174,278 research outputs found
Comparing Cournot and Bertrand Competition in a Unionized Mixed Duopoly
No full textWe investigate a differentiated mixed duopoly in which private and public firms can choose to strategically set prices or quantities by facing a union bargaining process. For the case of a unionized mixed duopoly, only the public firm is able to choose a type of contract irrespective of whether the goods are substitutes or complements in the equilibrium. Thus, we show that social welfare under Bertrand competition is always determined by the public firm's dominant strategy, wherein the Bertrand competition entails higher social welfare than the Cournot competition. Moreover, there are multiple Nash equilibria in the contract stage of the game. Finally, our main results hold irrespective of the nature of goods, with the exception of when a sufficiently large parameter of complements is employed, the ranking of private firm's profit is not reversed, which is contrast to the standard findings.Wage Bargaining, Union, Cournot-Bertrand Competition, Mixed Duopoly.
Cournot-Bertrand competition in a unionized mixed duopoly
No full textWe investigate a differentiated mixed duopoly in which private and public firms can choose to strategically set prices or quantities by facing a union bargaining process. For the case of a unionized mixed duopoly, only public firm is able to choose a type of contract based on the degree of substitutability in the equilibrium. Focusing on the case of substitute goods, we show that Bertrand (respectively, Cournot) competition entails higher social welfare than Cournot (respectively, Bertrand) competition if the degree of substitutability is relatively small (respectively, large). Thus, there are multiple Nash equilibria in the contract stage of the game. As a result, Singh and Vives' ranking of social welfare is reversed in a range of substitution values for which it is a dominant strategy for public firm to choose either quantity or price contracts.Wage Bargaining; Union; Cournot-Bertrand Competition; Mixed Duopoly
Convexity of Bertrand oligopoly TU-games with differentiated products
No full textIn this article we consider Bertrand oligopoly TU-games with differentiated products. We assume that the demand system is Shubik's (1980) and that firms operate at a constant and identical marginal and average cost. First, we show that the alpha and beta- characteristic functions (Aumann 1959) lead to the same class of Bertrand oligopoly TU-games and we prove that the convexity property holds for this class of games. Then, following Chander and Tulkens (1997) we consider the gamma-characteristic function where firms react to a deviating coalition by choosing individual best reply strategies. For this class of games, we show that the Equal Division Solution belongs to the core and we provide a sufficient condition under which such games are convex.Bertrand oligopoly TU-games; Core; Convexity; Equal Division Solution
Robustness to Strategic Uncertainty (Revision of DP 2010-70)
No full textWe model a player’s uncertainty about other players’ strategy choices as smooth probability distributions over their strategy sets. We call a strategy profile (strictly) robust to strategic uncertainty if it is the limit, as uncertainty vanishes, of some sequence (all sequences) of strategy profiles, in each of which every player’s strategy is optimal under under his or her uncertainty about the others. We derive general properties of such robustness, and apply the definition to Bertrand competition games and the Nash demand game, games that admit infinitely many Nash equilibria. We show that our robustness criterion selects a unique Nash equilibrium in the Bertrand games, and that this agrees with recent experimental findings. For the Nash demand game, we show that the less uncertain party obtains the bigger share.Nash equilibrium;refinement;strategic uncertainty;price competition;Bertrand competition;bargaining;Nash demand game
Variations on the Author
No full text“Variations on the Author” discusses two of Eduardo Coutinho’s recent films (Um Dia na Vida, from 2010, and Últimas Conversas, posthumously released in 2015) and their contribution to the general question of documentary authorship. The director’s filmography is characterized by a consistent yet self-effacing form of authorial self-inscription: Coutinho often features as an interviewer that rather than express opinions propels discourses; an interviewer that is good at listening. This mode of self-inscription characterizes him as an author who is not expressive but who is nonetheless markedly present on the screen. In Um Dia na Vida, however, Coutinho is completely absent form the image, while Últimas Conversas, on the contrary, includes a confessional prologue that moves the director from the margins to the center of his films. This article examines the ways in which these works stand out in the filmography of a director who offers new insights into the notion of cinematic authorship
O primeiro ancestral romântico do surrealismo, Aloysius Bertrand
No full textAloysius Bertrand was a romantic poet, largely regarded as the initiator of modern prose poem. His most accomplished work, Gaspard de la Nuit, gathered the interest of some important readers – such as Sainte-Beuve, Baudelaire, Mallarmé, Max Jacob and André Breton. This article focalizes on Jacob’s parodic approach to the text and the discovery of the work by the surrealist’s group at the fi rst years of the 20th century. The ancestry of surrealism, obstinate subject in some of Breton’s writings, exposes Bertrand to an infl uent, renewed attention that will last for decades (to the present day).
