1,721,326 research outputs found
2003a), “Unraveling Reduces Mobility in a Labor Market: Gastroentrology with and without a Centralized Match
No full text(Article begins on next page) The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters. Citation Niederle, Muriel and Alvin E. Roth. 2003. Unraveling reduces the scope of an entry level labor market: Gastroenterology with and without a centralized match. Journal of Political Economy 111(6)
Fairness, Public Good, and Emotional Aspects of Punishment Behavior
Full text linkWe report an experiment on two treatments of an ultimatum minigame.In one treatment, responders' reactions are hidden to proposers.We observe high rejection rates reflecting responders' intrinsic resistance to unfairness.In the second treatment, proposers are informed, allowing for dynamic effects over eight rounds of play.The higher rejection rates can be attributed to responders' provision of a public good: Punishment creates a group reputation for being "tough" and effectively "educate" proposers.Since rejection rates with informed proposers drop to the level of the treatment with non-informed proposers, the hypothesis of responders' enjoyment of overt punishment is not supported.game theory;public goods;bargaining;punishment;experimental economics
The Effects of a Centralized Clearinghouse on Job Placement, Wages, and Hiring Practices
Full text linkNew gastroenterologists participated in a labor market clearinghouse (a "match") from 1986 through the late 1990's, after which the match was abandoned. This provides an opportunity to study the effects of a match, by observing the differences in the outcomes and organization of the market when a match was operating, and when it was not. After the GI match ended, the market unraveled. Contracts were signed earlier each year, at diffuse times, often with exploding offers. The market became less national, more local. This allows us to discern the effect of the clearinghouse: it coordinated the timing of the market, in a way that increased its thickness and scope. The clearinghouse does not seem to have had an effect on wages. As this became known among gastroenterologists, an opportunity arose to reorganize the market to once again use a centralized clearinghouse. However it proved necessary to adopt policies that would allow employers to safely delay hiring and coordinate on using the clearinghouse. The market for gastroenterologists provides a case study of market failures, the way a centralized clearinghouse can fix them, and the effects on market outcomes. In the conclusion we discuss aspects of the experience of the gastroenterology labor market that seem to generalize fairly widely.
If you are offered the Right of First Refusal, Should you accept? An Investigation of Contract Design
Full text linkThe Handbook of Experimental Economics/ Alvin E. Roth, John H. Kagel.
No full textIn English.This book, which comprises eight chapters, presents a comprehensive critical survey of the results and methods of laboratory experiments in economics. The first chapter provides an introduction to experimental economics as a whole, with the remaining chapters providing surveys by leading practitioners in areas of economics that have seen a concentration of experiments: public goods, coordination problems, bargaining, industrial organization, asset markets, auctions, and individual decision making. The work aims both to help specialists set an agenda for future research and to provide nonspecialists with a critical review of work completed to date. Its focus is on elucidating the role of experimental studies as a progressive research tool so that wherever possible, emphasis is on series of experiments that build on one another. The contributors to the volume--Colin Camerer, Charles A. Holt, John H. Kagel, John O. Ledyard, Jack Ochs, Alvin E. Roth, and Shyam Sunder--adopt a particular methodological point of view: the way to learn how to design and conduct experiments is to consider how good experiments grow organically out of the issues and hypotheses they are designed to investigate.Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- List of Contributors -- 1. Introduction to Experimental Economics -- 2. Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research -- 3. Coordination Problems -- 4. Bargaining Experiments -- 5. Industrial Organization: A Survey of Laboratory Research -- 6. Experimental Asset Markets: A Survey -- 7. Auctions: A Survey of Experimental Research -- 8. Individual Decision Making -- Author Index -- Subject Index1 online resource
Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets
Full text linkThis essay examines how repugnance sometimes constrains what transactions and markets we see. When my colleagues and I have helped design markets and allocation procedures, we have often found that distaste for certain kinds of transactions is a real constraint, every bit as real as the constraints imposed by technology or by the requirements of incentives and efficiency. I'll first consider a range of examples, from slavery and indentured servitude (which once were not as repugnant as they now are) to lending money for interest (which used to be widely repugnant and is now not), and from bans on eating horse meat in California to bans on dwarf tossing in France. An example of special interest will be the widespread laws against the buying and selling of organs for transplantation. The historical record suggests that while repugnance can change over time, change can be quite slow.
Learning in High stakes utlimatum and market games. An experiment in the Slovak Republic
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