common phenomenon that is well researched in the literature on the ontology and epistemology of groups. The chapters in this volume seek to connect these literatures and to explore both intra- and inter- group disagreements. They apply their discussions to a range of political, religious, social, and scientific issues. The Epistemology of Group Disagreement is an important resource for students and scholars working on social and applied epistemology; disagreement; and topics at the intersection of epistemology, ethics, and politics
Gender, race, and group disagreement
No full textThis paper has two aims. The first is critical: it argues that our mainstream epistemology of disagreement does not have the resources to explain what goes wrong in cases of group-level epistemic injustice. The second is positive: we argue that a functionalist account of group belief and group justification delivers an account of the epistemic peerhood relation between groups that (1) accommodates minority and oppressed groups, and (2) diagnoses the epistemic injustice cases correctly as cases of unwarranted belief on the part of the oppressor group
The epistemology of group disagreement: an introduction
No full textThe topic of this volume—theepistemology of group disagreement—aims to face the complex topic of group disagreement head on; it represents the first-ever volume of papers dedicated exclusively to group disagreement and to the epistemological puzzles such disagreements raise. The volume consists of 12 new essays by leading epistemologists working in the area, and it spans a range of different key themes related to group disagreement, some established themes and others entirely new. In what follows, we offer brief summaries of these 12 chapters, drawing some connections between them where appropriate
Anti-Luck (Too Weak) Virtue Epistemology
No full textI argue that Duncan Pritchard’s anti-luck virtue epistemology is insufficient for knowledge. I show that Pritchard fails to achieve the aim that motivates his adoption of a virtue-theoretic condition in the first place: to guarantee the appropriate direction of fit that known beliefs have. Finally, I examine whether other virtue-theoretic accounts are able to explain what I call the direction of fit proble
Luck
No full textWinning a lottery, being hit by a stray bullet, or surviving a plane crash, all are instances of a mundane phenomenon: luck. Mundane as it is, the concept of luck nonetheless plays a pivotal role in central areas of philosophy, either because it is the key element of widespread philosophical theses or because it gives rise to challenging puzzles. For example, a common claim in philosophy of action is that acting because of luck prevents free action. A platitude in epistemology is that coming to believe the truth by sheer luck is incompatible with knowing. If two people act in the same way but the consequences of one of their actions are worse due to luck, should we morally assess them in the same way? Is the inequality of a person unjust when it is caused by bad luck? These two complex issues are a matter of controversy in ethics and political philosophy, respectively.A legitimate question is whether the concept of luck itself is worthy of philosophical investigation. One might think that it is not given (i) how acquainted we are with the phenomenon of luck in everyday life and (ii) the fact that progress has been made in the aforementioned debates on the assumption of a pre-theoretical understanding of the notion.However, the idea that a rigorous analysis of the general concept of luck might serve to make further progress in areas of philosophy where the notion plays a fundamental role has motivated a recent and growing philosophical literature on the nature of luck itself. Although some might be skeptical that investigating the nature of luck in general can help shed some light on long-standing philosophical debates such as the nature of knowledge—see Ballantyne 2014—it is hardly sustainable that no general account of luck will be able to ground any substantive claim in areas of philosophy where the notion is constantly invoked but left undefined. This article gives an overview of current philosophical theorizing about the concept of luck itself
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