1,721,103 research outputs found

    Kind of black: the musicians’ labour market in Italy

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    It is estimated that only 5 per cent of musicians in Italy are regularly employed. In an attempt at nderstanding such a peculiar situation, we build a theoretical model of the musicians’ labour market in which we embed the main institutional features of the Italian system. The presence of taxation encourages the formation of a black labour market for musicians and discourages talented agents from becoming full-time musicians in all second-best economies. In Italy both tendencies are particularly strong, and exacerbated by the peculiarities of the pension system for musicians. These inefficiencies might be corrected by a twofold policy: the reform of the pension system, highly desirable but unlikely to be politically feasible in the current Italian institutional setting, and the introduction of a sufficiently large unemployment benefit for musicians, step that has a general interest for any second-best economy and not only for the case of the musicians’ labour market, and that might instead be viable under certain circumstances

    Large taxes, status goods, and piracy

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    This paper studies the design of indirect redistributive taxation and of corrective taxation in the presence of status goods, allowing for the possibility that illegal copies of those goods may be purchased on black markets (the phenomenon of "piracy"). Heavy taxation of status goods, despite the fact that these are typically overconsumed, is not particularly favoured in a social welfare maximisation context, because the tax rate is highly distortionary, due to the presence of piracy. It is also noted that corrective taxation, aimed at remedying the inefficiencies associated with the consumption externalities generated by the status goods, is made ineffective by piracy

    The tax treatment of household public goods: an example

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    ChilD Working Paper no. 10/200

    Revisiting the equity-efficiency trade-off: taxation with noncooperative families

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    We consider an economy with intrahousehold inequality where household public goods like child-care or care of the elderly are produced at home using time. Non-cooperative behaviour determines an inefficiently low provision of such goods, and the presence of contribution productivity differentials implies comparative advantages in home work vs. market work. The joint consideration of optimal tax rules and tax reform rules establishes a presumption in favour of high progressivity achieved with a limited number of income brackets, possibly a flat-rate system. High progressivity is instrumental in remedying the inefficiency associated with the lack of cooperation, while limiting the differentiation of tax rates turns out to favour the full exploitation of comparative advantages
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