1,721,236 research outputs found
Book Review: Democracy’s International Law
No full textThis is essentially a book of protest against what is called international law, which the author finds to be largely the embodiment of immorality and antisocial practices akin to anarchy. The author is no tyro in the field of knowledge which he so scathingly criticizes. With a respected professional connection with international law, as American Agent in the well-known Pious Fund Case, as the Umpire of the Italian-Venezuelan Mixed Claims Commission and the author of some of its most learned awards, as a practitioner of many years standing, his views cannot be dismissed as the utterances of the impractical and misinformed reformer. His attack is directed against the irresponsible State, which he finds the subject of international law, and the so-called legalization of what he regards as the lawlessness of its acts of aggression
Book Review: International Arbitration from Athens to Locarno
No full textThe author of this book has rendered such useful service to the profession by his digest of the decisions and holdings of international tribunals in his Law and Procedure of International Tribunals and he has in other ways manifested so high a degree of social usefulness that we were entitled to expect more from a work bearing so expansive a title as the one under review. The reviewer was a little taken aback by the statement in the preface that "the only book containing in detail pronouncements of arbitral and other international courts of justice remains the Law and Procedure of International Tribunal by the present author." Thus to overlook the six volume work of Moore, which is still the source book for most work of the kind the author has here undertaken, excites wonder
Book Review: Democracy’s International Law
No full textThis is essentially a book of protest against what is called international law, which the author finds to be largely the embodiment of immorality and antisocial practices akin to anarchy. The author is no tyro in the field of knowledge which he so scathingly criticizes. With a respected professional connection with international law, as American Agent in the well-known Pious Fund Case, as the Umpire of the Italian-Venezuelan Mixed Claims Commission and the author of some of its most learned awards, as a practitioner of many years standing, his views cannot be dismissed as the utterances of the impractical and misinformed reformer. His attack is directed against the irresponsible State, which he finds the subject of international law, and the so-called legalization of what he regards as the lawlessness of its acts of aggression
Book Review: Chief Justice Stone and the Supreme Court
No full textRealizing that the higher one goes in the judicial hierarchy the more judicial doctrine tends to become subjective jurisprudence, and that the Supreme Court is a highly organized political body, the author, a teacher of political science, essays in minor degree by a number of articles the task of giving the public a profile of Chief Justice Stone\u27s contribution to constitutional doctrine. Preceded by an informative personal note from Charles A. Beard, the Dean of American historians, the profile is presented in the light of a few leading doctrines which, while fundamental, do not do complete justice to Chief Justice Stone\u27s magnificent contributions. The author is of course less interested in the Chief Justice\u27s personality than in the constitutional views which are expressed in his many opinions. Also, he is more interested in the Chief Justice\u27s conceptions of the judicial function than in the particular decisions the Chief Justice has written. The author notes, for example, the frequency with which Mr. Justice Stone\u27s dissenting opinions became in a later day the majority opinion of the Court. The Chief Justice is distinguished by a certain prophetic vision of the direction in which public policy is likely to go, and for that reason must have felt himself at home when the five conservatives of the pre-1936 days became gradually a dissenting minority, and the dissenters of those days, led by Holmes, Brandeis, Stone and Cardozo, represented the prevailing majority
Book Review: Treatise on International Law, 30 Yale Law Journal 102 (1920)
No full textThis is an unusual work. Instead of presenting the rules of positive law as developed in the practice of states, by custom, agreement, diplomacy, arbitration, etc., the learned author has apparently set himself the task of finding the underlying philosophy and legal force in the rules of conduct which characterize the intercourse of nations. His work therefore constitutes a critical analysis of the views of modern writers on the so-called rules of international law and an effort to deduce from conflicting opinion what seems to him the fundamental truth. This analysis is made from the point of view of the lawyer, the important conclusions of writers as to rules of law being measured by the test of legal accuracy. Where the practice of states differs, the author seeks to present the reasons, found in the external factors influencing state conduct, for departure from a norm, if there is one. The author evidences throughout a critical legal mind which takes nothing for granted; the book, therefore, cannot fail to be of interest to the student of international law
Book Review: Recognition in International Law
