23 research outputs found
Altered chemokine expression in the spinal cord and brain contributes to differential interleukin-1 beta-induced neutrophil recruitment
No full textThe pattern of neutrophil recruitment that accompanies inflammation in the CNS depends on the site of injury and the stage of development. The adult brain parenchyma is refractory to neutrophil recruitment and associated damage as compared to the spinal cord or juvenile brain. Using quantitative Taqman RT–PCR and enzyme-liked immunosorbent assay (ELISA), we compared mRNA and protein expression of the rat neutrophil chemoattractant chemokines (CINC) in spinal cord and brain of adult and juvenile rats to identify possible association with the observed differences in neutrophil recruitment. Interleukin-1? (IL-1?) injection resulted in up-regulated chemokine expression in both brain and spinal cord. CINC-3 mRNA was elevated above CINC-1 and CINC-2?, with expression levels for each higher in spinal cord than in brain. By ELISA, IL-1? induced greater CINC-1 and CINC-2? expression compared to CINC-3, with higher protein levels in spinal cord than in brain. In the juvenile brain, significantly higher levels of CINC-2? protein were observed in response to IL-1? injection than in the adult brain following an equivalent challenge. Correspondingly, neutrophil recruitment was observed in the juvenile brain and adult spinal cord, but not in the adult brain. No expression of CINC-2? mRNA was detected. Thus differential chemokine induction may contribute to variations in neutrophil recruitment in during development and between the different CNS compartments
Differential induction of interleukin-1 beta and tumour necrosis factor-alpha may account for specific patterns of leukocyte recruitment in the brain
No full textIn peripheral tissue, IL-1beta has been shown to induce TNFalpha expression and vice versa, resulting in mixed neutrophil and mononuclear cell recruitment to the site of injury. This has led to the concept of crosstalk in peripheral cytokine signalling pathways. In the brain parenchyma, however, restricted patterns of leukocyte recruitment following the focal injection of pro-inflammatory agents into the brain are observed. This study investigates the expression of the principal pro_inflammatory cytokines-IL-1beta and TNFalpha-in the brain after IL-1beta, TNFalpha, NMDA or endotoxin injection into the brain parenchyma of rats. Each of these agents gives rise to a distinct pattern of acute leukocyte recruitment at 24 h. We found that IL-1beta induces de novo synthesis of additional IL-1beta but not TNFalpha, as determined by RT-PCR and ELISA, and TNFalpha does not induce either itself or IL-1beta. Injection of NMDA results in IL-1beta, but not TNFalpha up-regulation. Injection of IL-1beta or NMDA is associated with neutrophil recruitment whereas injection of TNFalpha is associated with mononuclear cell recruitment. Following injection of endotoxin, both TNFalpha and IL-1beta levels are elevated and neutrophils and mononuclear cells are recruited to the brain. These data suggest that the signalling pathways that are present in the periphery are modified in the brain and that differential induction of TNFalpha and IL-1beta may have a role in the atypical pattern of leukocyte recruitment observed in the brain
Central nervous system injury triggers hepatic CC and CXC chemokine expression that is associated with leukocyte mobilization and recruitment to both the central nervous system and the liver
No full textThe administration of interleukin-1ß to the brain induces hepatic CXC chemokine synthesis, which increases neutrophil levels in the blood, liver, and brain. We now show that such hepatic response is not restricted to the CXC chemokines. CCL-2, a CC chemokine, was released by the liver in response to a tumor necrosis factor (TNF)- challenge to the brain and boosted monocyte levels. Furthermore, a clinically relevant compression injury to the spinal cord triggered hepatic chemokine expression of both types. After a spinal cord injury, elevated CCL-2 and CXCL-1 mRNA and protein were observed in the liver by TaqMan reverse transcriptase-polymerase chain reaction and enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay as early as 2 to 4 hours. Simultaneously, we observed elevated levels of these chemokines and circulating leukocyte populations in the blood. Leukocytes were recruited to the liver at this early stage, whereas at the site of challenge in the central nervous system, few were observed until 24 hours. Artificial elevation of blood CCL-2 triggered dose-dependent monocyte mobilization in the blood and enhanced monocyte recruitment to the brain after TNF- challenge. Attenuation of hepatic CCL-2 production with corticosteroids resulted in reduced monocyte levels after the TNF- challenge. Thus, combined production of CC and CXC hepatic chemokines appears to amplify the central nervous system response to injury
Paramedic Laryngoscopy in the Simulated Difficult Airway: Comparison of the Venner A.P. Advance and GlideScope Ranger Video Laryngoscopes
No full textOn the Status of Rights: Legal and Philosophical
No full textPhoto by Patrick Tomasso on Unsplash
ABSTRACT
In cases where the law conflicts with bioethics, the status of rights must be determined to resolve some of the tensions. This paper considers the origins of both legal and philosophical rights, arguing that rights per se do not exist naturally. Even natural rights that are constitutional or statutory came from relationships rather than existing in nature. Once agreed upon, rights develop moral influence.
