1,720,970 research outputs found
Autocracy With Chinese Characteristics: Beijing’s Behind-the-Scenes Reforms
Full text linkhttps://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/148140/1/Autocracy With Chinese Characteristics, posted version.pd
Taxless fiscal states: Lessons from 19th-century America and 21st-century China
No full textHow do modern fiscal states arise? Perhaps the most dominant explanation, based on the European experience, is that democratic institutions that limited the extractive power of states-exemplified by the 1688 Glorious Revolution in England-paved the way for the rise of fiscal capacity and subsequent prosperity. Revisionist accounts, however, reveal that this dominant narrative is flawed. In fact, numerous factors converged to enable the rise of European fiscal states, and in England, debt and land were particularly salient factors. Building off this literature, I bring attention to the role of 'taxless public financing' (i.e. financing public infrastructure through means other than taxation) in the making of fiscal states in two seldom compared cases: 19th-century America and 21st-century China. Both countries relied heavily on taxless financing to launch an infrastructure boom that spurred rapid growth along with massive corruption and financial risks
How China Escaped the Poverty Trap
No full textBold and meticulously researched, How China Escaped the Poverty Trap opens up a whole new avenue of thinking for scholars, practitioners, and anyone seeking to build adaptive systems.HOW CHINA ESCAPED THE POVERTY TRAP -- Contents -- List of Figures and Tables -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction: How Did Development Actually Happen? -- Part 1: FRAMEWORK AND BUILDING BLOCKS -- 1. Mapping Coevolution -- 2. Directed Improvisation -- Part 2: DIRECTION -- 3. Balancing Variety and Uniformity -- 4. Franchising the Bureaucracy -- Part 3: IMPROVISATION -- 5. From Building to Preserving Markets -- 6. Connecting First Movers and Laggards -- Conclusion: How Development Actually Happened beyond China -- Appendix A: Steps for Mapping Coevolution -- Appendix B: Interviews -- Notes -- References -- IndexBold and meticulously researched, How China Escaped the Poverty Trap opens up a whole new avenue of thinking for scholars, practitioners, and anyone seeking to build adaptive systems.Description based on publisher supplied metadata and other sources.Electronic reproduction. Ann Arbor, Michigan : ProQuest Ebook Central, YYYY. Available via World Wide Web. Access may be limited to ProQuest Ebook Central affiliated libraries
China's Labor Cost Problem
Full text linkhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/111744/1/Ang, China's labor cost problem.pd
Industrial transfer and the remaking of the People's Republic of China's competitive advantage
No full textThe recent economic slowdown in the People's Republic of China (PRC) has triggered fear and even panic among global investors. In particular, observers are worried that manufacturing - the engine of the PRC's hypergrowth over the past decades - has hit the doldrums. This article shows that low-end, labor-intensive export manufacturers on the coast have indeed been hit by rising costs and tougher local state regulations. However, it goes further to stress that some coastal manufacturers have begun relocating into, and investing in, the inland provinces of the PRC to take advantage of lower costs and policy concessions. By 2015, the value of domestic investment in five central provinces alone was 2.5 times that of foreign investment in the PRC. This phenomenon of industrial transfer, which began in the 2000s, plays a critical role in sparking economic growth in the interior regions, in economic restructuring on the coast, and in the remaking of the PRC's national competitive advantage
Which Comes First in Development-State Capacity or Economic Growth?
Full text linkThe Political Economist is a newsletter of the American Political Science Association Political Economy Section.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/113087/1/Ang, Political Economist, Spring 2015.pd
Authoritarian Restraints on Online Activism Revisited: Why "I-Paid-A-Bribe" Worked in India But Failed in China
Full text linkAuthoritarian states restrain online activism not only through repression and censorship, but also by indirectly weakening the ability of netizens to self-govern and constructively engage the state. I demonstrate this argument by comparing I-Paid-A-Bribe (IPAB)—a crowd-sourcing platform that collects anonymous reports of petty bribery—in India and China. Whereas IPAB originated and has thrived in India, a copycat effort in China fizzled out within months. Contrary to those who attribute China's failed outcome only to repression, I find that even before authorities shut down IPAB, the sites were already plagued by internal organizational problems that were comparatively absent in India. The study tempers expectations about the revolutionary effects of new media in mobilizing contention and checking corruption in the absence of a strong civil society.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/113088/1/Ang, IPAB China vs India.pd
Integrating Big Data and Thick Data to Transform Public Services Delivery
Full text linkBig data holds great promise for improving public services delivery and innovation in government, but they are not a panacea. Having lots of data can be overwhelming or have little utility if the data are “thin”—that is, they lack meaning for users or fail to capture issues that matter most. By yielding insights into what citizens really care about and how they consume services, thick data can inform both the collection and analysis of big data.
This report introduces the concept of “mixed analytics,” integrating big data and thick data to transform government decision making, public services delivery, and communication. The report presents three case studies of organizations that employ mixed analytics at the international, federal, and city level, respectively. Together, this research offers a set of transferable lessons for agencies at all levels of government:
• Lesson 1: Big data is a means to an end, rather than an end.
• Lesson 2: Thick data can identify unexpected problems or previously unexpressed needs.
• Lesson 3: Thick data can inform the analysis of big data.
• Lesson 4: Mixed analytics can offer both scale and depth.
• Lesson 5: Applying technology is a social activity, not an isolated technical task.
• Lesson 6: The best solutions are not always high-tech.https://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/148311/1/IBM Report, Integrating Big Data & Thick Data (FINAL).pd
Crafting Institutions for Localized Aid
Full text linkToday, most development practitioners agree that “going local” should be the way to
deliver foreign aid. However, while this idea is widely embraced in principle,
turning it into action is the hard problem. After all, aid professionals are steeped in
the framework of universal best practices. In order for localized aid to work, we
must begin by changing incentives, recruitment, and organizational structures
within aid agencies.http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/111884/1/Crafting institutions for localized aid, posted version.pd
Do Weberian Bureaucracies Lead to Markets or Vice Versa? A Coevolutionary Approach to Development
Full text linkAre Weberian bureaucracies a precondition for capitalist markets or is it the other way
around? According to the developmental school, state bureaucracies organized along
Weberian precepts is necessary for successful state-led growth. Yet some level of
economic wealth also appears to be necessary for achieving such desirable institutions.
Departing from conventional linear approaches to development, this essay develops and applies a coevolutionary approach that traces the mutual adaptation of bureaucracies and markets among local states in China. My analysis demonstrates that the particular features of bureaucracy that promote growth vary over the course of development, even among locales within a single country. More surprisingly, I find that the bureaucratic forms that initially sparked growth actually defied Weberian norms of technocratic specialization and impersonality. In other words, in rethinking the relationship between markets and institutions, we must distinguish between market-building and market-preserving institutions. Conventionally good institutions like Weberian bureaucracies are necessary to preserve markets after they have already emerged; however, it is the adaptive refashioning of preexisting “weak” institutions that build markets in the first place.Peer Reviewedhttp://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/2027.42/113200/1/YY_Ang princeton volume chap revised FINAL POSTED.pd
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