No full textThis is probably the most exhaustive study of recognition ever published. It is first of all to be noticed that recognition presupposes a congeries of independent states with no superstate in existence. Acknowledgment of the impossibility of a superstate, in which the author had great faith, must have caused him some regret. The work is divided into four parts. Part I discusses the legal nature of recognition and whether it fulfills a declaratory function, as the Institute of International Law supposes, or a constitutive function, as most authors assume. The author leans toward the constitutive view, since no state can have international intercourse without prior recognition. As a matter of fact, it is believed that while recognition is constitutive in that sense, it is also declaratory in assuming the prior existence of the state recognized. The reviewer would go further than the author in insisting upon its legal characteristic. There is responsibility not only to the parent state for premature recognition, but to the new state for tardy recognition. The fact that recognition is both legal and political at the same time should not cause astonishment, for that is true of many international acts. The reason why the legal characteristic has been overlooked is that few cases are known in which responsibility has been claimed, it being difficult to put a money value on such a delinquency. But that there is a duty to recognize a new state, regardless of one\u27s wishes in the matter, cannot be doubted
Book Review: Chief Justice Stone and the Supreme Court
No full textRealizing that the higher one goes in the judicial hierarchy the more judicial doctrine tends to become subjective jurisprudence, and that the Supreme Court is a highly organized political body, the author, a teacher of political science, essays in minor degree by a number of articles the task of giving the public a profile of Chief Justice Stone's contribution to constitutional doctrine. Preceded by an informative personal note from Charles A. Beard, the Dean of American historians, the profile is presented in the light of a few leading doctrines which, while fundamental, do not do complete justice to Chief Justice Stone's magnificent contributions. The author is of course less interested in the Chief Justice's personality than in the constitutional views which are expressed in his many opinions. Also, he is more interested in the Chief Justice's conceptions of the judicial function than in the particular decisions the Chief Justice has written. The author notes, for example, the frequency with which Mr. Justice Stone's dissenting opinions became in a later day the majority opinion of the Court. The Chief Justice is distinguished by a certain prophetic vision of the direction in which public policy is likely to go, and for that reason must have felt himself at home when the five conservatives of the pre-1936 days became gradually a dissenting minority, and the dissenters of those days, led by Holmes, Brandeis, Stone and Cardozo, represented the prevailing majority
Book Review: Treatise on International Law, 30 Yale Law Journal 102 (1920)
No full textThis is an unusual work. Instead of presenting the rules of positive law as developed in the practice of states, by custom, agreement, diplomacy, arbitration, etc., the learned author has apparently set himself the task of finding the underlying philosophy and legal force in the rules of conduct which characterize the intercourse of nations. His work therefore constitutes a critical analysis of the views of modern writers on the so-called rules of international law and an effort to deduce from conflicting opinion what seems to him the fundamental truth. This analysis is made from the point of view of the lawyer, the important conclusions of writers as to rules of law being measured by the test of legal accuracy. Where the practice of states differs, the author seeks to present the reasons, found in the external factors influencing state conduct, for departure from a norm, if there is one. The author evidences throughout a critical legal mind which takes nothing for granted; the book, therefore, cannot fail to be of interest to the student of international law
Book Review: Recognition in International Law
No full textThis is probably the most exhaustive study of recognition ever published. It is first of all to be noticed that recognition presupposes a congeries of independent states with no superstate in existence. Acknowledgment of the impossibility of a superstate, in which the author had great faith, must have caused him some regret. The work is divided into four parts. Part I discusses the legal nature of recognition and whether it fulfills a declaratory function, as the Institute of International Law supposes, or a constitutive function, as most authors assume. The author leans toward the constitutive view, since no state can have international intercourse without prior recognition. As a matter of fact, it is believed that while recognition is constitutive in that sense, it is also declaratory in assuming the prior existence of the state recognized. The reviewer would go further than the author in insisting upon its legal characteristic. There is responsibility not only to the parent state for premature recognition, but to the new state for tardy recognition. The fact that recognition is both legal and political at the same time should not cause astonishment, for that is true of many international acts. The reason why the legal characteristic has been overlooked is that few cases are known in which responsibility has been claimed, it being difficult to put a money value on such a delinquency. But that there is a duty to recognize a new state, regardless of one's wishes in the matter, cannot be doubted
Book Review: Enemy Property in America
No full textIn this compilation, the author deals with those sections of the Trading with the Enemy Act which relate to the seizure of the private property in the United States of German, Austrian, and Hungarian citizens during the late war and with the decisions which have construed the several sections of that Act
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