INTRODUCTION
l. The Question of Rights
The language of rights is omnipresent in current discourse in law, bioethics, and many other disciplines. Rights dialogue is frequently contentious – some thinkers take issue with various uses of rights in the modern dialogue. For example, some criticize “rights talk,” which heightens social conflict when used as a “trump” against disfavored arguments.[1] Others are displeased by what is termed “rights inflation,” where too many novel rights are developed, such that the rights these scholars view as “more important” become devalued.[2] Some solutions have been proposed: one recommendation is that rights should be restricted to extremely important or essential ones. Some Supreme Court justices make arguments for applying original meanings in legal cases.[3] Conflict over the quantity and status of rights has long been a subject of debate in law and philosophy. Even Jefferson had to balance his own strict reading of the Constitution with tendencies to exceed the plain text of the document.[4] This thread of discourse has grown in political prominence over the years, with more Supreme Court cases that suggest newly developed (or, perhaps, newly recognized) rights.
The theoretical conflict between textualists and those looking to intent or context could lead to repealing rights to abortion, sterilization, or marital privacy and deeply impacts our daily lives. Bioethics is ubiquitous, and rights discourse is fundamental. This paper analyzes the assumptions that underlie the existence of rights. The law is steeped in philosophy, though philosophical theories have an often-unacknowledged role. This is especially true in cases that navigate difficult bioethical issues. As a result of this interleaving, the ontological status of rights is necessary to resolve some of the theoretical tensions.
Many philosophers have either argued for or implicitly included human rights in their theories of morality and legality. However, there is no universally accepted definition of rights; various philosophers have their own approaches. For example: Louden comments, “Rights are permissions rather than requirements. Rights tell us what the bearer is at liberty to do”; Martin thinks that a right is “an established way of acting”; Hohfeld concludes that all rights are claims.[5] Similarly, there is dissent about the qualities of rights: The Declaration of Independence characterizes rights as unalienable, but not all thinkers agree. Nickel comments, “Inalienability does not mean that rights are absolute or can never be overridden by other considerations. . . Perhaps it is sufficient to say that [human] rights are very hard to lose.”[6] This discord necessitates additional analysis. “Many people tend to take the validity of. . . rights for granted. . . However, moral philosophers do not enjoy such license for epistemological complacency.”[7] Because of the fundamental impact that political and moral philosophy enacted as the law have, this paper considers the origins of both legal and philosophical rights, arguing that rights per se do not exist naturally. Even natural rights that are constitutional or statutory came from relationships rather than existing in nature. Once agreed upon, rights take on moral force.
ll. Legal Rights: From Case to Constitution
Bioethics and law sometimes address rights differently. Three Supreme Court cases marked the development of privacy rights in the United States: Griswold v. Connecticut (1965), Roe v. Wade (1973) and Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health (1990). These cases shape the normative dialogue and consider complex moral quandaries.
