1,721,101 research outputs found
CEO age, shareholder monitoring, and the organic growth of European firms
Full text linkThe question of why some firms grow faster than others is of high theoretical and practical importance. Beyond a wealth of studies based on stochastic models, firm growth has mostly been explained by looking at the structural characteristics of firms, sectors, and countries. The role of managers’ characteristics in fostering firms’ growth has been explored much less. In this study, we adopt one key characteristic of managers, the age of the chief executive officer (CEO) and examine its relationship with the firm’s organic growth. Using data from a large sample of European manufacturing firms, we find that firms managed by young CEOs grow faster in terms of sales and assets, but not in terms of profitability. These results hold with the inclusion of a large vector of firm and CEO characteristics, and a battery of robustness checks, including issues related to the time horizon and appointment of CEOs, the educational attainment of younger cohorts of managers, and endogeneity. We hypothesize that young CEOs are incentivized to boost firm growth to signal their talent in the managerial market and to secure a longer stream of future compensation benefits. To the extent that firm growth does not translate into higher profitability, this may create an agency problem, due to the divergence of this corporate strategy from shareholders’ targets. In line with this hypothesis, we find that a more concentrated ownership that allows for more effective monitoring moderates the relationship between CEO age and firm growth
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Do Italian firms improve their performance at home by investing abroad?
No full textInvestimenti all’estero e produttività. Un’analisi comparata di Italia, Francia e Spagna
No full textInvestimenti all’estero e produttività. Un’analisi comparata di Italia, Francia e Spagna
No full textHow Does Investing in Cheap Labour Countries Affect Performance at Home? France and Italy
No full textTransferring low tech manufacturing jobs to cheap labour countries is often seen by part of the general public and policy makers as a step into the de-industrialization of the European economies. However, recent contributions have shown that the effects on home economies are rarely negative. Our paper contributes to this literature by examining how outward investments to developing and less developed countries (LDCs) affect home activities of French and Italian firms that turn multinational in the period analysed. The effects of these investments are also compared to the effects of investments to developed economies (DCs). The analysis is carried out by using propensity score matching. We find no evidence of a negative effect of outward invest- ments to LDCs. In Italy they have a positive long term effect on value added and employment. For France we find a positive effect on the size of domestic output and employment
Multinational Banking in Europe: Financial Stability and Regulatory Implications Lessons from the Financial Crisis
No full textFrom Learning To Partnership: Multinational R&D Cooperationin Developing Countries
No full textThis paper is a first attempt to analyse the determinants of inter-firm R&D agreements between advanced and developing countries, i.e. between firms with asymmetric endowments of knowledge. It shows that international dispersion of R&D activity by multinationals also concerns developing countries, particularly the NICs. Indeed, both our theory and empirical evidence show that R&D can be carried out via aml-length agreements, even between partners with asymmetric endowments of knowledge. The paper develops a thcorelical model which brings together some of the central assutnptions of the literature on R&ll cooperation and of the literature on hierarchical transfer of technology. A niultinational has the option between setting up a subsidi;uy and competing with a local firm in a duopoly, or implementing an agreement and share monopoly profits. The two firms, if they choose the agreement, may also cooperate it1 R&D. The model shows that. K&D coopcration increases both the profitability and the stability of the agreement. the latter as far as it affects the long term relationship of trust between the partners. The niodel also shows that R&D cooperation is more likely when asymmctries in R&D efficiency between the partners are not loo large. Spillovers have an ambiguous role. They must be largc enough to induce firms to form an arm-length agreement, but if they are too large they discourage R&D cooperation. The empirical analysis is based on a data set of international arm-length agreements. By testing a dichotomous choice model it supports some of the key theoretical results and assumptions: R&D ngreenlents are particularly likely to emerge when firms have a nun-hierarchical relationship, in knowledge intensive industries and when technological asymmetries between home and host countries are not too large. Indeed most R&D agreements are concentrated in the NlCs which have relatively advanced industrial bases and capabilities.Multinational firm, International business, Management of technological innovation and R&D, Firm organisation and Markct structurc JEL Classification: F23, 032, L22,
The determinants and employment effects of international outsourcing: the case of Italy
Full text linkUsing a new firm-level database, we address micro determinants and employment consequences of international production outsourcing (INPOU). Regarding the former, we confirm that INPOU in Italy mostly counters emerging economies. threats to traditional manufactured goods: INPOU disproportionately targets developing countries and intensifies in sectors with stiffest Chinese competition. Concerning employment consequences, we concur with previous literature that INPOU firms. domestic employment performances are no worse than at matching no-INPOU firms. However, given Italy.s industrial structure (small-sized networked enterprises), INPOU might negatively affect subcontracting firms. Our evidence that employment performances worsen in the productive segments with strongest INPOU supports our conjecture.international outsourcing, multinational firms
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