1,721,041 research outputs found
sj-pdf-1-ilr-10.1177_00197939221134271 – Supplemental material for Effects of New Technologies on Work: The Case of Additive Manufacturing
Supplemental material, sj-pdf-1-ilr-10.1177_00197939221134271 for Effects of New Technologies on Work: The Case of Additive Manufacturing by Avner Ben-Ner, Ainhoa Urtasun and Bledi Taska in ILR Review</p
The Ecology of Collective Action: A Public Goods and Sanctions Experiment with Controlled Group Formation
For-Profit, State, and Nonprofit: How to Cut the Pie Among the Three Sectors
What is the best way to deliver various goods and services in the advanced complex economy? What is the appropriate division of labor among the state, the private for-profit, and the nonprofit sectors? This paper explores these questions relative to the well-being of consumers, and offers a set of broad answers grounded in a benefit-cost analysis that balances (1) the relative value derived by consumers and customers from their relations with organizations from the three sectors, and (2) the relative efficiency of the internal organization of these types of organizations. The paper illustrates this benefit-cost analysis in the context of several industries.Three-Sector Economy, Division of labor among for-profit firms, state, and nonprofit organizations, Organization-consumer interface, Comparative analysis of agency problems, Production of public goods
Public Options and Altruistic Firms - Antitrust Targets or Tools? The Welfare Impact of a Mixed Oligopoly With Managerial firms
I analyse the welfare impact of a mixed market with a public or private firm with some degree of altruism, in the presence of an agency problem. Contrary to some earlier findings, the total surplus turns out to be increasing in the degree of altruism. This impact is stronger than if there is no agency problem, despite more stringent conditions for the market to remain mixed. The altruistic firm is more cost-efficient, and viable if the market can remain
mixed. A competition policy that encourages entry may increase welfare, but its scope is reduced by higher altruism.non-profit maximising firms, public firms, mixed
oligopoly, competition policy
Measuring Trust: Which Measure Can Be Trusted?
The study examines the relationship of various survey measures of trust and risk taking with trusting behavior in the trust or investment game (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995). We conduct a series of standard trust game experiments from which we derive the standard trust measure – amount sent. We also conduct trust games in which we allow subjects in the role of trustors to make proposals for what they should send and what their counterparts (trustees) should send back, and offer the possibility of asking for costly contracts to support agreements. We use trustors’ request for such contracts as a new operationalization of behavioral trust (not asking for a contract indicates more trusting than asking for one). We compare the two behavioral measures to survey measures of trust and risk preferences. Our results confirm that the amount sent in the trust game is related to common-sense survey measures of trust but not to any measures of risk preferences. In contrast, none of the survey measures predicts asking for a contract. In addition, we investigate the association between risk preferences, gender, personality, cognitive ability and other individual characteristics and trust. We find that male subjects send significantly more than female subjects; risk attitude, the big five personality traits, cognitive ability and other variables show only limited association with the amount sent and asking for a contract. In contrast, survey trust measures are explained well by such variables. JEL classification: C72, C91, D63Trust; Trust game; Measurement
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