Griswold v. Connecticut concerned providing contraception to married couples in contravention of state law. Justice Douglas writes for the majority that, based in “a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights,” legally protected zones of privacy extend from the text of the Constitution. “Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.”[8] Writing in dissent, Justice Black argues that there is not a broad right to privacy included in the provisions of the Constitution, and expresses concern over “dilut[ion] or expans[ion]” of enumerated rights by terms such as privacy, which he characterizes as abstract and ambiguous – and subject to liberal reinterpretation.[9] He concludes that the government does have the right to invade privacy “unless prohibited by some specific constitutional provision.”[10] Also dissenting, Justice Stewart finetunes the argument: rather than look to community values beyond the Constitution, the Court ought to rely solely on text of the document, in which he “can find no such general right of privacy in the Bill of Rights, in any other part of the Constitution, or in any case ever decided by this court.”[11] Thus, Griswold v. Connecticut is an example of the tensions within the Supreme Court over strict textualism or broader interpretations of the Constitution that look to intent and purpose.
Roe v. Wade held that there is a right to privacy found through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that includes the right to make medical decisions including abortion. While the conclusion – that there is a Constitutionally protected right to abortion, with certain limits seems to expand the Griswold doctrine of privacy rights, dissent to the ruling stems from much the same concern as before. Justice Rehnquist writes:
A transaction resulting in an operation such as this is not "private" in the ordinary usage of that word. Nor is the "privacy" that the Court finds here even a distant relative of the freedom from searches and seizures protected by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution, which the Court has referred to as embodying a right to privacy.[12]
However, he then departs from the stricter approach of Justices Black and Stewart:
I agree… that the "liberty," against deprivation of which without due process the Fourteenth Amendment protects, embraces more than the rights found in the Bill of Rights. But that liberty is not guaranteed absolutely against deprivation, only against deprivation without due process of law.[13]
This is a tempering of the stricter constructionism found earlier, where more latitude is allowed for the interpretation of the text of the Constitution, even though there are clearly limits on how far the words may be stretched, with the genesis of a new right. Later, in Planned Parenthood of Southwestern Pennsylvania v. Casey, the Court further refined Roe v. Wade implementing an “undue burden” test.[14]
In Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, the Court held that there is a general liberty interest in the refusal of medical treatment. The case continues the tradition of Griswold and Roe v. Wade ensuring a liberty that is beyond the text, but also allows states to impose a strict evidentiary burden to shape how the right is exercised. The Court affirmed the lower court’s decision that “because there was no clear and convincing evidence of Nancy [Cruzan’s] desire to have life-sustaining treatment withdrawn. . . her parents lacked authority to effectuate such a request.”[15] The Supreme Court found that the clear and convincing evidentiary burden applied by the Missouri Supreme Court was consistent with the Due Process clause. Justice Scalia notes that even though he agrees with the Court’s decision, he finds this judgment unnecessary or, perhaps counterproductive, because the philosophical underpinnings of the case “are neither set forth in the Constitution nor known to the nine Justices of this Court any better than they are known to nine people picked at random from the Kansas City telephone directory” and should be left to the states to legislate as they see fit.[16] He goes on to further argue that the Due Process clause “does not protect individuals against deprivations of liberty simpliciter”; rather, it protects them from infringements of liberty that are not accompanied by due process.[17] Justice Scalia’s textualist position likely influenced his remarks.[18]
Comparing these cases, I argue there is a distinct effort to make the Constitution amenable to contemporary mores and able to address present issues that is moderated by justices who adhere to the text. The legal evolution of rights that are beyond the text of the Constitution may reflect social norms as well as the framers’ intent. Rights are protected by the Constitution, but the Constitution is mutable, through both case law and legislation. Prior to the adoption of the Constitution, the Declaration of Independence declared:
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.--That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.[19]
The Declaration of Independence gives insight into rights prior to the Constitution by referring to a priori rights extended by a creator, sheltered and supported by the state.[20]
For earlier evidence of rights, Supreme Court cases often reference English common law doctrines. The common law was informed by preexisting principles and drew on a historical body of thought: philosophy. Exploring philosophy can give insight about the evolution of law.
lll. Philosophical Rights: Issues of Ontology
A moral right, the precursor to many legal rights, in some ways is a claim that bears moral weight. One relevant distinction is between positive and negative rights: a positive right is a claim on another to do something for the right holder; a negative right is a claim on others to leave the rights holder alone. Some rights are per se (that is, rights that have a de novo ontological origin) and some are constructed (rights that are secondary to some other theoretical apparatus).
