1,721,082 research outputs found
L’impresa significante
Since 2008, a research team of Management Department (Ca’ Foscari University of Venice) has been conducting various action-research projects to support the strategy reconsideration of many businesses, with the supervision of the author of the present paper. These experiences lead to the Significant Business Manifesto, which aspires to imagine a new entrepreneurial model for all the Italian businesses, but inspiring even for the single one. The proposed model is structured on gradually more actionable levels: vision, mission, strategy, and business model. Such levels should characterize the ideal type of Italian business and should guide the related questions which every actual business needs to answer
Structural modes of recognition and virtual forms of empowerment: Towards a new antimafia culture
The moral mind. an invitation to the re-reading of iris murdoch
This article argues that Iris Murdoch opposes non-cognitivism because it fails to take into account dynamic moral phenomena that are key in any adequate philosophical exploration of the moral life, that is, the subjective experience of morality, difference, and change. Murdoch's argument challenges the dichotomies fact/value and cognitive/emotive, and proposes a complex, time-sensitive, dynamic model of the mind which focuses on change and transition. On this dynamic model, ethical objectivity is a personal achievement
Feeling Wronged: The Value and Deontic Power of Moral Distress
This paper argues that moral distress is a distinctive category of reactive attitudes that are taken to be part and parcel of the social dynamics for recognition. While moral distress does not demonstrate evidence of wrongdoing, it does emotionally articulate a demand for normative attention that is addressed to others as moral providers. The argument for this characterization of the deontic power of moral distress builds upon two examples in which the cognitive value of the victim’s emotional experience is controversial: the case of micro-aggression, and the case of misplaced distress. In contrast to appraisal and perceptual models of distress, it is argued that its epistemic and normative value is dialogical rather than evidential, in that it presses claims that engage the audience in a normative discussion about the normative standing of the claimant, the proper grounds of the attitude, and the normative standards used to assess them
Replies
These replies aim to clarify the method and aims of the essay by responding to the objections formulated by Damiano Canale, Massimo Reichlin, and Daniele Santoro
LOVE’S LUCK-KNOT: emotional vulnerability and symmetrical accountability
Pamela Anderson argues for liberating love and vulnerability from the myths of the Western philosophical imaginary that tie them to fragility, subjection, and dependency. Spurred by Judith Butler’s work, Anderson finds herself challenged to rethink her ontological assumptions, away from the Kantian conception of the self as morally and ontologically invulnerable. In (partial) support of Anderson’s agenda, I distinguish different contrastive pairs of concepts of vulnerability, and argue for the relevance of ontological vulnerability, showing that in a Kantian framework this is the root of shared agency. I argue that this–largely unexplored–Kantian claim converges with and sustains Anderson’s general plan to reassess the positive value of vulnerability in relation to mutual accountability. The ontological concept of vulnerability makes the finitude and interdependency of human agency apparent. In this context, love vulnerability can be appreciated and valued as a distinctive drive to cooperative interaction and shared agency, which allows finite and limited agents to deal and cope with the predicaments of contingency. Focusing on the dynamic and reciprocal permeability distinctive of love, I defend the claim that vulnerability to love is not the source of burdens and constraints but a key capacity that shapes human identity, drives and expands agency, and sustains relations of mutual accountability
Authority as a contingency plan
Humean constructivists object to Kantian constructivism that by endorsing the constitutivist strategy, which grounds moral obligations in rational agency, this position discounts the impact of contingency in moral life. In response to these charges, I argue that Humeans misrepresent the challenge of contingency and fail to provide adequate resources to cope with it. In its formalist variety, Humean constructivism fails to make sense of an important category of ethical judgments, which claim universal authority. The substantive varieties of Humean constructivism recognize that some ethical judgments aspire to universality, but fail to fully justify such an aspiration. These versions of constructivism represent a setback in regard to the achievements of Kantian constructivism. In conclusion, I briefly resume the advantages of advocating a Kantian conception of rational authority as a response to contingency
- …
