1,721,037 research outputs found

    [Vincenzo Aonzo (1912), funerary sculpture]

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    From Berresford: Vincenzo Aonzo (1912), Achille Canessa, Cimitero di Zinola, Savona.Angel hovering above seated woman.Title from Berresford

    Do Androids dream of electric phishing?

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    Introduction to malicious software

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    Novel Attacks and Defenses in the Userland of Android

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    In the last decade, mobile devices have spread rapidly, becoming more and more part of our everyday lives; this is due to their feature-richness, mobility, and affordable price. At the time of writing, Android is the leader of the market among operating systems, with a share of 76% and two and a half billion active Android devices around the world. Given that such small devices contain a massive amount of our private and sensitive information, the economic interests in the mobile ecosystem skyrocketed. For this reason, not only legitimate apps running on mobile environments have increased dramatically, but also malicious apps have also been on a steady rise. On the one hand, developers of mobile operating systems learned from security mistakes of the past, and they made significant strides in blocking those threats right from the start. On the other hand, these high-security levels did not deter attackers. In this thesis, I present my research contribution about the most meaningful attack and defense scenarios in the userland of the modern Android operating system. I have emphasized "userland'' because attack and defense solutions presented in this thesis are executing in the userspace of the operating system, due to the fact that Android is slightly different from traditional operating systems. After the necessary technical background, I show my solution, RmPerm, in order to enable Android users to better protect their privacy by selectively removing permissions from any app on any Android version. This operation does not require any modification to the underlying operating system because we repack the original application. Then, using again repackaging, I have developed Obfuscapk; it is a black-box obfuscation tool that can work with every Android app and offers a free solution with advanced state of the art obfuscation techniques -- especially the ones used by malware authors. Subsequently, I present a machine learning-based technique that focuses on the identification of malware in resource-constrained devices such as Android smartphones. This technique has a very low resource footprint and does not rely on resources outside the protected device. Afterward, I show how it is possible to mount a phishing attack -- the historically preferred attack vector -- by exploiting two recent Android features, initially introduced in the name of convenience. Although a technical solution to this problem certainly exists, it is not solvable from a single entity, and there is the need for a push from the entire community. But sometimes, even though there exists a solution to a well-known vulnerability, developers do not take proper precautions. In the end, I discuss the Frame Confusion vulnerability; it is often present in hybrid apps, and it was discovered some years ago, but I show how it is still widespread. I proposed a methodology, implemented in the FCDroid tool, for systematically detecting the Frame Confusion vulnerability in hybrid Android apps. The results of an extensive analysis carried out through FCDroid on a set of the most downloaded apps from the Google Play Store prove that 6.63% (i.e., 1637/24675) of hybrid apps are potentially vulnerable to Frame Confusion. The impact of such results on the Android users' community is estimated in 250.000.000 installations of vulnerable apps

    RmPerm: A Tool for Android Permissions Removal

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    Android apps are generally over-privileged, i.e., they request more permissions than they actually need to execute properly. Prior to version 6 users can install an app only by accepting all its requested permissions, while newer Android versions allow users to dynamically grant/deny groups of permissions. Since some them impact on users' privacy, we argue that users should be granted control at the granularity of the single permission. We propose a novel approach, which does not require any change to the underlying OS, allowing users to selectively remove permissions from apps before installing them, and with a finer granularity. We developed ool, an open-source tool, that implements our methodology, and we present the viability of our approach via an empirical assessment on 81K apps, underlining that, in the worst case, up to 86% of the apps can execute without crashing when none of the requested privacy-related permissions are granted

    MOULDS ON LABEL PAPER BOTTLED MINERAL WATER

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    Stemphilium botryosum e Penicillium chrysogenum are the principal fungi responsable of the spreading of moulds on paper label of bottled mineral water. The contamination of raw materials used for labels production is the origin of the alterations

    Phishing Attacks on Modern Android

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    Modern versions of Android have introduced a number of features in the name of convenience. This paper shows how two of these features, mobile password managers and Instant Apps, can be abused to make phishing attacks that are significantly more practical than existing ones. We have studied the leading password managers for mobile and we uncovered a number of design issues that leave them open to attacks. For example, we show it is possible to trick password managers into auto-suggesting credentials associated with arbitrary attacker-chosen websites. We then show how an attacker can abuse the recently introduced Instant Apps technology to allow a remote attacker to gain full UI control and, by abusing password managers, to implement an end-to-end phishing attack requiring only few user’s clicks. We also found that mobile password managers are vulnerable to “hidden fields” attacks, which makes these attacks even more practical and problematic. We conclude this paper by proposing a new secure-by-design API that avoids common errors and we show that the secure implementation of autofill functionality will require a community-wide effort, which this work hopes to inspire
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