We must appeal to the state of nature to understand the origin of rights. If rights exist in the state of nature, they are de novo; if not, they are constructed. The state of nature is the theoretical realm where there are no social conventions or no normative rules. The theoretical state of nature is stateless. Hobbes writes about the state of nature. He constructs the person within as incorporating two normative qualities: the law of nature, “whereby individuals are forbidden to do anything destructive of their lives or to omit the means of self-preservation,” and the right of nature, where the person has the “right to all things” – those things required for self-preservation.[21] Similarly, more contemporary philosophers have also inferred that the right to freedom is a natural right.[22] I argue that nature allows every person the freedom to all things, or a natural right against limitation on freedom. Every person has the capacity to do whatever they want, in accordance with their reason; liberty, rather than being a normative claim, is a component of the essence of beings. Yet both nature and other people pose some limitations.
Early modern contractarians’ status theories maintain that human attributes engender rights. [23] A specific formulation of human status ethics can be found in Kantian deontology. From the autonomous and rational will, Kant evolves his Categorical Imperative: “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.”[24] Without (or before) law, philosophers suggested behaviors should reflect moral rights.
Like Rawls, I maintain that the state of nature includes both a scarcity of resources and individuals with whom we may develop conflicts of interest.[25] Individually, we are vulnerable to others, and because of that natural vulnerability, we have an inclination toward self-interest.[26] Therefore, we eventually find the state of nature unsatisfactory and move to create a civil society. Then the subsequent pathway to creating “rights” is well known. People agree on them and act accordingly. Then, they are enshrined in the law.[27] I attribute the impetus to move from the state of nature toward government to interpersonal interaction that creates a form of the social contract. Rawls qualitatively describes this when he notes the “identity of interests” that powers interpersonal cooperation.[28]
To me, the development of positive social relations has three components. The first is the human capacity for empathy. Empathy is commonly accepted by psychologists as universal.[29] Kittay deepens the concept of human empathy, arguing that there is a “register of inevitable human dependency” – a natural sense of care found in the human experience of suffering and decay and death to which we all eventually succumb, necessitating a recognition of interdependence and cooperation.[30]
The second is the importance of identity in generating social cooperation.[31] There is a sense of familial resemblance that resonates when we see others in our lives, forming the base of the identification that allows us to create bonds of mutual assent. A microsociety develops when people are exposed to each other and acts as a miniaturized state, governed by what is at first an implicit social contract. An internal order is generated and can be codified.
The third component of social relations is the extension of the otherness-yet-sameness beyond human adults. Mirroring connects the fully abled adult man and the woman, as well as the child, the physically and mentally disabled, and could extend to animals as well.[32]
Therefore, to me, it seems that rights do not exist per se in the state of nature, but because of our human capacities, relationships yield a social contract. This contract governs interpersonal relations with normative power: rights are constructed. Once constructed based on people in micro-society and then larger groups, rights were codified. Negative rights like those found in the U.S. Constitution allow people in liberal society to codify nearly universal ground rules in certain arenas while respecting minority views and differing priorities. However, the social contract is not absolute: it may be broken by any party with the power to enforce their will upon the other and it will evolve to reflect changing standards. So, there is a subtle distinction to be made: in unequal contractual social relations, there are not constructed rights but rather privileges. In a social relationship that aims at equal status among members, these privileges are normative claims – rights that are not inherent or a priori but mandated to be equally applied by society’s governing body. In this way, I differ from Rawls. To me, justice is a fundamental moral principle only for societies that aim at cooperation, where advancing the interests of all is valued.[33]
CONCLUSION
From Liberty to Law
Social contractualism purports to provide moral rules for its followers even when other ethical systems flounder in the state of nature. Relationships consider the needs and wants of others. Rights exist, with the stipulation that they are constructed under social contracts that aim for equality of application. I also suggest that contractualist approaches may even expand the parties who may be allowed rights, something that has significant bearing on the law and practical bioethics.
