101,951 research outputs found
Decision under Uncertainty : the Classical Models
No full textThis chapiter of a collective book is dedicated to classical decision models under uncertainty, i.e. under situations where events do not have "objective" probabilities with which the Decision Marker agrees. We present successively the two main theories, their axiomatic, the interpretation and the justification of their axioms and their main properties : first, the general model of Subjective Expected Utility due to Savage (Savage, 1954), second, the Anscombe-Aumann (1963) theory, in a different framework. Both theories enforce the universal use of a probabilistic representation. We then discuss this issue in connection with the experimental result known as the Ellsberg paradox.Uncertainty, subjective probability, Subjective Expected Utility, Savage, Anscombe and Aumann, Ellsberg paradox.
A General Index of Inherent Risk
No full textWe extend the pioneering work of Aumann and Serrano by presenting an index of inherent riskiness of a gamble having the desirable properties of their index, while being applicable to gambles with either positive or negative expectations. As such, our index provides a measure of riskiness which is of use for both risk lovers and risk aversive gamblers, and is defined for all discrete and a large class of continuous gambles. We analyze abstract properties of our index, and present in addition three empirical applications - roulette, horse betting market and US options traded on financial stocks between 2005 and 2007.
"Role of Cleaning-in-Place in the Purification of mAb Supernatants Using Continuous Cation Exchange Chromatography"
No full textFalse Consciousness in Financial Markets: Or is it in Ivory Towers?
No full textIn general, models in finance assume that investors are risk averse. An example of such a recent model is the pioneering work of Aumann and Serrano, which presents an economic index of riskiness of gambles which is independent of wealth and holds (as might be understood from the adjective “economic”) for exclusively risk averse investors. In their paper, they discuss gambles with positive expected returns which will be accepted or rejected by agents which different levels of risk aversion. The question never asked by the authors (and in most of the finance literature) is: Who is offering these attractive gambles? To arrive at an answer, we extend the Aumann-Serrano risk index in such a way that it accommodates gambles with either positive or negative expectations and is thus suitable for both the risk averse and risk lovers. Once we allow for the existence of risk lovers, it may be shown that in financial markets, many gambles with negative expectations are taken either knowingly or unknowingly so that there are always people that act as if they are risk lovers. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of the implications of our result, in particular that gambling is by no means restricted to the casino or the track.
Improvement of an overloaded, multi-component, solvent gradient bioseparation through multiobjective optimization
No full text"Improvement of specific monoclonal antibody (mAb) activity by reduction of the mAb heterogeneity using continuous chromatography (MCSGP)"
No full textLetter, [Author unclear] to Paulina T. Merritt
No full textHandwritten letter to Paulina Merritt from an unknown author, October 1, 1876.
Creating Culture in the Lab: Equilibrium Conventions in Inter-Generational Ultimatum Games
No full textThe Ultimatum Game and the experiments surrounding it, have presented economists with a puzzle that they have struggled to explain. But as Robert Aumann has pointed out, while there may be only one sub-game perfect equilibrium to the Ultimatum Game, there are an infinite number of Nash equilibria. All that is needed to maintain a non-sub-game perfect equilibrium is a set of Sender beliefs that the offer contemplated is the minimum that would be accepted and behavior on the part of the Receivers that confirms these beliefs. The only puzzle is how such a set of mutually consistent beliefs developed in the first place and how they are passed on from one generation of player to the next. Using an inter-generational game experimental setting, this paper investigates how "culture" serves as the selection mechanism which solves this puzzle. Culture is then simply a system of beliefs and self-confirming actions which support any one of these non-sub-game perfect Nash equilibria as the accepted solution to the game being played. The outcome is, as Robert Aumann has called it a "perfectly good" Nash equilibrium convention which is just not perfect.
<strong>Robert Aumann</strong>:Interviewed at the 17th International Conference on Game Theory at Stony Brook University
No full textIn this interview Nobel Prize Winner Robert Aumann talks about how he was initially drawn into game theory, when he came to think of formalizing the folk-theorem, the proper role of game theory in relation to other disciplines and why behavioral game theory probably won't last long
Endogenous Coalitions Formations Through Technology Transfers and Fair Prices
No full textWe consider a situation in which members of an oligopoly have different technologies, which allow them to produce at different costs. Members may license their technology to other members. Using the Aumann-Drèze modification of the Shapley value, we compute fair prices for these licenses. We also study the problem of stability for these ``licensing coalitions.''Cooperative Game Theory, Technology Transfers, Modified Shapley Value
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