1,720,972 research outputs found
Civil-military cooperation: a marriage of reason
The Royal Netherlands Navy operates on, above and below the surface of the sea. What does this mean for the naval officer? First of all, he operates in an inherently dangerous environ-ment. The sea itself, as well as life and work on board, harbours many dangers. Secondly, it isimpossible for the crew to leave the ship during periods at sea, which can last up to about eight weeks. The ship forms a close and self-reliant community. In other words, the crew have to sail the ship safely, together. Basic naval or nautical training at the Royal Netherlands Naval College in Den Helder is oriented towards this. After a short historical survey of the basic naval training of the aspirant naval officer or midshipman of the Seaman Branch over the past few centuries, the present-day organization of basic naval training within the curriculum of the College and the various tools employed in it will be described
The role of communication and information in civil-military cooperation in humanitarian operations
Ten years into the post Cold War era have shown many humanitarian disasters caused by war. In the wake of these disasters many relief organizations emerged to give humanitarian aid. Nowadays, there is a great variety of actors working in the field of humanitarian operations in order to cope with the demands made by the security environment of the 21st century.The players in the humanitarian field have many origins: international military and civilian organizations, like the United Nations, whose members are nation states; non-governmental organizations (NGOs), like Memisa or Médecins sans Frontières (MSF); the International Committee for the Red Cross; transnational corporations; and the authorities of host nations.They are in fact any group that has the will and the potential to help in specific crises. All the organizations providing aid in crises have their specific working field, operating along side each other and, where and if necessary, collaborating with each other. They are in some instances very different from each other and often they are not traditional collaboration partners at all. Two reasons seem to account for the growth of organizations in this area and the resulting non-traditional coalitions that are necessary. Firstly, the transnational characteristics of the new security issues require another division of labour in which neither the military nor anyother single organization or nation is able to solve the problems on its own and a multi-actor approach is called for. Consequently, a wide variety of civilian and military actors, who generally have not met before, find themselves working on a shared problem. Secondly, because of the uncertainty amongst the traditional players regarding the approach to the new security issues, new actors have stepped into the void. In this article the authors will examine one field of such non-traditional multi-actor collaboration: the militarys relationship with civil organizations and institutions in humanitarian operations
Exciting dilemma: a defence economics view on a US exit from NATO
Study of an exit dilemma from a defence economic perspective on alliances, more specifically against a background of burden sharing theories on NATO. We consider an international alliance, NATO, to be a community programmed to receive, as once membership has been obtained, no country has ever exited, either under pressure or voluntarily. This includes France, a country that has been in the process of "checking out" but never left altogether. The authors ask themselves whether it would be possible to envisage NATO's most prominent member, the US to exit - as in actually leave - NATO in the near future. From the empirical research underpinning this article it will become clear the US carry the heaviest burden by far, but as to the question whether this means they might be expected to exit NATO on the short-term there appear to be some other issues to consider
An economic analysis of cyber attacks
The authors make an attempt to economize the 'feeling of being secure' in times of cyber threats. They distinguish the direct costs of cyber attacks, the indirect costs that follow from the responses to deter (possible) attacks and the indirect expenditures resulting from the rules and regulations that governments implement to deal with the dangers from cyberspace. The authors end with suggestions to calculate the costs of a large-scale cyber attack once such a disaster would have really occured. Such disaster could parralel the events on 9/1
Viable cooperation in civil-military relationships
In this paper the authors have adopted the Viable System Model (VSM), (a framework for diagnosing and (re)designing the distribution of complexity in order to ensure the viability of an organisation) to analyse the viability of an interorganisational civil military network in the context of a humanitarian operation. More in particular, they will assess the viability of civil-military collaboration in the case of the operation Allied Harbour (1999), using the VSM as a template. To this end, the remainder of this paper is divided into five sections. In section two, VSM is described, and, more in particular, the five functions required for viability and their interrelatedness. Section three discusses civil-military cooperation processes that took place during operation Allied Harbour between the NATO-military forces and the authorities of the host country, the representatives of UN-aid organisations and NGOs. We will compare the reality of civil-military cooperation to the standards provided by VSM and identify potential problems that may thwart the viability of civil-military networks. In section four we will assess the viability of civil-military cooperation during operation Allied Harbour. Finally, section five presents a summary of the findings of the paper
The paymasters: financial systems supporting terrorism
The authors discuss the mechanism through which terrorist organizations acquire the funds they need to conduct their operations. They focus on levers of control, advocating the identification of practices that may be disrupted and context that may be changed so that financing terrorism becomes progressively harder. They also discuss the problems of worldwide inter-organization cooperation between police organizations, armed forces, international politics, business corporations, and financial institutions, all of which play a part in financial counterterrorism. Here, the keys are consensus on the domains of cooperation and the division of responsibilities and trust. While trust needs to be shared widely, Beeres & Bollen conclude that partners in counterterrorism need only an average level of trust to cooperate effectively
Towards a European Defence Union?: Military Burden Sharing in the European Union 2006-2013
According to the European Council (2013), "Defence matters". However, the extent to which defence does matter appears to vary among the member states. Kollias (2008), analyzing burden sharing and free-riding behaviour of fifteen members of the European Union (EU15) over the year 2001, asks: Suppose the EU15 would create a formal military alliance offering an umbrella of collective defence and security, what member states would be considered over-contributing or under-contributing in providing collective defence and security? Kollias concludes, out of all EU15 members, France, Greece, Italy and the UK would be over-contributing regarding the costs they occur in producing collective military strength if a common European defence came into existence. All other EU countries would be under-contributing compared to the benefits they would enjoy. Our paper aims to revisit Kollias’ analysis and to find out, if, nowadays, EU member states would have moved towards each other in the provision of EU-wide defence and security and whether the same would hold regarding the distribution of costs and benefits. We find that over the period 2006-2013 change has occurred. Over this timespan, if united in EDU, Greece would have been considered an under-contributing country, while Germany would count as an over-contributing country
'The global financial war on terror': analyses en cijfers
Beschouwing over de financiële aspecten van terrorisme en contraterrorisme. Er kan geen aanslag plaatsvinden of verijdeld worden zonder dat daar geld mee gemoeid is
On the conditions for CIMIC during humanitarian operations
This paper focuses on three questions. Firstly, what causes civilian actors and the military to cooperate? Secondly, is civil-military cooperation limited to specific areas and, finally, how to decide to which civil-military alliances time and energy should be devoted? The authors describe an episode of the repatriation of Kosovar refugees during operation Allied Harbour in 1999. In this section the authors point out some of the collaboration processes that have developed between the military and civilian actors within the Emergency Management Group (EMG). In addition, they present some examples of failing civil-military cooperation. In the next section some conditions for civil-military cooperation to occur will be discussed and the authors describe some of the characteristics of civil-military alliances. Section 4 focuses on the ways in which specific kinds of military contributions may influence the need for prolonged cooperation from the civilian actors perspective. In section 5 some notes are provided on how to decide which civil-military alliances are important to enter into. Finally, section 6 summarises the findings of the paper
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