1,721,143 research outputs found
A Good Opening: The Key to Make the Most of Unilateral Climate Action
In this paper we argue that when a subgroup of countries cooperate on emission
reduction, the optimal response of non-signatory countries reflects the interaction between
three potentially opposing factors, the incentive to free-ride on the environmental benefits
of cooperation, the incentive to expand energy consumption, and the incentive to adopt the
cleaner technologies introduced by the coalition. Using an IntegratedAssessmentModel with
a game-theoretic structure we find that the equilibrium abatement of the coalition composed
by OECD countries would be moderate, in line with the Pledges subscribed in Copenhagen,
but increasing. The mitigation strategy would consist of investments in energy R&D and
deployment of cleaner technologies with high learning potentials. International knowledge
and technology externalities would facilitate the diffusion of cleaner technologies in nonsignatory
countries, offsetting the free-riding incentive and reducing their emissions. If the
OECD group curbs emissions beyond the optimal equilibrium level, reaching reduction rates
between 40 and 453⁄4low2005 levels in 2050, the benefits of technology externalitieswould
no longer compensate the effect of lower fossil fuel prices.Our results suggest that amoderate
unilateral climate policy could induce a virtuous behaviour in non-signatory countries and that
policies promoting the international transfer of technologies and knowledge could represent
an effective complement to mitigation targets
Investimenti e politiche per una riduzione delle emissioni di gas serra nel settore energetico
How can China help reduce climate policy costs?
See: http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/172
Climate Change Mitigation Strategies in Fast-Growing Countries: The Benefits of Early Action
This paper builds on the assumption that OECD countries are (or will soon be) taking actions to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions. These actions, however, will not be sufficient to control global warming, unless developing countries also get involved in the cooperative effort to reduce GHG emissions. The paper investigates the best short-term strategies that emerging economies can adopt in reacting to OECD countries' mitigation effort, given the common long-term goal to prevent excessive warming without hampering economic growth. Results indicate that developing countries would incur substantial economic losses by following a myopic strategy that disregards climate in the short-run, and that their optimal investment behaviour is to anticipate the implementation of a climate policy by roughly 10 years. Investing in innovation ahead of time is also found to be advantageous. The degree of policy anticipation is shown to be important in determining the financial transfers of an international carbon market meant to provide incentives for the participation of developing countries. This is especially relevant for China, whose recent and foreseeable trends of investments in innovation are consistent with the adoption of domestic emission reduction obligations in 2030
Delayed Participation of Developing Countries to Climate Agreements: Should Action in the EU and US be Postponed?
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