The strict/loose constructionism debate that has played out in the Supreme Court’s decisions focuses on whether rights are enumerated or implied. Theoretical or implicit contracts may be change quickly, based on the power dynamics in a social relationship. Theoretical bounds of the social contract (possibly including animals, nonhumans, etc.) may be constricted by an official contract, so these concerns would need to be adjudicated in the context of the Constitution. In certain cases, strict interpretation reflects the rights determined by the social compact and limits new positive rights; in others, a broad interpretation keeps government out of certain decisions, expanding negative rights to reflect changing social norms. The negative rights afforded in the Constitution provide a framework meant to allow expansive individual choices and freedom. The underlying social compact has more to do with the norms behind societal structure than forcing a set of agreed upon social norms at the level of individual behavior. The Constitution’s text can be unclear, arbitrary, or open to multiple meanings. The literary theorist may be willing to accept contradiction or multiple meanings, but the legal scholar may not. The issue of whether the social compact is set or evolving affects constitutional interpretation.
The law is itself may be stuck in a state of indeterminacy: the law, in the eyes of the framers, was centered on a discourse steeped in natural, human rights, attributed to a creator. Today, there is an impulse toward inherent human dignity to support rights. The strict/loose constructionism debate concerns interpretation.[34] In conclusion, rights have no ontological status per se, but are derived from a complex framework that springs from our relationships and dictates the appropriateness of our actions. While the Constitution establishes the negative rights reflecting a social compact, interpretations recognize the limitations on rights that are also rooted in societal relationships.
The author would like to thank Stephen G. Post, PhD, and Caitlyn Tabor, JD, for providing feedback on early drafts of this paper.
[1] Mary Ann Glendon, A World Made New: Eleanor Roosevelt and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (New York: Random House, 2001), 14.
[2] James Griffin, On Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University, 2008).
[3] Maurice Cranston, What Are Human Rights? (London: Bodley Head, 1973).
[4] Barry Balleck, “When The Ends Justify the Means: Thomas Jefferson and the Louisiana Purchase,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 22, no. 4 (1992): 679-680.
[5] Robert Louden, “Rights Infatuation and the Impoverishment of Moral Theory,” Journal of Value Inquiry 17 (1983): 95; Rex Martin, A System of Rights (Oxford: Oxford University, 1993), 1; Wesley Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions (New Haven: Yale University, 1919), 36.
[6] James Nickel, "Human Rights", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2019 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, accessed 27 April 2021, https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/rights-human/.
[7] Andrew Fagan, “Human Rights,” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. James Fieser and Bradley Dowden, accessed 27 April 2021, https://iep.utm.edu/hum-rts/.
[8] Griswold v. Connecticut 381 U.S. 479 (1965), para. 18, https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/381/479.
[9] Griswold v. Connecticut 381 U.S. 479 (1965), para. 69 https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/381/479.
[10] Griswold v. Connecticut 381 U.S. 479 (1965), para. 69 https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/381/479.
[11] Griswold v. Connecticut 381 U.S. 479 (1965), para. 92 https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/381/479.
[12] Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973), 172, https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/410/113%26amp.
[13] Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113 (1973), 172-173, https://www.law.cornell.edu/supremecourt/text/410/113%26amp.
[14] Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/505/833/#:~:text=Casey%2C%20505%20U.S.%20833%20(1992)&text=A%20person%20retains%20the%20right,the%20mother%20is%20at%20risk.
[15] Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health 497 U.S. 261 (1990), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/88-1503.ZO.html.
[16] Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health 497 U.S. 261 (1990), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/88-1503.ZO.html.
