10,138 research outputs found

    The impact of EC-92 on developing countries'trade : a dissenting view

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    Most benefits of the European Community (EC-92) program will probably not come from marginal changes in trade flows. Those changes are important to European policymakers, but are of remote interest to developing countries. The main threats to developing countries are the diversion of investment funds to EC countries and continued external barriers, especially nontariff barriers. The EC expects higher growth and lower prices as a result of EC-92. The net effect on developing countries of the removal of internal trade barriers depends on the country's income and price elasticities with the EC. Current estimates suggest the effect will be small. If new external barriers emerge, or if EC-wide barriers replace national barriers, EC firms may collaborate more with large US or Japanese firms. None of these developments will improve developing countries'trade in manufactures and services. Investment in EC countries may increase to meet the extra demand, growth, or trade diversion resulting from EC-92. This could lead to increased investments in developing countries but given heavy indebtedness in developing countries, is more likely to divert investment funds, thus limiting their future production and growth. Technical standards in EC-92 may also be tougher than national standards in member countries, which could hurt developing country exporters. Is"Fortress Europe"likely? The EC Commission says no, but the Community's record is not good.Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,TF054105-DONOR FUNDED OPERATION ADMINISTRATION FEE INCOME AND EXPENSE ACCOUNT,Trade and Regional Integration,Trade Policy

    EC Bananarama 1992 : the sequel - the EC Commission proposal

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    Some European Community (EC) countries give preferred market access and high prices to bananas from selected developing countries or EC regional suppliers. This preferential status is regarded as a form of aid to these countries, most of which are developing small island economies. EC marketers of bananas from these preferred suppliers also benefit because of the high retail prices. Nonpreferred suppliers - mainly developing countries of Latin America - are hurt by the policies because access is denied or restricted and the lower demand depresses the world price for bananas. The Community's commitment to establish a single unified EC banana market on December 31, 1992 provides a timely opportunity to reform existing distortionary trade policies. The recently announced proposal of the Commission of ECs to regulate banana trade within a unified market relies on quotas to control imports. The proposal is extremely complicated. It is designed to severely restrict competition and to maintain the advantages of selected groups. The authors update their earlier analysis of world banana trade to reflect the market in 1993. They evaluate the implications of the Commission's proposal alongside existing and alternative policies. They find that current policies cost EC consumers about 1.6billionannuallytotransferanetbenefitof1.6 billion annually to transfer a net benefit of 0.3 billion a year to preferred suppliers. So, it costs EC consumers about 5.30totransfer5.30 to transfer 1.00 of aid toselect developing countries or regions. Additionally, every dollar of aid reaching preferred suppliers costs other developing country suppliers 0.32.ECmarketersarethemainbeneficiaries.Ofthe0.32. EC marketers are the main beneficiaries. Of the 5.30 cost to EC consumers, over 3.00iscollectedasexcessivemarketingmarginsbyprotectedimportersandwholesalers.About3.00 is collected as excessive marketing margins by protected importers and wholesalers. About 1.00 is lost in outright waste. Several plausible versions of the Commission's proposal are modelled. At best they are found to be slightly less costly than existing policies and at worst, considerably more costly. A 3.5 percent reduction in the quota allocation is estimated to lead to a 30 percent increase in the cost of the proposal. The authors conclude that the Commission's proposal for a unified EC banana policy appears to be little more than a way of replacing existing distortionary national policies with an almost equally distortionary single policy and market. The only difference: the costs would be borne by consumers in all EC countries rather than consumers in only some countries. Worse still, costs could increase. Markets that now gain the benefits of mostly open and competitive marketing such as Germany would face closed and uncompetitive conditions. For developing countries exporting bananas, the proposal offers little. At best conditions may be no worse than they are now. At worst the policy could hurt Latin American suppliers even more than current policies and introduce considerable confusion about the level of support to preferred suppliers. Under the proposed quota system aid will not be well targeted. A more efficient way of achieving the EC's aid commitment is through a small tariff of about 17 percent, used to fund a system of well-targeted deficiency payments or direct aid. The only reason for choosing the Commission's proposal over simpler, tariff-based options seems to be to maintain the vested interests of protected EC markteters. But this is contrary to the objectives of unification, which are to seek gains from increased competition and trade.Environmental Economics&Policies,Access to Markets,Markets and Market Access,Economic Theory&Research,Consumption

    Politically Acceptable Trade Compromises Between The EC and The US: A Game Theory Approach

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    A model is developed to quantify the special status of agriculture in the US and the EC trade negotiations. The role of special interests are measured by a policy goals function (PGF) whose weights are estimated for each special interest group. The analysis searches for mutually acceptable, mutually advantageous trade agreements between the US and the EC using a partial equilibrium world trade model coupled with game theory. Results suggest that it is in the best interest of the US (resp. EC) 'for the EC (resp. US) to liberalize whi1e the other follows the status quo policies of 1986. Mutual gains in PGF values to both countries pursuing "large" liberalizations are unlikely to exist, although "small" liberalizations may give rise to "small" mutual gains. Altering each country's action space, and permitting compensatory payments to the most influencial groups yields trade liberalization, but free trade does not result.game theory, trade liberalization, trade negotiations, International Relations/Trade,

