198,457 research outputs found

    What’s wrong with ‘mental’ disorders? : a commentary on ‘What is a mental/psychiatric disorder? : from DSM-IV to DSM-V’ by Stein et al

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    The editorial by Stein et al. (2010) is timely and relevant given the development of DSM-V and the likely impact that such a development will have on mental health services in the USA. The revision of the DSM will also affect international psychiatric research and global practice thanks to the interplay between the development of DSM and ICD (Fulford & Sartorius, 2009). The editorial by Stein and colleagues is very rich and there are many themes suitable for further examination and discussion. For this response, however, we have chosen to focus on two themes: the use of the term ‘mental’ and the idea of psychiatric disorders being ‘in’ an individual

    The future of scientific psychiatry

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    Neuroscience has long had an impact on the field of psychiatry, and over the last two decades, with the advent of cognitive neuroscience and functional neuroimaging, that influence has been most pronounced. However, many question whether psychopathology can be understood by relying on neuroscience alone, and highlight some of the perceived limits to the way in which neuroscience informs psychiatry

    Delusional beliefs and reason giving

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    Delusions are often regarded as irrational beliefs, but their irrationality is not sufficient to explain what is pathological about them. In this paper we ask whether deluded subjects have the capacity to support the content of their delusions with reasons, that is, whether they can author their delusional states. The hypothesis that delusions are characterised by a failure of authorship, which is a dimension of self knowledge, deserves to be empirically tested because (a) it has the potential to account for the distinction between endorsing a delusion and endorsing a framework belief; (b) it contributes to a philosophical analysis of the relationship between rationality and self knowledge; and (c) it informs diagnosis and therapy in clinical psychiatry. However, authorship cannot provide a demarcation criterion between delusions and other irrational belief states

    Tecnica MRI Quantitativa nell’analisi di modelli di imbibizione dell’acqua in materiali porosi trattati con composti protettivi fluorurati ecologicamente sostenibili

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    Immagini MRI di sezioni interne di materiali porosi consentono di valutare l’efficacia di prodotti e trattamenti protettivi al fine di ottimizzare protocolli di intervento. Sono stati sintetizzati prodotti contenenti blocchi perfluoropolieterei, solubili in alcol e in solventi idroalcolici, ma non in CFC. Mediante MRI quantitativa ed un software sviluppato ad hoc é stato possibile determinare l’altezza del fronte di imbibizione dell’acqua in campioni di biocalcarenite trattati con questi prodotti e con altri commerciali. Sono stati ottenuti buoni fit dei dati a modelli ottenuti partendo dal modello di Washburn [1]. I risultati dimostrano la migliore efficacia dei nuovi prodotti, non dannosi per l’ambiente. [1] M. Gombia, V. Bortolotti, R.J.S. Brown, M. Camaiti, P. Fantazzini J Appl Phys 103 (2008) 094913

    Correction: Kinetics of trifurcated electron flow in the decaheme bacterial proteins MtrC and MtrF (Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America (2019) 116 (3425-3430) DOI: 10.1073/pnas.1818003116)

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    Correction for "Kinetics of trifurcated electron flow in the decaheme bacterial proteins MtrC and MtrF," by Xiuyun Jiang, Bastian Burger, Fruzsina Gajdos, C. Bortolotti, Zdenek Futera, Marian Breuer, and Jochen Blumberger, which was first published February 12, 2019; 10.1073/pnas.1818003116 (Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 116, 3425-3430)

    Affective dimensions of the phenomenon of double bookkeeping in delusions

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    It has been argued that schizophrenic delusions are "behaviourally inert." This is evidence for the phenomenon of "double bookkeeping," according to which people are not consistent in their commitment to the content of their delusions. The traditional explanation for the phenomenon is that people do not genuinely believe the content of their delusions. In the article, we resist the traditional explanation and offer an alternative hypothesis: people with delusions often fail to acquire or to maintain the motivation to act on their delusional beliefs. This may be due to avolition, to emotional disturbances, or to the fact that, given the peculiar content of some delusions, the surrounding environment does not support the agent's motivation to act. © 2012 The Author(s)

    Delusions and Responsibility for Action: Insights from the Breivik Case

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    What factors should be taken into account when attributing criminal responsibility to perpetrators of severe crimes? We discuss the Breivik case, and the considerations which led to holding Breivik accountable for his criminal acts. We put some pressure on the view that experiencing certain psychiatric symptoms or receiving a certain psychiatric diagnosis is sufficient to establish criminal insanity. We also argue that the presence of delusional beliefs, often regarded as a key factor in determining responsibility, is neither necessary nor sufficient for criminal insanity. © 2013 The Author(s)

    A role for ownership and authorship in the analysis of thought insertion

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    Philosophers are interested in the phenomenon of thought insertion because it challenges the common assumption that one can ascribe to oneself the thoughts that one can access first-personally. In the standard philosophical analysis of thought insertion, the subject owns the 'inserted' thought but lacks a sense of agency towards it. In this paper we want to provide an alternative analysis of the condition, according to which subjects typically lack both ownership and authorship of the 'inserted' thoughts. We argue that by appealing to a failure of ownership and authorship we can describe more accurately the phenomenology of thought insertion, and distinguish it from that of non-delusional beliefs that have not been deliberated about, and of other delusions of passivity. We can also start developing a more psychologically realistic account of the relation between intentionality, rationality and self knowledge in normal and abnormal cognition

    Una torre civica: il castello di Gemona

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    Ricollegandosi agli esiti della ricerca storica sul castello di Gemona condotta nel 1994/95, l'intervento propone una riflessione sulla funzione civica che le rovine del castello hanno svolto in epoca moderna e contemporanea
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