[17] Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health 497 U.S. 261 (1990), https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/88-1503.ZO.html.
[18] It is worth noting that some of the Supreme Court’s conservatives – like Scalia, Thomas, Roberts – have expressed explicit disdain for the right to privacy introduced in Griswold. Jamal Greene, “The So-Called Right to Privacy,” UC Davis Law Review 43 (2010): 715-747, https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/faculty_scholarship/622.
[19] National Archives. “Declaration of Independence: A Transcription.” July 4, 1776; reviewed July 24, 2020, https://www.archives.gov/founding-docs/declaration-transcript.
[20] However, the reference to a creator has come to mean a natural right and a priori best describes it rather than a religious underpinning. To borrow from Husserl, this approach will be bracketed out.
[21] DJC Carmichael, “Hobbes on Natural Right in Society: The ‘Leviathan’ Account,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 23, no. 1 (1990): 4-5.
[22] HLA Hart, “Are There Any Natural Rights?” The Philosophical Review 64, no. 2 (1955): 175.
[23] Warren Quinn, Morality and Action (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1993), 170.
[24] Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. James Ellington, 3rd ed. (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1993), 30.
[25] John Rawls, A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition (Cambridge: Belknap, 1999), 109.
[26] JS Mill, Remarks on Bentham’s Philosophy, in Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Vol. X, ed. JM Robson (Toronto:
The Role of Coping Humour in the Physical and Mental Health of Older Adults
No full textObjectives - This study examined the associations among coping humor, other personal/social factors, and the health status of community-dwelling older adults. Method - Survey questionnaires were completed with 73 community dwelling older adults. Included were measures of coping humor, spirituality, self-efficacy, social support and physical and mental health status. Results - Correlations across all variables showed coping humor to be significantly associated with social support, self-efficacy, depression, and anxiety. Forward stepwise regression analyses showed that coping humor and self-efficacy contributed to outcome variance in measures of mental health status. Contrary to expectation, neither social support nor spirituality contributed to the total outcome variance on any of the dependant measures. Conclusion - The importance of spirituality, self-efficacy and social support in determining the quality of life of older adults is well supported in the literature. Coping humor as a mechanism for managing the inevitable health stresses of aging has received less attention. This study shows that coping humor and self efficacy are important factors for explaining health status in older adults. Correlations among coping humor, self efficacy, and social support suggest that a sense of humor may play an important role in reinforcing self-efficacious approaches to the management of health issues.coping humor, aging, health status
Characteristics of inertial gravity waves over Southern Africa as simulated with CAM-EULAG
No full textModulation of the expression and activity of cyclooxygenases in normal and accelerated erythropoiesis.
No full textThe present study was aimed at characterizing the expression and activity of cyclooxygenase (COX) isoenzymes in erythropoiesis. The expression and activity of cyclooxygenase (COX) and prostaglandin (PG) synthases were investigated in: 1) erythroblasts developed in culture from human CD34 + hematopoietic progenitors, 2) erythroblasts in bone marrow specimens, and 3) peripheral erythrocytes isolated from healthy donors and from patients with a high regeneration rate of erythrocytes. While COX-1 protein was observed at each stage of erythroblast development, COX-2 protein was induced at later stages through a p38-MAPK-dependent