1,722,077 research outputs found

    Current Account Reversals: Always a Problem?

    Full text link
    Using panel data and case studies, we analyze the pre-1970 history of international capital flows and current account reversals. Considering a sample of emerging markets and advanced economies with per capita GDPs at least 60 per cent those of the lead country, we show that the incidence of reversals has been unusually great in recent years. The only prior period that matched the last three decades in terms of the frequency and magnitude of reversals was the 1920s and 1930s, decades notorious for the instability of capital flows. In contrast, reversals were both less common and smaller in the Bretton Woods and pre-World War I gold standard eras.

    From Benign Neglect to Malignant Preoccupation: U.S. Balance-of-Payments Policy in the 1960s

    Full text link
    U.S. balance-of-payments problems in the 1960s remain poorly understood. In this paper I argue that they had two aspects. On the one hand there was a problem of real overvaluation, evident in the erosion of the current account and reflecting the reluctance of the Fed, the Executive and Congress to subordinate domestic political and economic objectives to balance-of-payments goals. In addition there was the systemic aspect, that the main source of international liquidity for the expanding world economy was dollar balances. The role of the United States was to act as banker to the world, borrowing short and lending long. But just like a bank providing liquidity transformation services, the U.S. was vulnerable to a depositor run.' So long as foreign central banks, concerned to preserve the Bretton Woods System, stood ready to support the dollar, they provided the equivalent of deposit insurance. But unlike a classic lender of last resort, their willingness to do so was limited. When that limit was reached in 1971, the dollar -- and the Bretton Woods System -- came crashing down.

    Bond Markets as Conduits for Capital Flows: How Does Asia Compare?

    Full text link
    We use data on the extent to which residents of one country hold the bonds of issuers resident in another as a measure of financial integration or interrelatedness, asking how Asia compares with Europe and Latin America and with the base case in which the purchaser and issuer of the bonds reside in different regions. Not surprisingly, we find that Europe is head and shoulders above other regions in terms of financial integration. More interesting is that Asia already seems to have made some progress on this front compared to Latin America and other parts of the world. The contrast with Latin America is largely explained by stronger creditor and investor rights, more expeditious and less costly contract enforcement, and greater transparency that lead to larger and better developed financial systems in Asia, something that is conducive to foreign participation in local markets and to intra-regional cross holdings of Asian bonds generally. Further results based on a limited sample suggest that one factor holding back investment in foreign bonds in East Asia may be limited geographical diversification by mutual funds, in turn reflecting a dearth of appropriate assets. Asian Bond Fund 2, by creating a passively managed portfolio of local currency bonds potentially attractive to mutual fund managers and investors, may help to relax this constraint.

    International Policy Coordination: The Long View

    Full text link
    This paper places current efforts at international economic policy coordination in historical perspective. It argues that successful cooperation is most likely in four sets of circumstances. First, when it centers on technical issues. Second, when cooperation is institutionalized – when procedures and precedents create presumptions about the appropriate conduct of policy and reduce the transactions costs of reaching an agreement. Third, when it is concerned with preserving an existing set of policies and behaviors (when it is concerned with preserving a policy regime). Fourth, when it occurs in the context of broad comity among nations. These points are elaborated through a review of 150 years of historical experience and then used to assess the scope for cooperative responses to the current economic crisis.

    Bretton Woods and the Great Inflation

    Full text link
    In this paper we show that the acceleration of inflation in the United States after 1965 reflected a shift in perceived responsibility for managing the country's international financial position. Prior to 1965 this responsibility was lodged primarily with the Fed, whose policies resembled those of a central bank playing by the gold standard rules of the game. Over time, however, this responsibility was increasingly assumed by the Treasury, while the Federal Reserve acquired increasing room for maneuver as a result of the adoption of the Interest Equalization Tax and other policies with effects analogous to capital controls. Once the external constraint shaped policy less powerfully, the Fed pursued other goals more aggressively, resulting in more inflationary pressure. We document these points with a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee.

    The Breakup of the Euro Area

    Full text link
    The possibility that the euro area might break up was being raised even before the single currency existed. These scenarios were then lent new life five or six years on, when appreciation of the euro and problems of slow growth in various member states led politicians to blame the European Central Bank for disappointing economic performance. Highly-placed European officials reportedly discussed the possibility that one or more participants might withdraw from the monetary union. How seriously should we take these scenarios? And how significant would be the economic and political consequences? It is unlikely, I argue here, that one or more members of the euro area will leave in the next ten years; total disintegration of the euro area is even more unlikely. While other authors have minimized the technical difficulties of reintroducing a national currency, I suggest that those technical difficulties would be quite formidable. Nor is it certain that the economic problems of the participating member states would be significantly ameliorated by abandoning the euro. And even if there are immediate economic benefits, there would be longer-term political costs.

    The Unstable EMS

    Full text link
    macroeconomics, EMS

    2005), “Is china’s FDI Coming at the Expense of Other Countries?” NBER Working Paper no.11335

    No full text
    We analyze how China's emergence as a destination for foreign direct investment is affecting the ability of other countries to attract FDI. We do so using an approach that accounts for the endogeneity of China's FDI. The impact turns out to vary by region. China's rapid growth and attractions as a destination for FDI also encourages FDI flows to other Asian countries, as if producers in these economies belong to a common supply chain. There is also evidence of FDI diversion from OECD recipients. We interpret this in terms of FDI motivated by the desire to produce close to the market where the final sale takes place. For whatever reason # limits on their ability to raise finance for investment in multiple markets or limits on their ability to control operations in diverse locations # firms more inclined to invest in China for this reason are corresponding less inclined to invest in the OECD. A detailed analysis of Japanese foreign direct investment outflows disaggregated by sector further supports these conclusions. Barry Eichengreen Department of Economics University of California 549 Evans Hall 3880 Berkeley, CA 94720-3880 and NBER [email protected] Hui Tong Bank of England Threadneedle Street London, England [email protected] Barry Eichengreen and Hui Tong April 2005 1

    Should there be a coordinated response to the problem of global imbalances? Can there be one?

    Full text link
    This paper analyzes the options for international policy coordination in order to redress the global imbalances. The case for policy coordination rests on a number of assumptions such as the existence of important spillover effects of national policies and a common understanding of the nature of the problem. In reality, important obstacles exist to get to effective policy coordination, including resistance from domestic interest groups and disagreement of the effectiveness of policy instruments. These obstacles can be reduced by developing a multilateral consensus on common goals and by addressing commitment problems via issuing multi-year schedules for policy adjustments.Global imbalances, international policy coordination, international financial architecture
    corecore