208 research outputs found
EJT_796540__Appendix_I_Methodology – Supplemental material for Implementation in practice: The use of force to protect civilians in United Nations peacekeeping
No full textSupplemental material, EJT_796540__Appendix_I_Methodology for Implementation in practice: The use of force to protect civilians in United Nations peacekeeping by Ingvild Bode and John Karlsrud in European Journal of International Relations</p
AI Technologies and International Relations:Do We Need New Analytical Frameworks?
Full text linkAI technologies are drawing increasing attention among international relations (IR) scholars. Ingvild Bode reviews this literature through considering, in particular, the extent to which such studies continue to use or expand on well-traded analytical frameworks. She finds that scholarship on AI in IR can look back at a longer-than-expected trajectory and centres on four key themes: the balance of power; disinformation; governance; and ethics. Much of this literature works with well-established IR conceptualisations, while studies across three emerging themes - (re)conceptualising technology, beyond the AI arms race, and unpacking relevant actors - push and expand established disciplinary frameworks. ◼.</p
WarPod #7:Denise Garcia: Common Good Governance in the Age of Military Artificial Intelligence
No full textDr. Ingvild Bode, Associate Professor at the Center for War Studies and Principal Investigator of the AutoNorms project, speaks to Denise Garcia, Professor at Northeastern University in Boston. Prof. Garcia delivered the 2022 CWS Annual Lecture, where she presented her forthcoming book "Common Good Governance in the Age of Military Artificial Intelligence" (Oxford University Press). The book examines the complexities entailed in establishing a global framework to govern the military use of AI by proposing inclusive and humane ways to forge cooperation. In this WarPod Prof. Garcia discusses what inspired her to write this book as well as why she chose this particular approach towards the study of patterns and trends in the militarization of AI
WarPod #7:Denise Garcia: Common Good Governance in the Age of Military Artificial Intelligence
No full textDr. Ingvild Bode, Associate Professor at the Center for War Studies and Principal Investigator of the AutoNorms project, speaks to Denise Garcia, Professor at Northeastern University in Boston. Prof. Garcia delivered the 2022 CWS Annual Lecture, where she presented her forthcoming book "Common Good Governance in the Age of Military Artificial Intelligence" (Oxford University Press). The book examines the complexities entailed in establishing a global framework to govern the military use of AI by proposing inclusive and humane ways to forge cooperation. In this WarPod Prof. Garcia discusses what inspired her to write this book as well as why she chose this particular approach towards the study of patterns and trends in the militarization of AI
WarPod #7:Denise Garcia: Common Good Governance in the Age of Military Artificial Intelligence
No full textDr. Ingvild Bode, Associate Professor at the Center for War Studies and Principal Investigator of the AutoNorms project, speaks to Denise Garcia, Professor at Northeastern University in Boston. Prof. Garcia delivered the 2022 CWS Annual Lecture, where she presented her forthcoming book "Common Good Governance in the Age of Military Artificial Intelligence" (Oxford University Press). The book examines the complexities entailed in establishing a global framework to govern the military use of AI by proposing inclusive and humane ways to forge cooperation. In this WarPod Prof. Garcia discusses what inspired her to write this book as well as why she chose this particular approach towards the study of patterns and trends in the militarization of AI
Automation and Autonomy in Air Defence Systems Catalogue (v.1)
No full textAutomation and Autonomy in Air Defence Systems Catalogue (v.1)
Dr Tom Watts, Department of Politics and International Relations, Hertfordshire University & Dr Ingvild Bode, Centre for War Studies, University of Southern Denmark.
This catalogue has been created in conjunction with the ‘Meaning-Less Human Control: Lessons from Air Defence Systems on Meaningful Human Control for the debate on AWS’ report published in February 2020 as a collaboration between Drone Wars UK and the University of Southern Denmark. It provides information on the system history, maximum system range, target type, system updates/variants and automated/autonomous features of twenty-eight air defence systems which have been operated by at least sixty states.
