4,578 research outputs found
Replication Data for: The Geography of Democratic Discontent
No full textThis provides the replication data and do file for all output in Ballard-Rosa, Carnegie & Schonfeld (2022) "The Geography of Democratic Discontent
Replication Data for: "Economic Decline, Social Identity, and Authoritarian Values in the United States"
No full textThis includes all data sources and do files to replicate all tables and figures reported in the main text and online appendix for Ballard-Rosa, Jensen & Scheve (2021)
Replication Data for: The Geography of Democratic Discontent
No full textThis provides replication data and do files for all results presented in the main text and online appendix for Ballard-Rosa, Carnegie & Schonfeld, "The Geography of Democratic Discontent
Replication Data for: The Economic Origins of Authoritarian Values: Evidence from Local Trade Shocks in the United Kingdom
No full textThis dataverse contains all data and do files necessary to replicate figures and tables from Ballard-Rosa, Malik, Rickard & Scheve (2021
Replication Data for: Trade as Villain: Belief in the American Dream and Declining Support for Globalization
No full textThis provides replication data and code for all analyses presented in the main text and online appendix
Replication Data for: The Structure of American Income Tax Policy Preferences
No full textThis contains the data and replication files for "The Structure of American Tax Policy Preferences.
Replication Data for: Contingent Advantage? Sovereign Borrowing, Democratic Institutions, and Global Capital Cycles
No full textHow do domestic and global factors shape governments' capacity to issue debt in primary capital markets? Consistent with the ``democratic advantage," we identify domestic institutional mechanisms, including executive constraints and policy transparency, that facilitate debt issuance rather than electoral events. Most importantly, we argue that the democratic advantage is contingent: investors' attention to domestic politics varies with conditions in global capital markets. When global financial liquidity is low, investors are risk-averse, and political risk constrains governments' capacity to borrow. But when global markets are flush, investors are risk-tolerant and less sensitive to political risk. We support our argument with new data on 245,000 government bond issues in primary capital markets---the point at which governments' costs of market access matter most---for 131 sovereign issuers (1990-2016). In doing so, we highlight the role of systemic factors, which are under-appreciated in much ``open economy politics" research, in determining access to capital markets
Replication Data for: Economic Crises and Trade Policy Competition
No full textHow do crises affect trade policy? We reconcile starkly diverging accounts in the literature by showing that economic adversity generates endogenous incentives not only for protection, but also for liberalization. We first develop formally the mechanisms by which two features of shocks---intensity and duration---influence the resources and political strategies of distressed firms. Our central insight is that policy adjustments to resuscitate afflicted industries typically generate "knock-on" effects on the profitability and political maneuverings of other firms in the economy. We incorporate these countervailing pressures in our analysis of trade policy competition. In the wake of crises, protection initially increases when impacted firms lobby for assistance, but then decreases as industries run low on resources to expend on lobbying and as firms in other industries mobilize to counter-lobby. We test our theoretical predictions using sub-national and cross-national data and present real-world illustrations to highlight the mechanisms driving our results
Replication Data for: Economic Crises and Trade Policy Competition
No full textHow do crises affect trade policy? We reconcile starkly diverging accounts in the literature by showing that economic adversity generates endogenous incentives not only for protection, but also for liberalization. We first develop formally the mechanisms by which two features of shocks---intensity and duration---influence the resources and political strategies of distressed firms. Our central insight is that policy adjustments to resuscitate afflicted industries typically generate "knock-on" effects on the profitability and political maneuverings of other firms in the economy. We incorporate these countervailing pressures in our analysis of trade policy competition. In the wake of crises, protection initially increases when impacted firms lobby for assistance, but then decreases as industries run low on resources to expend on lobbying and as firms in other industries mobilize to counter-lobby. We test our theoretical predictions using sub-national and cross-national data and present real-world illustrations to highlight the mechanisms driving our results
Replication Data for: Contingent Advantage? Sovereign Borrowing, Democratic Institutions, and Global Capital Cycles
No full textHow do domestic and global factors shape governments' capacity to issue debt in primary capital markets? Consistent with the ``democratic advantage," we identify domestic institutional mechanisms, including executive constraints and policy transparency, that facilitate debt issuance rather than electoral events. Most importantly, we argue that the democratic advantage is contingent: investors' attention to domestic politics varies with conditions in global capital markets. When global financial liquidity is low, investors are risk-averse, and political risk constrains governments' capacity to borrow. But when global markets are flush, investors are risk-tolerant and less sensitive to political risk. We support our argument with new data on 245,000 government bond issues in primary capital markets---the point at which governments' costs of market access matter most---for 131 sovereign issuers (1990-2016). In doing so, we highlight the role of systemic factors, which are under-appreciated in much ``open economy politics" research, in determining access to capital markets
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