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Jaspers e Weizsäcker: la medicina in discussione
Al centro di questo saggio c’è il confronto tra due medici e pensatori: Karl Jaspers e Viktor
von Weizsäcker. I loro rapporti, a lungo caratterizzati da stima e reciproco rispetto, si
interrompono negli anni Cinquanta in seguito alla durissima polemica intrapresa da
Jaspers negli scritti Zur Kritik der Psychoanalyse (1950), Die Idee des Arztes (1953),
Arzt und Patient (1953). Weizsäcker viene accusato di aspirare ad una «rivoluzione
totale della medicina», nefasta per la scienza e pericolosa per i malati, che Jaspers intende
contrastare pubblicamente. Nel saggio, prendendo le mosse da quanto Jaspers scrive sulle
ricerche di Weizsäcker nella quarta edizione della Psicopatologia generale, proverò a
ricostruire le ragioni di questa controversia in cui viene in primo piano l’interrogazione,
sempre attuale, sull’incerto statuto epistemologico della medicina
Tra indeterminatezza e arbitrio. Jaspers e l’«arte» di scrivere Krankengeschichten
Faced with the scant interest psychiatry of his time showed in patient's biographical histories, Jaspers draws attention to this important resource of clinical practice and psychopathological investigation. In this context, he makes, over the years, a series of methodological observations on the writing of biographical histories of the sick, dedicating, in General Psychopathology, a specific paragraph to what he calls the «art» of writing Krankengeschichten. In this essay, by retracing some of the cores of Jaspers’s reflection on biographische Krankengeschichte, we will dwell on the critical points that emerge in its realisation and the solutions that Jaspers identifies to overcome them. We will defend the thesis that his indications on how to draw up good and useful Krankengeschichten, rather than aiming at constructing a rigid canon of medical-biographical narration, have the aim of avoiding two specular risks: that of indeterminateness and that of arbitrariness
Acting for the Best and Feeling Regret. Notes on Some Cases of Moral Conflict
Agents who have experienced a moral conflict often perceive a particularly strong discrepancy between a negative emotional state and the awareness that, if they could ever go back, they would confirm the choice made. This dissonance is seen as typical of the feeling of regret, to which Bernard Williams has drawn attention. In this essay, I will investigate his main claims in the light of some objections raised by Richard Mervyn Hare and Philippa Foot. In particular, I will explore the meaning of regret in those cases in which the agents believe they have acted for the best or at any rate according to the principles of a coherent ethical theory. To this end, I will review some cases of moral conflict in which some ethically valid reasons for subordinating one moral obligation to the other seem to be available to the agents
Concetto e critica dell'esperienza nella psicologia di Hegel
The aim of this essay is to investigate the role which the experience has
within the philosophical and speculative psychology elaborated by Hegel, psychology
that seems to be uninterested to the empirical content of the single faculties and activities
of the spirit. Indeed, Hegel, from the early years, criticizes the configuration which
the experience has assumed in the empirical psychology of his time, where it has been
reduced to a mere perception of individual data or to a generalisation of the individual
perceptions. But this criticism does not result in a denial of the role of the experience,
because, according to Hegel, just through a different and profitable relationship with the
experience is possible to give life to a psychology authentically speculative. It is not based
on the experience, but it wants to take it into account, it is not confined to reproduce the
empirical facts delivered to the internal or external perception, but it seizes in them the
free and conscious activity of the spiri
BETWEEN MIMESIS AND FICTION: RECOGNITION IN ADAM SMITH
In Adam Smith’s ethics of sympathy, recognition is closely linked to seeking approval and esteem from other social actors. In the light of the undoubtedly great importance granted by Smith to social approval a series of questions arise, such as: Does the search for recognition necessarily imply the adoption by the individual of mimetic behaviours which, by replicating what is socially shared, guarantee approval and esteem? And to what extent does mimesis require a capacity for fiction? In this regard, is it not the case that individual moral evaluations risk being reduced to the conformist reverberation of those of society? The aim of this essay is first of all to understand in which terms Smith, in his Theory of Moral Sentiments, understands the link between mimesis, fiction and recognition. To this end, the role played by mimesis and fiction will be scrutinised along the various interconnected dimensions that structure the complex phenomenon of recognition: the emotional, the one linked to public success, and the moral one. Finally, in the light of the peculiar account on mimesis developed by Smith on aesthetic grounds, also the ethical implications of this link will be discussed
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