pathway. Both COX isoforms were also observed in mature erythroblasts of the bone marrow. Erythroblasts developed in culture synthesized significantly more PGE2 than TXB2 and indomethacin delayed erythroid maturation. COX-1 and COX-2 were also observed in erythrocytes by immunostainings, although COX expression was confined to a fraction of circulating erythrocytes. Peripheral erythrocytes synthesized low but detectable amounts of PGE2 and TXB2. Similarly to erythroblast progenitors, PGE2 was the prevalent prostanoid released by erythrocytes. This biosynthetic capacity was significantly increased in erythrocytes from patients with accelerated erythropoiesis as compared to controls. Both COX isoforms are present and enzymatically active during human erythropoiesis, although with different kinetics, and COX-derived prostanoids may play a role in erythroid maturation. Furthermore, peripheral erythrocytes retain in part the capacity of expressing COX and synthesizing prostanoids, which may contribute to the hemostatic-thrombotic response to vascular injury in different diseases, including congenital hemolytic disorders. © 2004 International Society for Experimental Hematology. Published by Elsevier Inc.ALLEN JE, 1971, SCIENCE, V174, P512, DOI 10.1126-science.174.4008.512; ANDREWS DA, 1988, CURR OPIN HEMATOL, V56, P89; Boer AK, 2002, BLOOD, V100, P467, DOI 10.1182-blood.V100.2.467; Butchart EG, 2003, CIRCULATION, V108, P68, DOI 10.1161-01.cir.0000087383.62522.1e; Degousee N, 2003, CIRC RES, V92, P757, DOI 10.1161-01.RES.0000067929.01404.03; Deveaux S, 1997, EMBO J, V16, P5654, DOI 10.1093-emboj-16.18.5654; DUKES PP, 1973, J LAB CLIN MED, V82, P704; Dupuis A, 1998, PROSTAG OTH LIPID M, V55, P179; Dupuis F, 1997, J LIPID MEDIAT CELL, V16, P117, DOI 10.1016-S0929-7855(97)00007-2; Eldor A, 2002, BLOOD, V99, P36, DOI 10.1182-blood.V99.1.36; Fabre JE, 2001, J CLIN INVEST, V107, P603, DOI 10.1172-JCI10881; FitzGerald GA, 2001, NEW ENGL J MED, V345, P433; FOULON I, 1993, ARTERIOSCLER THROMB, V13, P421; Jacobs-Helber SM, 2000, BLOOD, V96, P933; KANNEL W B, 1972, Stroke, V3, P409; Kaufman D W, 1996, Eur J Haematol Suppl, V60, P23; Kendall RG, 2001, CLIN LAB HAEMATOL, V23, P71, DOI 10.1046-j.1365-2257.2001.00351.x; Lasa M, 2000, MOL CELL BIOL, V20, P4265, DOI 10.1128-MCB.20.12.4265-4274.2000; Li Q, 1996, J BIOL CHEM, V271, P18651; Lorenz M, 1999, EXP HEMATOL, V27, P1494, DOI 10.1016-S0301-472X(99)00087-9; Mary J Y, 1996, Eur J Haematol Suppl, V60, P35; Mroske C, 2000, EXP HEMATOL, V28, P411, DOI 10.1016-S0301-472X(00)00125-9; OONISHI T, 1988, PROSTAGL LIPID OTHER, V56, P89; PATRONO C, 1994, NEW ENGL J MED, V330, P1287; Ranelletti FO, 2000, INT J CANCER, V85, P438, DOI 10.1002-(SICI)1097-0215(20000201)85:3438::AID-IJC223.3.CO;2-6; Rocca B, 1999, J CLIN INVEST, V103, P1469, DOI 10.1172-JCI6400; Rocca B, 1997, CIRCULATION, V95, P11; ROCCA B, 1995, PLATELETS, V6, P152, DOI 10.3109-09537109509013268; Rocca B, 2002, P NATL ACAD SCI USA, V99, P7634, DOI 10.1073-pnas.112202999; Santos MT, 1997, CIRCULATION, V95, P63; Secchiero P, 2002, J LEUKOCYTE BIOL, V72, P986; Shin HS, 2002, J BIOL CHEM, V277, P21086, DOI 10.1074-jbc.M200203200; SHIVDASANI RA, 1995, P NATL ACAD SCI USA, V92, P8690, DOI 10.1073-pnas.92.19.8690; Smith WL, 2001, J CLIN INVEST, V107, P1491, DOI 10.1172-JCI13271; TENCZAR FJ, 1973, TRANSFUSION, V13, P183; Ueno N, 2001, J BIOL CHEM, V276, P34918, DOI 10.1074-jbc.M100429200; Valles J, 1998, CIRCULATION, V97, P350; VEZZA R, 1993, BLOOD, V82, P2704; Vitrat N, 2000, THROMB HAEMOSTASIS, V83, P759; WANNAMETHEE G, 1994, J INTERN MED, V235, P163; WILLIAMS JO, 1969, NEW ENGL J MED, V280, P312, DOI 10.1056-NEJM196902062800606; Witt O, 2000, BLOOD, V95, P2391; Zamai L, 2000, BLOOD, V95, P371698
Towards Intercultural Documentary