This catalogue has been constructed using a range of open-source material. This includes: (1) press releases and marketing material from weapons manufacturers; (2) press releases and factsheets published by defence ministries; (3) technical and policy reports authored by researchers based at think tanks; (4) Media reports from reputable international news and defence outlets; and (5) other air defence system databases. All references are provided as URLs and were accessible online as of January 2nd 2021. Please note: when information about a system has been unavailable, we have listed it as NDA (No Data Available).
In constructing this open-source catalogue, we have faced three methodological challenges worth briefly highlighting here:
Many of the technical capabilities of air defence systems are not publicly available. Without having physically observed the testing and development of these systems, or been involved in their operation, we cannot be sure of their exact capabilities.
Given the political sensitivities concerning the definition of autonomy, some of the open-source information which is available on the autonomous and automated features of air defence systems is vague and, at times, even contradictory.
Whilst this catalogue has included information on the technical capabilities of air defence systems, this must be qualified by the uncertainty concerning the Rules of Engagement under which human agents use these systems.
A more detailed explanation of our case selection, catalogue index and research approach and limitations can be found in Section 3 of the accompanying report.
Spotted an error? Contact Us!
We have taken the decision to make this catalogue open-access so that, if any of the information included in this document is incorrect, we can update it accordingly. If you spot an error in this catalogue, and would like to inform us of it, we can be reached at [email protected]
Funding
Research for this data catalogue was supported by grants from the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust and from the European Research Council
Loitering Munitions and Unpredictability: Autonomy in Weapon Systems and Challenges to Human Control
Full text linkThis report, published by the Center for War Studies, University of Southern Denmark and the Royal Holloway Centre for International Security, highlights the immediate need to regulate autonomous weapon systems, or ‘killer robots’ as they are colloquially called.
Written by Dr. Ingvild Bode and Dr. Tom F.A. Watts, authors of an earlier study of air defence systems published with Drone Wars UK, the “Loitering Munitions and Unpredictability” report examines whether the use of automated, autonomous, and AI technologies as part of the global development, testing, and fielding of loitering munitions since the 1980s has impacted emerging practices and social norms of human control over the use of force. It is commonly assumed that the challenges generated by the weaponization of autonomy will materialise in the near to medium term future. The report’s central argument is that whilst most existing loitering munitions are operated by a human who authorizes strikes against system-designated targets, the integration of automated and autonomous technologies into these weapons has created worrying precedents deserving of greater public scrutiny.
Loitering munitions – or ‘killer drones’ as they are often popularly known – are expendable uncrewed aircraft which can integrate sensor-based analysis to hover over, detect and explode into targets. These weapons are very important technologies within the international regulatory debates on autonomous weapon systems – a set of technologies defined by Article 36 as weapons “where force is applied automatically on the basis of a sensor-based targeting system”.
The earliest loitering munitions such as the Israel Aerospace Industries Harpy are widely considered as being examples of weapons capable of automatically applying force via sensor-based targeting without human intervention. A May 2021 report authored by a UN Panel of Experts on Libya suggests that Kargu-2 loitering munitions manufactured by the Turkish defence company STM may have been “programmed to attack targets without requiring data connectivity between the operator and the munition”. According to research published by Daniel Gettinger, the number of states producing these weapons more than doubled from fewer than 10 in 2017 to almost 24 by mid-2022. The sizeable role which loitering munitions have played in the ongoing fighting between Russia and the Ukraine further underscores the timeliness of this report, having raised debates on whether so called “killer robots are the future of war?”
Most manufacturers of these weapons characterize loitering munitions as “human in the loop” systems. The operators of these systems are required to authorize strikes against system-designated targets. The findings of this report, however, suggest that the global trend toward increasing autonomy in targeting has already affected the quality and form of control over the use of force that humans can exercise over specific targeting decisions. Loitering munitions can use automated, autonomous, and to a limited extent, AI technologies to identify, track, and select targets. Some manufacturers also allude to the potential capacity of the systems to attack targets without human intervention. This suggests that human operators of loitering munitions may not always retain an ability to visually verify targets before attack. This report highlights three principal areas of concern:
Greater uncertainties regarding how human agents exert control over specific targeting decisions.
The use of loitering munitions as anti-personnel weapons and in populated areas.
Potential indiscriminate and wide area effects associated with the fielding of loitering munitions.
