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    Prendre d’une main et donner de l’autre : taxation des produits pétroliers et aide internationale

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    To study transfers between oil-consuming developed countries and oil-producing developing countries, we use a dynamic decentralized general-equilibrium model (GEM) with two countries : a rich, altruistic, and resource-poor country (North) and a poor , resource-rich country (South), where resource-owners live alongside impoverished workers. On the one hand, North’s taxation of resource use extracts a portion of South’s mining rents in a distorting manner. On the other hand, North distributes foreign aid to improve the situation of South’s poor. The coexistence of these transfers in opposite directions illustrates the interference between North’s tax and international-aid policies. We analyze the interference and suggest a contractual solution based on coordination between the two sets of policies.Pour étudier les transferts entre les pays développés, consommateurs de pétrole, et les pays pauvres qui en produisent, nous proposons un modèle d’équilibre général décentralisé dynamique à deux pays : un pays riche, altruiste et pauvre en ressource (Nord) et un pays pauvre, riche en ressource (Sud) où les propriétaires de la ressource cohabitent avec des travailleurs pauvres. D’une part, la taxation de l’usage de la ressource dans le Nord extrait une partie des rentes minières du Sud de manière distorsive. D’autre part, le Nord distribue une aide étrangère pour améliorer la situation des pauvres du Sud. La coexistence de ces transferts de sens contraires témoigne de l’interférence des politiques de fiscalité et d’aide internationale mises en place par le Nord. Cet article analyse cette interférence et suggère une issue contractuelle sur la base d’une coordination de ces politiques.Daubanes Julien, Berlinschi Ruxanda. Prendre d’une main et donner de l’autre : taxation des produits pétroliers et aide internationale . In: Économie & prévision, n°190-191, 2009-4-5. pp. 21-37

    Migration and geopolitical preferences

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    status: Publishe

    Do migrants think differently? Evidence from East European and post-Soviet states

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    This research analyzes differences in values and beliefs between individuals in European and post-Soviet states who intend to emigrate and those who do not. In particular, we investigate which political, economic and social values and beliefs are significant determinants of the intention to emigrate, after controlling for relevant socio-economic and demographic confounding factors. The results indicate that self-selection patterns exist in some dimensions, such as evaluation of home country governance and institutions, political participation and trust in other people, while they are absent in other dimensions, such as economic liberalism, views on democracy and free markets. Results also indicate that migrant self-selection patterns are heterogeneous across regions. This analysis aims to improve our understanding of the determinants of emigration, as well as of its possible consequences on the dynamics of governance and institutions.status: Publishe

    On the political economy of illegal immigration

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    This paper provides an economic rationale for the tolerance of some level of illegal immigration by many developed countries. Illegal migrants can be easily hired with informal contracts that do not respect labour market regulations such as the minimum wage. Informal employment of illegal migrants allows increases in production and capital revenues above the levels in which marginal labour productivity equals the minimum wage and it does not depress natives’ wages, protected by the regulation.Using a standard general equilibrium model, we show that in presence of a minimum wage regulation, natives with sufficient capital holdings prefera positive level of illegal immigration.status: Publishe

    On the Political Economy of Illegal Immigration

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    status: Publishe

    Does working abroad affect political opinions? Evidence from Moldova

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    This paper investigates the effects of work experience abroad on political opinions using survey data from Moldova, a former soviet republic caught in an ideological battle between Russia and the West, with high emigration rates to both destinations. Contrarily to studies conducted in Africa or Latin America, we find no effect of past migration on democratic participation or on critical governance assessment. Likewise, no effect is found on domestic policy preferences. The one dimension strongly associated with migration experience is geopolitical preference, whereby return migrants from former Soviet countries are more likely to support closer ties with Russia, while return migrants from Western countries show higher support for EU integration, controlling for economic, demographic and ethnic confounding factors. For identification, we instrument individual migration with district level migrant networks. IV regressions show that only work experience in Western countries affects geopolitical preferences

    Community influence as an explanatory factor why Roma children get little schooling

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    Parents who experience poverty and who want to provide their children with an escape route can be expected to encourage and support their progeny’s education. The evidence that Roma parents behave differently is unsettling. In this paper we test empirically an explanation for that behavior. The explanation is based on a theory (Stark et al. 2018) that can be “borrowed” to rationalize the enforcement of norms of little formal education in underprivileged communities. An analysis of survey data collected in Roma communities in four Central and Eastern European countries lends support to the explanation. The analysis reveals a strong negative correlation between the influence of the Roma community on an individual member’s life and the importance accorded by the individual to formal schooling for children. The correlation is robust to controlling for standard determinants of attitudes towards schooling, such as poverty, unemployment, labor market discrimination, and parents’ educational attainment. The analysis suggests that policy interventions aiming to increase the formal education of Roma children need to reckon with the influence of Roma community norms on individual choices

    Comfort and conformity: A culture-based theory of migration

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    This paper proposes a theory of migration decisions in which cultural traits play a role. Individuals are assumed to value comfort (high wages) and conformity (interactions with individuals who share similar world views). Regions are assumed to differ economically (average wages) and culturally (average world views and their diversity). The model shows that self-selection of inter-regional migrants on world views is non-monotonic if one region is more diverse than the other, and it weakens with economic gaps between regions. This non-monoticity can lead to a dichotomy of outcomes: culturally diverse regions become even more diverse because of migration, while culturally homogeneous regions become even more homogeneous. Consequently, Tieboutian sorting (people moving to the region in which world views are closer to theirs) only holds when regions have similar wages and diversity of world views

    Reputation concerns in aid conditionality

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    Conditionality enforcement, Reputation, O19, D82, D73,

    On the Political Economy of Illegal Immigration

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    This paper provides an economic rationale to the presence of large populations of illegal immigrants in most developed countries.We develop a political economy model in which illegal immigration arises as an endogenous policy outcome. We define migration policy as the number of legal and illegal migrants entering a country. Legal and illegal migrants are perfect substitutes in the production function, but only illegal migrants can work for wages lower than the minimum legal wage.Voters care about their labour and capital revenues and dislike illegal migrationmore than they dislike legal migration.In absence of a minimum wage regulation, the median voter prefers a positive number of legal migrants and no illegal migrants. In presence of a minimum wage regulation, legal migrants increase the rates of return to capital and decrease the wages of natives until they reach the minimum legal wage. Illegal migrants allow a further increase in the rates of returns to capital, without further affecting the wages of natives, which are protected by the minimum wage regulation. Then the median voter's preferred migration policy may include a positive level of illegal immigration.status: Publishe
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