72 research outputs found
Engineering Chinese Civilisation
No full textThis second China Story Yearbook covers the period during which the fifth generation of Chinese leaders took control of the Communist Party, in late 2012, and then the government of the People�s Republic in early 2013. Xi Jinping became the new General Secretary of the Party and later President of the People�s Republic, and Li Keqiang was appointed Premier
Barme (Geremie R.). Shades of Mao. The Posthumous Cult of the Great Leader
No full textAubin Françoise. Barme (Geremie R.). Shades of Mao. The Posthumous Cult of the Great Leader. In: Archives de sciences sociales des religions, n°106, 1999. pp. 35-36
Under One Heaven
No full textIn the China Story Yearbook 2014: Shared Destiny, we take as our theme a concept emphasised by Xi Jinping, the leader of China’s partystate, in October 2013 when he spoke of the People’s Republic being part of a Community of Shared Destiny, officially translated as a Community of Common Destiny. The expression featured in Chinese pronouncements from as early as 2007 when it was declared that the Mainland and Taiwan formed a Community of Shared Destiny. Addressing the issue of China’s relations with the countries that surround it at the inaugural Periphery Diplomacy Work Forum held in Beijing on 24 October 2013, Xi Jinping further developed the idea when he summed up the engagement between the People’s Republic and its neighbours by using a series of ‘Confucian-style’ one-word expressions: positive bilateral and multilateral relationships were to be based on amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness
In the red on contemporary Chinese culture
No full text"Illustrated with fascinating cartoons and photographs and rich with facts, anecdotes, and events. In the Red provides a narrative history of Chinese culture during the past twenty years, exposing the complex relationship between "official" culture (produced, supported, or sanctioned by the government) and "nonofficial" or countercultures (especially among urban youths and dissidents). Investigating what goes on behind the rhetoric of the Chinese government and the dissident community, author Geremie R. Barme questions mainstream Western perceptions of cultural developments, artistic freedom, and popular lifestyles in modern China." "This bold account of the cultural predicament of the world's most populous nation provides insights available nowhere else."--BOOK JACKET
Torching the Relay
No full text[The following remarks were written in response to a series of questions from writers at Woroni, the paper produced by students at The Australian National University. They were drafted on April 28 and revised on May 3, 2008. I would add that I was travelling in China during the Australian leg of the Olympic Torch Relay. My thanks to Tom Swann of Woroni for inviting me to respond to his questions, and to Jeffrey Wasserstrom for suggesting that China Beat post this material.—GRB]
Q: In general, the article will be asking: why was there such a powerful expression of Chinese nationalism in the Australian national capital, Canberra? We are guided by our personal observations that much of the protesting was overtly political and often antagonistic, which we think was not fully brought out in the media coverage.
Geremie R. Barmé: Chinese demonstrators in Canberra would claim that they were giving voice to righteous patriotic (rather than the more negative “nationalistic”) sentiment in the face of deliberate distortions of the real situation in Tibetan China resulting from the “Western media” demonization of the People’s Republic of China, and the way the media had handled the March disturbances in Lhasa and elsewhere in what, for want of a better expression, I would call Tibetan China (that is the areas including the TAR, Qinghai, parts of Gansu, Sichuan, and Yunnan with large ethnic Tibetan populations). In the days leading up to the Canberra leg of the Olympic torch relay, Chinese organizers (both official and non-official) made the case to their fellows that Canberra is a city with a small population and that if patriotic Chinese did not turn up in numbers then protesters—“Tibet splittists” (to use the Chinese jargon), adherents of Falun Gong and a rag-bag of “anti-Chinese elements”—would make a big showing of “anti-Chinese” fervor in front of the national and international media. Only a large vocally patriotic Chinese presence could counter this
An Exemplary Society
No full textIn the 2012 Corruption Perceptions Index report by Transparency International, China ranked eightieth out of the 176 countries surveyed, with a score of thirty-nine from a possible one hundred. By contrast, Singapore is ranked fifth with a score of eighty-seven, Hong Kong fourteenth with a score of seventy-seven and Taiwan is in thirty-seventh place with a score of sixty-one. These comparisons show that China’s corruption cannot be due to some specific way people of a Chinese cultural background conduct business or public administration. Since he assumed the presidency, Xi Jinping has refocused the attention of government on the eradication of corruption, using not only the instruments of state power to arrest and detain offenders but also traditional methods of persuasion to encourage civilised behaviour in the community as a whole. Whether such methods, pioneered in the early years of the People’s Republic, and in fact even earlier, are still effective remains an open question
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