This report’s analysis is drawn from two sources of data: first, a new qualitative data catalogue which compiles the available open-source information about the technical details, development history, and use of autonomy and automation in a global sample of 24 loitering munitions; and second, an in-depth study of how such systems have been used in three recent conflicts – the Libyan Civil War (2014-2020), the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh War, and the War in Ukraine (2022-).
Based on its findings, the authors urge the various stakeholder groups participating in the debates at the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons Group of Governmental Experts and elsewhere to develop and adopt legally binding international rules on autonomy in weapon systems, including loitering munitions as a category therein. It is recommended that states:
Affirm, retain, and strengthen the current standard of real-time, direct human assessment of, and control over, specific targeting decisions when using loitering munitions and other weapons integrating automated, autonomous, and AI technologies as a firewall for ensuring compliance with legal and ethical norms.
Establish controls over the duration and geographical area within which weapons like loitering munitions that can use automated, autonomous, and AI technologies to identify, select, track, and apply force can operate.
Prohibit the integration of machine learning and other forms of unpredictable AI algorithms into the targeting functions of loitering munitions because of how this may fundamentally alter the predictability, explainability, and accountability of specific targeting decisions and their outcomes.
Establish controls over the types of environments in which sensor-based weapons like loitering munitions that can use automated, autonomous, and AI technologies to identify, select, track, and apply force to targets can operate. Loitering munitions functioning as AWS should not be used in populated areas.
Prohibit the use of certain target profiles for sensor-based weapons which use automated, autonomous, and AI technologies in targeting functions. This should include prohibiting the design, testing, and use of autonomy in weapon systems, including loitering munitions, to “target human beings” as well as limiting the use of such weapons “to objects that are military objectives by nature” (ICRC, 2021: 2.).
Be more forthcoming in releasing technical details relating to the quality of human control exercised in operating loitering munitions in specific targeting decisions. This should include the sharing, where appropriate, of details regarding the level and character of the training that human operators of loitering munitions receive.
Funding: Research for the report was supported by funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme (under grant agreement No. 852123, AutoNorms project) and from the Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust. Tom Watts’ revisions to this report were supported by the funding provided by his Leverhulme Trust Early Career Research Fellowship (ECF-2022-135). We also collaborated with Article 36 in writing the report.
About the authors: Dr Ingvild Bode is Associate Professor at the Center for War Studies, University of Southern Denmark and a Senior Research Fellow at the Conflict Analysis Research Centre, University of Kent. She is the Principal Investigator of the European Research Council-funded “AutoNorms” project, examining how autonomous weapons systems may change international use of force norms. Her research focuses on understanding processes of normative change, especially through studying practices in relation to the use of force, military Artificial Intelligence, and associated governance demands. More information about Ingvild’s her research is available here.
Dr Tom F.A. Watts is a Leverhulme Trust Early Career Researcher based at the Department of Politics, International Relations, and Philosophy at Royal Holloway, University of London. His current project titled “Great Power Competition and Remote Warfare: Change or Continuity in Practice?” (ECF-2022-135) examines the relationship between the use of the strategic practices associated with the concept of remote warfare, the dynamics of change and continuity in contemporary American foreign policy, and autonomy in weapons systems. More information about Tom’s research is available here
Individual Agency and Policy Change at the United Nations: The People of the United Nations
No full textThis book highlights how temporary international civil servants play a crucial role in initiating processes of legal and institutional change in the United Nations system. These individuals are the “missing” creative elements needed to fully understand the emergence and initial spread of UN ideas such as human development, sovereignty as responsibility, and multifunctional peacekeeping.
The book:
•Shows that that temporary UN officials are an actor category which is empirically crucial, yet usually neglected in analytical studies of the UN system. Focussing on these particular individual actors therefore allows for a better understanding of complex UN decision-making.
