114 research outputs found

    Birth of a nuclear base. The US, Italy, and the Cold War Path to La Maddalena

    No full text
    This article reconstructs the path that led the US and Italy to negotiate and eventually agree on the homeporting of a US submarine tender in La Maddalena, Sardinia, which became the de- facto main US nuclear submarine base in the Cold War Mediterranean. Unlike what has been claimed by anti-base authors, according to the records of the Department of State the opening of a US base in La Maddalena in 1972 was not an achievement of a long-term US foreign policy goal, but a compromise. Indeed, the Department of Defense aimed to homeport a submarine tender in the much more strategical Augusta Bay, Sicily, while the remote La Maddalena was proposed by Italy, whose government (unsurprisingly) negotiated with the US pursuing its own national interest

    Preservare la scuola italiana in Istria. La diplomazia italiana e la questione delle scuole bilingui (1959)

    No full text
    The article deals with the issue of bilingual schools in the former Free Territory of Trieste, a 1959 Yugoslav project aimed at creating in the Yugoslav administered Zone B new schools in which all classes would be taught in both Italian and Slovenian or Croatian. The Italian diplomacy strongly opposed this project, the implementation of which would almost certainly have led to the gradual closure of the schools with Italian as language of instruction provided by the 1954 London Memorandum of Understanding, and, in prospect, to the national assimilation of the Italian minority in Istria. The efforts of the Italian diplomacy were crowned with success: indeed, the Yugoslav authorities dropped the project, which was changed into the inclusion of the study of the Italian language in the Zone B schools with Slovenian and Croatian as language of instruction

    “Death to the slavs!”. The Italian-Yugoslav relations on mutual minorities and the impact of the 1961 Trieste riots (1954–1964)

    No full text
    After the 1954 Memorandum of Understanding of London, Italy and Yugoslavia settled their border dispute by partitioning what was formerly the Free Territory of Trieste. Furthermore, they also agreed to extend to each other’s national minorities living in the two zones of the former Free Territory the protection measures established by the Special Statute, an annex to the Memorandum. Neither of the two countries fully complied with the Special Statute but wanted it to be implemented in the Zone administered by the other side. Italy wanted to negotiate all further implementations and new concessions on the basis of reciprocity, the main rationale for the protection measures stipulated in the Special Statute. By contrast, Yugoslavia wanted Italy to agree to the unilateral implementation of the Special Statute in Trieste and to other concessions. This led to a stalemate in the negotiations and consequently to the poor enforcement of the Special Statute, which caused rising tensions on the local level, even though, in the meantime, the overall diplomatic relations between the two countries continued to improve. Yugoslavia’s increasing requests for unilateral implementation of the Special Statute and the Yugoslav-funded Slovene organisations in Italy resulted in a series of major anti-Yugoslav and anti-Slovene demonstrations in Trieste. After these riots and the ensuing debate on the minority issue, the need to rely on reciprocity also became evident to the Yugoslav diplomacy. Yugoslavia, therefore, dropped its old policy and started to improve the treatment of its Italian minority and agreed to negotiate based on the principle of reciprocity. This led to quick benefits for both minorities, and a new path that led Italy and Yugoslavia to sign new agreements on their mutual minorities, going even beyond the Special Statute

    Preservare la scuola italiana in Istria. La diplomazia italiana e la questione delle scuole bilingui (1959)

    No full text
    The article deals with the issue of bilingual schools in the former Free Territory of Trieste, a 1959 Yugoslav project aimed at creating in the Yugoslav administered Zone B new schools in which all classes would be taught in both Italian and Slovenian or Croatian. The Italian diplomacy strongly opposed this project, the implementation of which would almost certainly have led to the gradual closure of the schools with Italian as language of instruction provided by the 1954 London Memorandum of Understanding, and, in prospect, to the national assimilation of the Italian minority in Istria. The efforts of the Italian diplomacy were crowned with success: indeed, the Yugoslav authorities dropped the project, which was changed into the inclusion of the study of the Italian language in the Zone B schools with Slovenian and Croatian as language of instruction

    Notizie sulle azioni navali della Seconda Guerra Mondiale. Le operazioni di superficie in Mediterraneo (1940)

    No full text
    The paper introduces three Notizie sulle azioni navali reports related to some surface operations carried out by the Italian navy during the first months of its involvement in the Second World War. The first document, the very first of the whole Notizie series, deals with the Battle of Cape Passero, an engagement with two British cruisers that ended up in the sinking of the torpedo boats Airone and Ariel, and of the destroyer Artigliere, while the destroyer Aviere was seriously damaged. The action proved the superior fire accuracy of the British units, who additionally benefitted of the use of the radar technology, here used for the very first time in the Mediterranean theatre. The second document deals with two shore bombings on Greek positions in Southern Albania, the first one carried out by the Italian 7th Cruiser Division (cruisers Eugenio di Savoia and Montecuccoli, escorted by the 15th Destroyer Squadron) on the 18th of December 1940, and the second one by the 8th Division on the 4th of March 1941. These naval gunfire support operations were overall successful, but the bad coordination between Italian naval and air units emerged as a serious problem. The third and last document deals with the Battle of the Strait of Otranto, a British attack to an Italian convoy that took place during the night between the 11th and the 12th of November 1940, thus at the same time of the aerial strike on Taranto – the first all-aircraft ship to (anchored in port) ship naval attack in history. Despite the fierce resistance of the Italian escorting torpedo boat Fabrizi, the outcome of the fight was the sinking of all the merchantmen of the convoy (Locatelli, Premuda, Capo Vado, Catalani)

