24,336 research outputs found
Bertrand Competition with Non-rigid Capacity Constraints
No full textWe examine a model of Bertrand competition with non-rigid capacity constraints, so that by incurring an additional cost, firms can produce beyond capacity. We find that there is an interval of prices such that a price can be sustained as a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if and only if it lies in this interval. We then examine the properties of this set as (a) the number of firms becomes large and (b) the capacity cost increases.
Some forgotten equilibria of the Bertrand duopoly!?
No full textThis note analyzes the Bertrand duopoly with constant but asymmetric marginal costs on a market with homogenous products. It is shown that there exist some equilibria that are ignored in the literature on IO. In addition, in this setting (perfectly or nearly perfectly) competitive equilibria exist.
Bertrand competition with non-rigid capacity constraints
No full textWe examine a model of Bertrand competition with non-rigid capacity constraints, so that by incurring an additional per unit cost of capacity expansion, firms can produce beyond capacity. We find that there is an interval of prices such that a price can be sustained as a pure strategy Nash equilibrium if and only if it lies in this interval. We then examine the properties of this set as [a] the number of firms becomes large and [b] the capacity cost increases.Bertrand competition, capacity constraint
Endogenous Timing of Moves in Bertrand-Edgeworth Triopolies
No full textWe determine the endogenous order of moves in which the firms set their prices in the framework of a capacity-constrained Bertrand-Edgeworth triopoly. A three-period
timing game that determines the period in which the firms announce their prices precedes the price-setting stage. We show for the non-trivial case (in which the Bertrand-Edgeworth triopoly has only an equilibrium in non-degenerated mixedstrategies) that the firm with the largest capacity sets its price first, while the two other firms set their prices later. Our result extends a finding by Deneckere and Kovenock (1992) from duopolies to triopolies. This extension was made possible by Hirata's (2009) recent advancements on the mixed-strategy equilibria of Bertrand-Edgeworth games
THE COURNOT-BERTRAND PROFIT DIFFERENTIAL : A REVERSAL RESULT IN A DIFFERENTIATED DUOPOLY WITH WAGE BARGAINING
No full textThis paper compares Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in a downstream differentiated duopoly in which the input price (wage) paid by each downstream firm is the outcome of a strategic bargain with its upstream supplier (labour union). We show that the standard result that Cournot equilibrium profits exceed those under Bertrand competition - when the differentiated duopoly game is played in imperfect substitutes - is reversible. Whether equilibrium profits are higher under Cournot or Bertrand competition is shown to depend upon the nature of the upstream agents’ preferences, on the distribution of bargaining power over the input price and on the degree of product market differentiation. We find that the standard result holds unless unions are both powerful and place considerable weight on the wage argument in their utility function. One implication of this is that if the upstream agents are profit-maximising firms, then the standard result will obtain.differentiated duopoly ; wage bargaining ; Cournot ; Bertrand.
The Folk theorem and bertrand competition
No full textWe examine if the folk theorem of perfect competition holds under Bertrand competition (when firms supply all demand), both when entry is exogenous, as well as when it is free. Inter alia, we also characterize the limit equilibrium sets.Bertrand oligopoly, folk theorem, limit properties, exogenous entry, free entry
The Cournot-Bertrand profit differential: a reversal result in a differentiated duopoly with wage bargaining
No full textThis paper compares Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in a downstream differentiated duopoly in which the input price (wage) paid by each downstream firm is the outcome of a strategic bargain with its upstream supplier (labour union). We show that the standard result that Cournot equilibrium profits exceed those under Bertrand competition - when the differentiated duopoly game is played in imperfect substitutes - is reversible. Whether equilibrium profits are higher under Cournot or Bertrand competition is shown to depend upon the nature of the upstream agents’ preferences, on the distribution of bargaining power over the input price and on the degree of product market differentiation. We find that the standard result holds unless unions are both powerful and place considerable weight on the wage argument in their utility function. One implication of this is that if the upstream agents are profit-maximising firms, then the standard result will obtain
On stability of Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in a simple model of the labour market
No full textWe examine a Bertrand-Edgeworth model of competition in a labour market where the workers simultaneously set wages disregarding any influence their current decision may have on opponents' future decisions. The iterated best response process is shown to converge in finite time to a Bertrand-Nash solution, where wages are set at the market-clearing level. This convergence result is also shown to hold when the assumption of static expectations is replaced by milder restrictions on beliefs about opponents'' wages.
Fonds Louis Bertrand. Fonds numérisé. Correspondance de Louis Bertrand. [Lettre ms de Marcel Batilliat à Louis Bertrand]
No full textNumérisation effectuée à partir d'un document original : LBC0069.Appartient à l'ensemble documentaire : 3M000Appartient à l'ensemble documentaire : 3M007Autres : Tampon = cercle avec les initiales M et B stylisées.Batilliat, Marcel (1871-1941).Bertrand, Louis (1866-1941).Versailles (Yvelines).Lieu de copie : Versaille
Fonds Louis Bertrand. Fonds numérisé. Correspondance de Louis Bertrand. [Lettre ms de Marcel Batilliat à Louis Bertrand]
No full textNumérisation effectuée à partir d'un document original : LBC0070.Appartient à l'ensemble documentaire : 3M000Appartient à l'ensemble documentaire : 3M007Autres : Tampon = cercle avec les initiales M et B stylisées.Batilliat, Marcel (1871-1941).Bertrand, Louis (1866-1941).Versailles (Yvelines).Lieu de copie : Versaille
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