393 research outputs found
Contract enforcement and institutions among the Maghribi Traders: Refuting Edwards and Ogilvie
No full textEdwards and Ogilvie (2008) dispute the empirical basis for the view (Greif, e.g., 1989, 1994,2006) that multilateral reputation mechanism mitigated agency problems among the eleventh-century Maghribi traders. They assert that the relations among merchants and agents were law-based. This paper refutes this assertion using quantitative and documentary evidence thereby vindicating the position that the legal system had a marginal role in mitigating agency problems in long-distance trade in this historical era. Edwards and Ogilvie constantly present legal actions in non-trade related legal cases as evidence for a reliance on the legal system for matters pertaining to long-distance trade. Their criticism of Greif’s documentary analysis also fails scrutiny. The claim that merchants' relations with their overseas agents were law-based is wrong. This paper is based on quantitative analyses of the corpuses containing the hundreds of documents on which the literature relies and a careful review of the documents and the literature Edwards and Ogilvie cite. Their assertion is shown to be based on unrepresentative and irrelevant examples, an inaccurate description of the literature, and a consistent misreading of the few sources they consulted. In particular, their examples for the use of the court are mainly taken from mandatory legal procedures associated with sorting out the assets and liabilities of deceased traders’ estates. Such examples do not support the claim that agency relations were law-based. The quantitative analysis reveals that empirical basis for the multilateral reputation view is stronger than originally perceived. This paper also sheds light on the roles of the legal system and reputation mechanism during this period.institutions; contract-enforcement; reputation; Maghribi traders; agency relations
Contract Enforcement and Institutions among the Maghribi Traders: Refuting Edwards and Ogilvie
No full textEdwards and Ogilvie (2008) dispute the empirical basis for the view (Greif, e.g., 1989, 1994, 2006) that multilateral reputation mechanism mitigated agency problems among the eleventh-century Maghribi traders. They assert that the relations among merchants and agents were law-based. This paper refutes this assertion using quantitative and documentary evidence thereby vindicating the position that the legal system had a marginal role in mitigating agency problems in long-distance trade in this historical era.** Edwards and Ogilvie constantly present legal actions in non-trade related legal cases as evidence for a reliance on the legal system for matters pertaining to long-distance trade. Their criticism of Greif’s documentary analysis also fails scrutiny. The claim that merchants' relations with their overseas agents were law-based is wrong. This paper is based on quantitative analyses of the corpuses containing the hundreds of documents on which the literature relies and a careful review of the documents and the literature Edwards and Ogilvie cite. Their assertion is shown to be based on unrepresentative and irrelevant examples, an inaccurate description of the literature, and a consistent misreading of the few sources they consulted. In particular, their examples for the use of the court are mainly taken from mandatory legal procedures associated with sorting out the assets and liabilities of deceased traders’ estates. Such examples do not support the claim that agency relations were law-based. The quantitative analysis reveals that empirical basis for the multilateral reputation view is stronger than originally perceived. This paper also sheds light on the roles of the legal system and reputation mechanism during this period.
Cultural and Institutional Bifurcation: China and Europe Compared
No full textHow to sustain cooperation is a key challenge for any society. Different social organizations have evolved in the course of history to cope with this challenge by relying on different combinations of external (formal and informal) enforcement institutions and intrinsic motivation. Some societies rely more on informal enforcement and moral obligations within their constituting groups. Others rely more on formal enforcement and general moral obligations towards society at large. How do culture and institutions interact in generating different evolutionary trajectories of societal organizations? Do contemporary attitudes, institutions and behavior reflect distinct pre-modern trajectories?
This paper addresses these questions by examining the bifurcation in the societal organizations of pre-modern China and Europe. It focuses on their distinct epitomizing social
structures, the clan and the city, that sustain cooperation through different mixes of enforcement and intrinsic motivation. The Chinese clan is a kinship-based hierarchical organization in which
strong moral ties and reputation among clan’s members are particularly important in sustaining cooperation. In Medieval Europe, by contrast, the main example of a cooperative organization is the city. Here cooperation is across kinship lines and external enforcement plays a bigger role. But morality and reputation, although weaker, also matter and extend beyond one’s kin.
The analysis exposes the impact of different initial moral systems and kinship organizations on China’s and Europe’s distinct cultural and institutional trajectories during the last millennium. These initial conditions influenced subsequent evolution through
complementarities between moral systems and institutions. The implied social relations, moral obligations, and enforcement capacity further influenced the interactions with other external
organizations (such as other cities or clans, or higher state authority), which further reinforced the distinct trajectories.
This paper’s historical and comparative institutional analysis is based on the model in Avner Greif and Guido Tabellini (2010). It combines the analysis of generalized and limited morality (Tabellini 2008) with the analysis of the evolution of institutional complexes composed of complementary institutional and cultural elements (Greif 2006, ch. 7). A comparable analysis of the impact of initial beliefs and social structures is provided by Greif (1994, 2006, ch 9)
The clan and the corporation: sustaining cooperation in China and Europe
No full textOver the last millennium, the clan and the corporation have been the loci of cooperation in China and Europe respectively. This paper examines – analytically and historically – the cultural and institutional co-evolution that led to this bifurcation. We highlight that groups with which individuals identify are basic units of cooperation. Such loyalty groups influence institutional development because intra-group moral commitment reduces enforcement cost implying a comparative advantage in pursuing collective actions. Loyalty groups perpetuate due to positive feedbacks between morality, institutions, and the implied pattern of cooperation
Théorie des jeux et analyse historique des institutions. Les institutions économiques du Moyen Âge
No full textGame Theory and Historical Institutional Analysis: Self-Enforcing, Non-Market Institutions During the Late Medieval Period. A. Greif.