•Demonstrates how these civil servants matter, looking at what their agency is based on. Offering a new and distinctive model, Bode seeks to move towards a comprehensive conceptualisation of individual agency, which is currently conspicuous for its absence in many theoretical approaches that address policy change
•Uses three key case studies of international civil servants (Francis Deng, Mahbub ul Haq and Marrack Goulding) to explore the possibilities of this specific group of UN individuals to act as agents of change and thereby test the prevailing notion that international bureaucrats can only act as agents of the status quo
Meaning-less Human Control: Lessons from air defence systems on meaningful human control for the debate on AWS
Full text linkA new report co-published today by Drone Wars UK and the Centre for War Studies; University of Southern Denmark examines the lessons to be learned from the diminishing human control of air defence systems for the debate about lethal autonomous weapons systems (LAWS) – ‘Killer Robots’ as they are colloquially called.In an autonomous weapons system, autonomous capabilities are integrated into critical functions that relate to the selection and engagement of targets without direct human intervention. Subject expert Professor Noel Sharkey, suggests that a Lethal Autonomous Weapon System can be defined as “systems that, once activated, can track, identify and attack targets with violent force without further human intervention”. Examples of such systems include BAE Systems’ Taranis drone, stationary sentries such as the Samsung Techwin SGR-A1, and ground vehicles such as the Kalashnikov Concern Uran-9.Air Defence Systems are an important area of study in relation to the development of LAWS as, they are already in operation and, while not completely autonomous due to having a human operator in control, they have automated and increasingly autonomous features. Vincent Boulanin and Maaike Verbruggen’s study for the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates that 89 states operate air defence systems. These includes global military powers such as the US, the UK, France, Russia, and China but also regional powers such as Brazil, India, and Japan. The ‘Meaning-less human control’ report draws on a new data catalogue constructed by the report’s authors, Ingvild Bode and Tom Watts, to examine automation and autonomy in 28 air defence systems used across the world, and analyses high-profile failures of such systems including the downing of Iran Air Flight 655 (1988), Malaysian Airlines MH 17 (2014), Ukrainian Airlines PS752 (2020), and two instances of fratricide involving the Patriot Air Defense System in the Second Gulf War (2003). Its central argument is that the integration of autonomy and automation into the critical functions of air defense systems has, under some conditions, made human control over specific use of force decisions increasingly meaningless.The report argues this is happening for three reasons: (1) because of the speed at which these systems operate, (2) because of the complexity of the tasks they perform, and (3) because of the demands their use places human operators under. As more and more tasks have been delegated to machines, the human operators of air defence systems have changed from active controllers to more passive supervisors. In a practical sense, this has meant that human operators have come to fulfil minimal but at the same time impossibly complex roles lacking a sufficient understanding of the decision-making process, sufficient situational understanding, and the time to properly think about decisions. Taken together, the quality of control that human operators can exercise in specific use of force situations has incrementally become more meaningless than meaningful
More than Counterterrorism? Re-examining the Obama administration's military response to al-Qaeda's affiliates
Full text linkThis thesis critically examines the means, animators and continuity of American counterterrorism operations outside of Afghanistan and Iraq during Obama's presidency. It takes the form of a structured-focused comparison of the Obama administration's military response to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, al-Shabaab, and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Most existing studies of Obama's foreign and counterterrorism policies have analysed these campaigns in isolation from one another, or marganlised them. This thesis presents the first holistic study of the Obama administration's military response against all three of al-Qaeda's regional affiliates and speaks to a series of larger trends in the contemporary practices of American military intervention in the global south. It argues that there was far more to the means of U.S. counterterrorism operations outside of Afghanistan and Iraq than a single technological development (drones) and a single practice of statecraft (targeted killings). Security force assistance programmes are shown to have also been at the centre of what is conceptualised as Obama's small-footprint approach to counterterrorism, and the larger retooling of the coercive practices of U.S. military intervention in the global south during the era of perceived imperial decline which followed the Global Financial Crisis and Iraq War. It also argues that there was more animating the military response to al-Qaeda's affiliates than just counterterrorism and national security concerns. Working within the historical materialist tradition, al-Qaeda's affiliates are shown to have challenged two core practices of American imperialism: the reproduction of open-doors and closed frontiers. This thesis contributes to International Relations scholarship more broadly by shedding new light on the relationship between military assistance programmes and the spatial arrangement of American power. An alternative perspective on al-Qaeda's challenge to American primacy 'from below' is also advanced by outlining the movement's approach to economic warfare
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