    Notizie sulle azioni navali della Seconda Guerra Mondiale. Le operazioni di superficie in Mediterraneo (1940)

    No full text
    The paper introduces three Notizie sulle azioni navali reports related to some surface operations carried out by the Italian navy during the first months of its involvement in the Second World War. The first document, the very first of the whole Notizie series, deals with the Battle of Cape Passero, an engagement whit two British cruisers that ended up in the sinking of the torpedo boats Airone and Ariel, and of the destroyer Artigliere, while the destroyer Aviere was seriously damaged. The action proved the superior fire accuracy of the British units, who additionally benefitted of the use of the radar technology, here used for the very first time in the Mediterranean theatre. The second document deals with two shore bombings on Greek positions in Southern Albania, the first one carried out by the Italian 7th Cruiser Division (cruisers Eugenio di Savoia and Montecuccoli, escorted by the 15th Destroyer Squadron) on the 18th of December 1940, and the second one by the 8th Division on the 4th of March 1941. These naval gunfire support operations were overall successful, but the bad coordination between Italian naval and air units emerged as a serious problem. The third and last document deals with the Battle of the Strait of Otranto, a British attack to an Italian convoy that took place during the night between the 11th and the 12th of November 1940, thus at the same time of the aerial strike on Taranto – the first all-aircraft ship to (anchored in port) ship naval attack in history. Despite the fierce resistance of the Italian escorting torpedo boat Fabrizi, the outcome of the fight was the sinking of all the merchantmen of the convoy (Locatelli, Premuda, Capo Vado, Catalani)

    "Death to the Slavs!": The Italian-Yugoslav Relations on Mutual Minorities and the Impact of the 1961 Trieste Riots (1954-1964)

    No full text
    After the 1954 Memorandum of Understanding of London, Italy and Yugoslavia settled their border dispute by partitioning what was formerly the Free Territory of Trieste. Furthermore, they also agreed to extend to each other's national minorities living in the two zones of the former Free Territory the protection measures established by the Special Statute, an annex to the Memorandum. Neither of the two countries fully complied with the Special Statute but wanted it to be implemented in the Zone administered by the other side. Italy wanted to negotiate all further implementations and new concessions on the basis of reciprocity, the main rationale for the protection measures stipulated in the Special Statute. In contrast, Yugoslavia wanted Italy to agree to the unilateral implementation of the Special Statute in Trieste and to other concessions. This led to a stalemate in the negotiations and consequently to the poor enforcement of the Special Statute, which caused rising tensions on the local level, even though, in the meantime, the overall diplomatic relations between the two countries continued to improve. Yugoslavia's increasing requests for unilateral implementation of the Special Statute and the Yugoslav -funded Slovene organisations in Italy resulted in a series of major anti -Yugoslav and anti -Slovene demonstrations in Trieste. After these riots and the ensuing debate on the minority issue, the need to rely on reciprocity also became evident to the Yugoslav diplomacy. Yugoslavia, therefore, dropped its old policy and started to improve the treatment of its Italian minority and agreed to negotiate based on the principle of reciprocity. This led to quick benefits for both minorities, and a new path that led Italy and Yugoslavia to sign new agreements on their mutual minorities, going even beyond the Special Statute

    La rivista “Geopolitica” e la questione delle terre irredente tra ambizioni scientifiche, politiche e territoriali

    No full text
    Italian geographers Ernesto Massi and Giorgio Roletto founded in 1939 the geopolitics journal “Geopolitica”, whose aim was to provide a foreign policy doctrinal basis to the fascist regime. Some of the most prominent fascist politicians and intellectuals contributed to the journal, included the top brass of the fascist Italian irredentism. “Geopolitica” gradually developed an irredentist discourse, without, however, somehow affecting the fascist foreign policy

    La rivista Geopolitica e la questione delle terre irredente tra ambizioni scientifiche, politiche e territoriali

    No full text
    L'articolo non si limita a ricostruire il discorso irredentista sviluppato dalla rivista "Geopolitica", ma propone anche una prima ricostruzione dei rapporti intercorrenti tra i vari gruppi irredentisti fascisti, e tra questi ed il regime e il Ministero degli Affari Esteri
    corecore