No full text‘Towards Intercultural Documentary’ is a PhD by Published Work that is comprised of four documentary films, an exhibition catalogue essay and an academic book chapter to form a collective body of work in film and text focused on what Rughani proposes as ‘intercultural documentary practice’. This body of work configures ‘intercultural documentary practice’ as a space or arena in which people of radically different perspectives encounter the other.1 Intercultural documentary aspires to create pluralised spaces of exchange by engaging difference within and between communities. In this work, voices traditionally overlooked, excluded or edged to the cultural margins are re-framed to find a new centrality in a broader encounter, more accurately reflecting the diverse influences that comprise polyglot societies. In the United Kingdom (UK) context, three submitted films, broadcast to peak-time audiences on BBC 2 and Channel 4, stood in contradistinction to mainstream narratives that typically portrayed British experience as largely monocultural and homogeneous.
The contribution to knowledge of this thesis is in deepening and extending the dynamics of documentary practice to embrace intercultural communication and to weld this to the ethics of documentary making. In so doing, this body of work situates ethics as central to the documentary encounter and offers new practice-based insights into navigating tensions in the process of making such work and its methodologies.
‘Towards Intercultural Documentary’ presents a case for the coherence of the body of work that makes a contribution to knowledge at the inter-disciplinary confluence of: documentary studies and practice, ethics and intercultural communication. The submission comprises: Islam and the Temple of’ ‘Ilm’ (BBC 2, 1990); One of the Family (Channel 4, 2000); Playing Model Soldiers (Channel 4, 2000); Glass Houses (British Council, 2004); the exhibition catalogue essay British Homeland in Home (British Council, 2004) and the book chapter ‘Are You a Vulture? Reflecting on the ethics and aesthetics of coverage of atrocity and its aftermath, in Peace Journalism (Peter Lang, 2010)
Mapping area of habitat for inland wetland species
No full text\ua9 2025 The Author(s). Conservation Biology published by Wiley Periodicals LLC on behalf of Society for Conservation Biology.Area of habitat (AOH) maps provide a high-resolution representation of the habitat available in a species’ range and can support conservation policy and planning processes. However, until recently, there was insufficient knowledge on the distribution of inland wetlands and freshwater biodiversity to develop AOH mapping methods specifically tailored to inland wetlands. We used a combined empirical and thematic approach to translate inland wetland habitat classes in the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) Habitats Classification Scheme into spatially explicit wetland-cover types derived from the Global Lakes and Wetlands Database 2 and the World Karst Aquifer Map. The AOH was subsequently estimated as the area in the mapped range that corresponded to each species’ habitat and elevation associations. We developed and tested the method with IUCN Red List assessment data, range maps, and point locality data for fishes, odonates, decapod crustaceans, and mollusks (22,876 species). The method performed well in comparison with similar methods already developed for terrestrial mammals, birds, amphibians, and reptiles. The mean map prevalence (proportion of area in a species’ range that was AOH) was 18–32% for each taxonomic group. Based on data on known localities of occurrence, 78–100% of species per taxonomic group had a higher classification accuracy than expected if AOH were distributed in the range at random. This represents an increased accuracy in the distribution of wetland species. Our study represents the first attempt to distinguish between inland wetland habitat subclasses and to include subterranean habitats in an AOH mapping method. Our method will facilitate the inclusion of previously underrepresented taxa in key conservation tools and analyses and is expected to increase the accuracy of AOH mapping for any species associated with inland wetlands
