1,720,978 research outputs found

    Merging FMEA and Digital Twins to Improve Trustfulness

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    We show that the integration of adversary emulation and the FMEA methodology can improve the trustfulness of an ICT infrastructure by discovering and stopping the attack paths due to faults. To achieve the required level of accuracy, the emulation exploits the digital twin of the infrastructure and those of the threat actors. The infrastructure twin is a smart inventory describing the infrastructure modules and their instances, the physical and logical connections among instances, the module vulnerabilities, and the attacks they enable. A threat actor twin describes its attack surface, the attacks it can implement, its strategy, and its final goal if any. We present alternative strategies to discover new attack paths due to faults. The simplest one assumes failures have occurred and updates the infrastructure twin to model their effects. Then, it runs the emulation to discover, and stop, the new attack paths due to failures. Other strategies dynamically update the infrastructure twin during the emulation to simulate the occurrence of faults. The paper also discusses how to select countermeasures to stop the attack paths a fault enables to prevent a threat actor from reaching its goal

    CyVar: Extending Var-At-Risk to ICT

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    CyVar extends the Value-At-Risk statistics to ICT systems under attack by intelligent, goal oriented agents. CyVar is related to the time it takes an agent to acquire some access privileges and to the one it owns these privileges. To evaluate the former time, we use the security stress, a synthetic measure of the robustness of an ICT system. We approximate this measure through the Haruspex suite, an integrated set of tools that supports ICT risk assessment and management. After defining CyVar, we show how it supports the evaluation of three versions of an industrial control system

    TACL: Trust-Based and Scalable Access Control for IoT Using Blockchain

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    Internet of Things (IoT) security, privacy and trust remain the major challenges, mainly due to the massive scale and distributed nature of IoT networks. Access control systems are used in security to control access to valuable resources. This paper proposes a novel trust-based access control (TACL) model for IoT. Trust provides IoT devices with a natural mechanism to judge other devices, similarly to how we tackle security in our human society. Trust relationship among IoT devices provides a means to influence the future behaviours of their communication. Services and resources should be shared with a requesting device only if other devices trust that device. An access control system equipped with a trust management allows the computation of trust to make efficient decision in controlling access to resources. TACL is an advanced access control system that takes trust information into consideration before allowing subjects to perform operations on resources. The EOS blockchain is used as a tool to publish and evaluate the performance of the proposed model. The results demonstrate that TACL is a lightweight and scalable protocol designed to achieve fine-grained access control

    Hierarchical, Model-Based Risk Management of Critical Infrastructures

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    Risk management is a process that includes several steps, from vulnerability analysis to the formulation of a risk mitigation plan that selects countermeasures to be adopted. With reference to an information infrastructure, we present a risk management strategy that considers a sequence of hierarchical models, each describing dependencies among infrastructure components. A dependency exists anytime a security-related attribute of a component depends upon the attributes of other components. We discuss how this notion supports the formal definition of risk mitigation plan and the evaluation of the infrastructure robustness. A hierarchical relation exists among models that are analyzed because each model increases the level of details of some components in a previous one. Since components and dependencies are modeled through a hypergraph, to increase the model detail level, some hypergraph nodes are replaced by more and more detailed hypergraphs. We show how critical information for the assessment can be automatically deduced from the hypergraph and define conditions that determine cases where a hierarchical decomposition simplifies the assessment. In these cases, the assessment has to analyze the hypergraph that replaces the component rather than applying again all the analyses to a more detailed, and hence larger, hypergraph. We also show how the proposed framework supports the definition of a risk mitigation plan and discuss some indicators of the overall infrastructure robustness. Lastly, the development of tools to support the assessment is discussed

    Discovering How to Attack a System

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    We evaluate the performance of a genetic algorithm to discover the best set of rules to implement an intrusion against an ICT network. The rules determine how the attacker selects and sequentializes its actions to implement an intrusion. The fitness of a set of rules is assigned after exploiting it in an intrusion. The evaluation of the distinct sets of rules in the populations the algorithm considers requires multiple intrusions. To avoid the resulting noise on the ICT network, the intrusions target a digital twin of the network. We present a preliminary experimental results that supports the feasibility of the proposed solution

    H-Verify: Automating Intrusions through Digital Twins

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    This paper introduces H-Verify, a platform to design and implement intrusions against real-world ICT infrastructures. Unique in its approach, H-Verify leverages adversary simulations previously ran on a digital twin of the target infrastructure to fully or partially automate the planning and execution of intrusions but it can also act as a flexible decision support system for the manual planning of intrusions. Furthermore, the tool also supports the simulation results, detecting false positives in the infrastructure vulnerabilities, testing applied countermeasures, and supporting users with distinct levels of experience in red teaming engagements
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