1,721,056 research outputs found
Exploration Strategies based on Multi-Criteria Decision Making for an Autonomous Mobile Robot
No full textExploration Strategies Based on Multi-Criteria Decision Making for Search and Rescue Autonomous Robots
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Asynchronous Multi-Robot Patrolling against Intrusions in Arbitrary Topologies
Full text linkUse of game theoretical models to derive randomized mobile robot patrolling strategies has recently received a growing attention. We focus on the problem of patrolling environments with arbitrary topologies using multiple robots. We address two important issues cur rently open in the literature. We determine the smallest number of robots needed to patrol a given environment and we compute the optimal patrolling strategies along several coordination dimensions. Finally, we experimentally evaluate the proposed techniques
Communication-Constrained Multirobot Exploration: Short Taxonomy and Comparative Results
No full textBilevel programming methods for computing single-leader-multi-follower equilibria in normal-form and polymatrix games
No full textThe concept of leader-follower (or Stackelberg) equilibrium plays a central role in a number of real-world applications bordering on mathematical optimization and game theory. While the single-follower case has been investigated since the inception of bilevel programming with the seminal work of von Stackelberg, results for the case with multiple followers are only sporadic and not many computationally affordable methods are available. In this work, we consider Stackelberg games with two or more followers who play a (pure or mixed) Nash equilibrium once the leader has committed to a (pure or mixed) strategy, focusing on normal-form and polymatrix games. As customary in bilevel programming, we address the two extreme cases where, if the leader’s commitment originates more Nash equilibria in the followers’ game, one which either maximizes (optimistic case) or minimizes (pessimistic case) the leader’s utility is selected. First, we show that, in both cases and when assuming mixed strategies, the optimization problem associated with the search problem of finding a Stackelberg equilibrium is NP-hard and not in Poly-APX unless P=NP. We then consider different situations based on whether the leader or the followers can play mixed strategies or are restricted to pure strategies only, proposing exact nonconvex mathematical programming formulations for the optimistic case for normal-form and polymatrix games. For the pessimistic problem, which cannot be tackled with a (single-level) mathematical programming formulation, we propose a heuristic black-box algorithm. All the methods and formulations that we propose are thoroughly evaluated computationally
Team-Maxmin Equilibrium: Efficiency Bounds and Algorithms
Full text linkThe Team-maxmin equilibrium prescribes the optimal strategies for a team of rational players sharing the same goal and without the capability of correlating their strategies in strategic games against an adversary. This solution concept can capture situations in which an agent controls multiple resources - corresponding to the team members - that cannot communicate. It is known that such equilibrium always exists and it is unique (except degenerate cases) and these properties make it a credible solution concept to be used in real-world applications, especially in security scenarios. Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, the Team-maxmin equilibrium is almost completely unexplored in the literature. In this paper, we investigate bounds of (in)efficiency of the Team-maxmin equilibrium w.r.t. the Nash equilibria and w.r.t. the Maxmin equilibrium when the team members can play correlated strategies. Furthermore, we study a number of algorithms to find and/or approximate an equilibrium, discussing their theoretical guarantees and evaluating their performance by using a standard testbed of game instances
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