Keywords: Aloysius Bertrand. French romanticism. Gaspard de la Nuit. Max Jacob. André Beton. Surrealism.O poeta romântico Aloysius Bertrand, considerado por muitos o inaugurador do poema em prosa moderno, é obscuro nos círculos acadêmicos brasileiros – ainda que sua mais notável obra, Gaspard de la Nuit, seja objeto de leituras ricas conduzidas por autores tão solares como Sainte-Beuve, Baudelaire, Mallarmé, Max Jacob e André Breton. Este artigo começa revisitando a abordagem paródica de Max Jacob relativamente a Bertrand para desembocar na descoberta desse romântico pelo círculo surrealista de Breton na aurora do século XX. O tema dos ascendentes do surrealismo, motivo obstinado de uma fase dos escritos bretonianos, é ocasião para expor Bertrand a um olhar renovado que será influente nas décadas seguintes, até nossos dias.
Palavras-chave: Aloysius Bertrand. Max Jacob. André Breton. Romantismo francês. Surrealismo
On the robustness of concealing cost information in oligopoly
No full textCompeting firms are usually better informed about their own cost parameters than about those of their rivals. Therefore, it is an important issue to study the incentives of firms to exchange private cost information. We resolve and further generalize an influential model of Raith (1996) and show that, independent of the number of firms, concealing cost information is a dominant firm strategy in heterogeneous Bertrand oligopolies with substitutive as well as with complementary goods.cost uncertainty
O objeto em Bertrand e Salgado
No full textSebastião Salgado as well asYan Arthus Bertrand are mapping the world, undertaking an extraordinary work of capturing images. Both photograph people at every place of the world, even at the smallest ones. Why is Salgado is than so much more celebrated? Maybe the answer lays in the relation "subject-object". Knowing means for Salgado to photograph.The presuppositions of both photographs are revealed in that way of mediation. In a sense, their positions are alike. The position assumed by Bertrand is macro referential, and he captures groups from an uncommonpoint of view, showing man's superiority over the planet/nature. Salgado,on his turn, states that it is necessary to go down. While participant, he deeply immerses in sounds, aromas, gestures and reappropriations. When approaching an object, the subject is forced to take a stand.Tanto Sebastião Salgado quanto Yan Arthus Bertrand estão mapeando o mundo num descomunal trabalho de captação de imagens. FotografamoHomem em todas os lugarejos da terra, por menor que sejam. Mas por que Salgado é tão mais celebrizado? Talvez a resposta esteja na relação"sujeito-objeto". "Conhecer, no vocabulário de Salgado, é fotografar''. Os pressupostos de cada um dos dois fotOgrafos, revelam-se nessa forma de mediação. E ate certo ponto, elas se parecem, ambas as posições. Subjaz algo de modernista. Na posição de Bertrand, macro referencializada, ele apanha conjuntos sob um ponto de vista incomum. Parece um projeto baseado na superioridade do homem sobre o planeta/natureza, o e aio dado moderno. Ja Salgado diz que é preciso descer. Enquanto participe, esta imerso em sons, aromas, gestos e reapropriações. Aproximar-sedo objeto obriga o sujeito a tomar uma posição
Alfredo da Silva e Salazar
No full textO presente trabalho constitui o último volume da trilogia iniciada com as biografias de Alfredo da Silva (Bertrand, 2004) e Manuel de Mello (INAPA, 2007), seu genro e sucessor à frente dos destinos do grupo da Companhia União Fabril (CUF)
Convexity and the Shapley value in Bertrand oligopoly TU-games with Shubik's demand functions
No full textThe Bertrand Oligopoly situation with Shubik's demand functions is modelled as a cooperative TU game. For that purpose two optimization problems are solved to arrive at the description of the worth of any coalition in the so-called Bertrand Oligopoly Game. Under certain circumstances, this Bertrand oligopoly game has clear affinities with the well-known notion in statistics called variance with respect to the distinct marginal costs. This Bertrand Oligopoly Game is shown to be totally balanced, but fails to be convex unless all the firms have the same marginal costs. Under the complementary circumstances, the Bertrand Oligopoly Game is shown to be convex and in addition, its Shapley value is fully determined on the basis of linearity applied to an appealing decomposition of the Bertrand Oligopoly Game into the difference between two convex games, besides two nonessential games. One of these two essential games concerns the square of one non- essential game.Bertrand Oligopoly situation, Bertrand Oligopoly Game, Convexity, Shapley Value, Total Balancedness.
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