120,500 research outputs found
Constable (W. G.). The Painter's Workshop.
No full textCoremans P. Constable (W. G.). The Painter's Workshop. . In: Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire, tome 34, fasc. 1, 1956. pp. 170-171
Fonds Louis Bertrand. Fonds numérisé. Correspondance de Louis Bertrand. [Lettre autographe de G. Jean-Aubry à Louis Bertrand]
No full textNumérisation effectuée à partir d'un document original : LBC0027.Appartient à l'ensemble documentaire : 3M000Appartient à l'ensemble documentaire : 3M007Jean-Aubry, G. (1882-1950).Bertrand, Louis (1866-1941).Londres (GB).Lieu de copie : Londre
Export Taxes under Bertrand Duopoly
No full textThis article analyses export taxes in a Bertrand duopoly with product differentiation, where a home and a foreign firm both export to a third-country market. It is shown that the maximum-revenue export tax always exceeds the optimum-welfare export tax. In a Nash equilibrium in export taxes, the country with the low cost firm imposes the largest export tax. The results under Bertrand duopoly are compared with those under Cournot duopoly. It is shown that the absolute value of the export subsidy or tax under Cournot duopoly exceeds the export tax under Bertrand duopoly.
Comparing Cournot and Bertrand Competition in a Unionized Mixed Duopoly
No full textWe investigate a differentiated mixed duopoly in which private and public firms can choose to strategically set prices or quantities by facing a union bargaining process. For the case of a unionized mixed duopoly, only the public firm is able to choose a type of contract irrespective of whether the goods are substitutes or complements in the equilibrium. Thus, we show that social welfare under Bertrand competition is always determined by the public firm's dominant strategy, wherein the Bertrand competition entails higher social welfare than the Cournot competition. Moreover, there are multiple Nash equilibria in the contract stage of the game. Finally, our main results hold irrespective of the nature of goods, with the exception of when a sufficiently large parameter of complements is employed, the ranking of private firm's profit is not reversed, which is contrast to the standard findings.Wage Bargaining, Union, Cournot-Bertrand Competition, Mixed Duopoly.
Cournot-Bertrand competition in a unionized mixed duopoly
No full textWe investigate a differentiated mixed duopoly in which private and public firms can choose to strategically set prices or quantities by facing a union bargaining process. For the case of a unionized mixed duopoly, only public firm is able to choose a type of contract based on the degree of substitutability in the equilibrium. Focusing on the case of substitute goods, we show that Bertrand (respectively, Cournot) competition entails higher social welfare than Cournot (respectively, Bertrand) competition if the degree of substitutability is relatively small (respectively, large). Thus, there are multiple Nash equilibria in the contract stage of the game. As a result, Singh and Vives' ranking of social welfare is reversed in a range of substitution values for which it is a dominant strategy for public firm to choose either quantity or price contracts.Wage Bargaining; Union; Cournot-Bertrand Competition; Mixed Duopoly
Bertrand Competition with Non-rigid Capacity Constraints
No full textWe examine a model of Bertrand competition with non-rigid capacity constraints, so that by incurring an additional cost, firms can produce beyond capacity. We find that there is an interval of prices such that a price can be sustained as a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if and only if it lies in this interval. We then examine the properties of this set as (a) the number of firms becomes large and (b) the capacity cost increases.
Bertrand competition with non-rigid capacity constraints
No full textWe examine a model of Bertrand competition with non-rigid capacity constraints, so that by incurring an additional per unit cost of capacity expansion, firms can produce beyond capacity. We find that there is an interval of prices such that a price can be sustained as a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if and only if it lies in this interval. We then examine the properties of this set as [a] the number of firms becomes large and [b] the capacity cost increases.Bertrand competition, capacity constraint
Quality Uncertainty as Resolution of the Bertrand Paradox
No full textWe show that in a homogeneous-good duopoly market with quality uncertainty and constant unit costs, the Bertrand paradox (i.e., marginal cost pricing) can be avoided.oligopoly, endogenous preferences, threshold utility
Cournot and Bertrand competition with asymmetric costs in a mixed duopoly
No full textWe investigate a differentiated mixed duopoly in which private and public firms can choose to strategically set prices or quantities when the public firm is less efficient than the private firm. Thus, regardless of whether the goods are substitutes or complements, if the degree of public firm's inefficiency is sufficiently small, there exists a dominant strategy for both public and private firms that choose Bertrand competition, while there exists a dominant strategy only for the private firm that chooses Bertrand competition if the degree of inefficiency is sufficiently large. Consequently, we show that regardless of the nature of goods, (i) social welfare under Bertrand competition is determined in equilibrium, if the degree of public firm's inefficiency is sufficiently small; and (ii) if the degree of its inefficiency is sufficiently large, social welfare under which the private firm sets its price and the public firm sets its quantity is determined in equilibrium. Moreover, the ranking of a private firm's profit is not reversed.Inefficiency, Cournot-Bertrand Competition, Mixed Duopoly
Comparing Cournot and Bertrand Equilibria in a Differentiated Duopoly with Product R&D
No full textThis paper compares Bertrand and Cournot equilibria in a differentiated duopoly with substitute goods and product R&D. I find that R&D expenditure, prices and firms� net profits are always higher under quantity competition than under price competition. Furthermore, output, consumer surplus and total welfare are higher in the Bertrand equilibrium than in the Cournot equilibrium if either R&D spillovers are weak or products are sufficiently differentiated. If R&D spillovers are strong and products are not too differentiated, then output, consumer surplus and total welfare are lower in the Bertrand case than in the Cournot case. Thus a key finding of the paper is that there are circumstances where quantity competition can be more beneficial than price competition both for consumers and for firms.
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