1,720,999 research outputs found
Analisi statica e processi di aggiustamento all'equilibrio nella teoria della concorrenza monopolistica di Negishi
No full textThe subjective approach to general equilibrium under imperfect competition
No full textSource: RISEC: International Review of Economics and Business, September 2005, v. 52, iss. 3, pp. 319-53
Publication Date: September 2005
Abstract: We study the main problems of the "subjective" approach to general equilibrium under imperfect competition, initiated by Negishi (1961), and compare it with an "objective" approach, namely the Cournotian tradition, pioneered by Gabszewicz and Vial (1972). In particular, we investigate the relationship between static analysis and adjustment processes towards equilibrium. We show that the basic assumptions underlying the equilibrium notion proposed by Negishi are essentially different from those that characterize the Cournotian tradition and the attempts to interpret Negishi's theory as a special case of a more general Cournotian-type framework (Gary-Bobo, 1987, 1989) are in fact inconsistent with the original model. Moreover, we demonstrate that to formalize adjustment mechanisms toward equilibrium within Negishi's approach raises quite peculiar difficulties that can be to some extent overcome within the Cournotian approach
Concezione neoclassica e classica della stazionarietà nella teoria dell'equilibrio generale di Cassel
No full text`Very nice' trivial equilibria in strategic market games
No full textFollowing Shapley [Theory of Measurement of Economic Externalities, Academic Press, New York, 1976], we study the problem of the existence of a Nash Equilibrium (NE) in which each trading post is either active or “legitimately” inactive, and we call it a Shapley NE. We consider an example of an exchange economy, borrowed from Cordella and Gabszewicz [Games Econ. Behav. 22 (1998) 162–169], which satisfies the assumptions of Dubey and Shubik [J. Econ. Theory 17 (1978) 1–20], and we show that the trivial equilibrium, the unique NE of the associated strategic market game, is not “very nice,” in the sense that it is not “legitimately” trivial. This result has the more general implication that, under the Dubey and Shubik's assumptions, a Shapley NE may fail to exist
Nondictatorial Arrovian social welfare functions and integer programs (Working paper No 01-10_ eco Series in Economics, Dipartimento di Scienze economiche e Statistiche, Università di Udine)
No full textIn this paper, we use a respecified and simplified version of an
integer program characterization of Arrovian social welfare functions,
proposed by Sethuranam et al. (2003), to provide an alternative proof
of Theorem 2 in Kalai and Muller (1977).
Journal of Economic Literature Classifcation Number: D71
Characterization of domains admitting strategy-proof and non-dictatorial social choice functions: A reappraisal (Discussion paper no. 2007-1, CEPET - Central European Program in Economic Theory, Institute of Public Economics, Graz University)
No full textWe show, with an example, that the theorem on the characterization of domains admitting strategy-proof and non-dictatorial social
choice functions by Kalai and Muller (1977) does not hold when the
set of alternatives is infinite. Then, we introduce a class of social
choice functions for which it is possible to restore the validity of the
theorem also in this case.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: D71
Reconsidering two-agent Nash implementation
No full textIn this paper, we reconsider the full characterization of two-agent Nash
implementation provided in the celebrated papers byMoore and Repullo (Econometrica
58:1083–1099, 1990) and Dutta and Sen (Rev Econ Stud 58:121–128, 1991), since
we are able to show that the characterizing conditions are not logically independent.
We prove that an amended version of the conditions proposed in these papers is still
necessary and sufficient for Nash implementability. Then, by using our necessary and
sufficient condition, we show that Maskin’s impossibility result can be avoided under
restrictions on the outcomes and the domain of preferences much weaker than those
previously imposed by Moore and Repullo (Econometrica 58:1083–1099, 1990) and
Dutta and Sen (Rev Econ Stud 58:121–128, 1991)
Noncooperative oligopoly in markets with a continuum of traders: A limit theorem (Working paper no. 994, Warwick economic research papers, Department of Economics, University of Warwick).
No full textIn this paper, in an exchange economy with atoms and an atomless
part, we analyze the relationship between the set of the Cournot-Nash
equilibrium allocations of a strategic market game and the set of the
Walras equilibrium allocations of the exchange economy with which
it is associated. In an example, we show that, even when atoms are
countably infinite, Cournot-Nash equilibria yield different allocations
from the Walras equilibrium allocations of the underlying exchange
economy. We partially replicate the exchange economy by increasing
the number of atoms without affecting the atomless part while ensuring that the measure space of agents remains finite. We show that any
sequence of Cournot-Nash equilibrium allocations of the strategic market game associated with the partially replicated exchange economies
approximates a Walras equilibrium allocation of the original exchange
economy
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