    EC structural funds

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    Ireland is the recipient of one of the largest foreign aid programmes in the world. Our net receipts from the EC between 1990 and 1992 averaged 6.7 per cent of GNP. The EC has three structural funds; the guidance section of FEOGA (the Agricultural Fund), the Social Fund and the Regional Fund; a fourth, the Cohesion Fund, is to come into effect before the end of 1993 under the Maastricht Treaty. The share of structural spending in the EC budget is set to increase from 18 per cent in 1987, to 29 per cent in 1992 and 36 per cent in 1999

    The Singer or the Song? Developments in Performers' Rights from the Perspective of a Cultural Economist

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    Over the last century, performers gradually acquired statutory protection of their economic and moral rights. These rights are not copyright in the legal sense but neighboring rights and until recently, they were mainly remuneration rights that are collectively administered. With the WPPT (WIPO Performers and Phonograms Treaty), performers now have individual exclusive rights for digital performances; this leads to the question: what has motivated this change – is it a change in the perception of the value of performer or a change brought about by the changing technology of copying or, indeed, a change that reflects different economic costs and benefits? The paper discusses the role of copyright law as an incentive to performers and asks if the economic role of the performer is so different from that of the author. The conclusion is that a complex interaction of the legal regulations, economic conditions and institutional arrangements for administering these new rights will determine the outcome

    Poor results of 5-aminolevulinic acid-photodynamic therapy for residual high-grade dysplasia and early cancer in barrett esophagus after endoscopic resection

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    BACKGROUND AND STUDY AIMS: The aim of the study was to evaluate the efficacy of photodynamic therapy (PDT) in the treatment of residual high-grade dysplasia or early cancer (HGD/EC) after endoscopic resection in Barrett esophagus. PATIENTS AND METHODS: Study patients were separated into group A, with proven residual HGD/EC, and group B with possible HGD/EC (positive lateral margins in the endoscopic resection specimen, without HGD/EC in the remaining Barrett esophagus). PDT treatment consisted of 5-aminolevulinic (5-ALA) photosensitization (40 mg/kg) followed by illumination of the Barrett esophagus with a total light dose of 100 J/cm (2). Complete remission was defined as the absence of HGD/EC in biopsies taken in two consecutive follow-up endoscopies. The percentage regression of Barrett esophagus, as well as the recurrence rate of HGD/EC, was calculated. RESULTS: 20 patients underwent PDT (group A, 11; group B, 9). Mild complications were seen in 4/26 procedures. The overall success rate was 15/20 (75 %). There was a significant difference in success rate between group A (55 %) and group B (100 %); P = 0.03. All patients had residual Barrett esophagus after PDT; the median regression percentage was 50 % (IQR 25 - 70 %). Recurrence of HGD/EC occurred in four patients (two each in groups A and B) after a median follow up of 30 months. CONCLUSIONS: In this selected group of patients, the addition of 5-ALA-PDT after endoscopic resection for HGD/EC had a disappointing success rate in patients who had residual HGD/EC after endoscopic resection. Most patients undergoing 5-ALA-PDT have residual Barrett mucosa after PDT and 5-ALA-PDT does not seem to prevent recurrences during follow-u

    Zooming in on Barrett oesophagus using narrow-band imaging: an international observer agreement study

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    Background Several classifications of mucosal morphology have been proposed in Barrett oesophagus using narrow-band imaging (NBI). We evaluated a simplified classification in which only the regularity of mucosal and vascular patterns were evaluated. Aim To assess the inter and intraobserver agreement and the correlation with histology of a simplified NBI classification of mucosal morphology in Barrett oesophagus combining the experience of two referral centres. Methods Two hundred NBI images [57 high-grade intraepithelial neoplasia (HGIN)/early cancer (EC)] were evaluated twice by four NBI-experienced and four nonexperienced endoscopists in the field of NBI. Endoscopists assessed each image for: quality, suspicion for dysplasia, and regularity of mucosal and vascular patterns. Observer agreement was assessed using kappa statistics. Results Overall interobserver agreement for the items evaluated was 'moderate' and varied between 0.42 and 0.44. Overall intraobserver agreement was 'moderate' to 'substantial' (kappa 0.60-0.62). There were no significant differences in agreement between expert and nonexpert endoscopists. Endoscopist correctly identified 71% of the images containing HGIN/EC. Of the areas without HGIN/EC, 68% were correctly identified as not suspicious. Again, there were no significant differences between experts and nonexperts. Conclusion Our proposed, simplified classification for Barrett mucosal morphology has a moderate interobserver and a moderate to substantial intraobserver agreement. The lack of differences in agreements between expert and nonexpert endoscopists suggests a short learning curve. The disappointing rate for correctly indentifying HGIN/EC, questions, however, whether detailed inspection of Barrett oesophagus with NBI can replace histological sampling. Eur J Gastroenterol Hepatol 21: 1068-1075 (C) 2009 Wolters Kluwer Health vertical bar Lippincott Williams & Wilkin
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