Recent development of game theory has enabled expanding the analysis of historical institutions to examine self-enforcing, non-market institutions. This paper provides a brief methodological discussion of Historical Institutional Analysis that utilizes game theory for the study of such institutions. To illustrate the methodology, contributions, and potential benefit of this approach, the paper briefly discusses recent works applying this methodology to the study of institutions during the late medieval period. Particular attention is given to these studies' implications regarding institutional efficiency and path dependance.Greif Avner. Théorie des jeux et analyse historique des institutions. Les institutions économiques du Moyen Âge. In: Annales. Histoire, Sciences Sociales. 53ᵉ année, N. 3, 1998. pp. 597-633
The curious commentary on the citation practices of Avner Greif
No full textEthnically homogeneous middleman group, Maghribi traders’ coalition, Economics of trust, Economics of identity, Priority citations, Reputation,
Contract Enforcement and Institutions among the Maghribi Traders: Refuting Edwards and Ogilvie
No full textEdwards and Ogilvie dispute the empirical basis of the view that a multilateral reputation mechanism mitigated agency problems among the eleventh-century Maghribi traders. They allege that the relations among merchants and agents were founded in law. This paper refutes this assertion using comprehensive quantitative analyses of all available primary sources and a careful review of the documents and the literature Edwards and Ogilvie cite. Among recent new quantitative findings reported: (1) less than one percent of the documents’ content is devoted to legal activity on any matter. (2) The legal system was mainly used for mandatory, non-trade related matters. (3) The documents reflect thousands of agency relations but there are less than six court documents possibly reflecting its use in agency disputes. (4) A ten percent random sample of all the documents finds no trade-related legal actions among Maghribis beyond those in the court documents. (5) About 75 percent of agency relations were not based on a legal contract. The paper also reaffirms the accuracy of Greif’s documentary examples and sheds light on the roles of the legal system and reputation mechanism during this period.multilateral reputation mechanism, Maghribi traders, Edwards and Ogilvie
MARKET AND GOVERNMENT FAILURES IN HISTORICAL INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS BY DOUGLASS C. NORTH AND AVNER GREIF
No full textEconomic historians Douglass C. North and Avner Greif use the tools on the New Institutional Economics and Game Theory and draw the attention of economists to the fact that both markets and governments are institutional constructs created by opportunistic individuals and groups with different interests. They show how exceptionally many are the social and cultural conditions of credible commitment are necessary for the emergence of efficient markets and government. In contrast with standard economic approaches, from the historical-institutional point of view it is the efficiency of some markets and governments should be treated as “deviations” from a norm and states of “failure” – as a starting points in analyses of markets and governments. This observation bears important implications both for contemporary institutional engineering and for economic theory, and even for teaching economics.</p
Qu’est-ce que l’analyse institutionnelle ?
No full textDepuis sa thèse novatrice sur les Maghribis – ces commerçants juifs de la Méditerranée musulmane du xie siècle –, les institutions ont toujours constitué le thème central des travaux d’Avner Greif, aujourd’hui professeur d’économie à l’université de Stanford. En 2006, il publie un ouvrage résumant plus de quinze ans de recherches théoriques et empiriques sur ce sujet, Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy. Lessons from Medieval Trade. Nous publions ici la traduction inédite de l’int..
Contract enforcement and institutions among the Maghribi Traders: Refuting Edwards and Ogilvie
No full textEdwards and Ogilvie (2008) dispute the empirical basis for the view (Greif, e.g., 1989, 1994,2006) that multilateral reputation mechanism mitigated agency problems among the eleventh-century Maghribi traders. They assert that the relations among merchants and agents were law-based. This paper refutes this assertion using quantitative and documentary evidence thereby vindicating the position that the legal system had a marginal role in mitigating agency problems in long-distance trade in this historical era. Edwards and Ogilvie constantly present legal actions in
non-trade related legal cases as evidence for a reliance on the legal system for matters pertaining to long-distance trade. Their criticism of Greif’s documentary analysis also fails scrutiny. The claim that merchants' relations with their overseas agents were law-based is wrong. This paper is based on quantitative analyses of the corpuses containing the hundreds of documents on which the literature relies and a careful review of the documents and the literature Edwards and Ogilvie cite. Their assertion is shown to be based on unrepresentative and irrelevant examples, an inaccurate description of the literature, and a consistent misreading of the few sources they consulted. In particular, their examples for the use of the court are mainly taken from mandatory legal procedures associated with sorting out the assets and liabilities of deceased traders’ estates. Such examples do not support the claim that agency relations were law-based. The quantitative analysis reveals that empirical basis for the multilateral reputation view is stronger than originally perceived. This paper also sheds light on the roles of the legal system and reputation mechanism during this period
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