155 research outputs found
Arabic Treebank : Part 2 v 3.1
No full textArabic Treebank: Part 2 (ATB2) v 3.1 , Linguistic Data Consortium (LDC) catalog number LDC2011T09 and isbn 1-58563-590-1, was developed at LDC. It consists of 501 newswire stories from Ummah Press with part-of-speech (POS), morphology, gloss and syntactic treebank annotation in accordance with the Penn Arabic Treebank (PATB) Guidelines developed in 2008 and 2009
Is the discount on the secondary market a case for LDC debt relief?
No full textIn 1988, the prices on the secondary market of LDC debt averaged 50 cents per dollar of face value. From the observation of such discount, this paper goes one step further and argues thatthe debt should be written down in order to account for the discrepancy between the face and market value of the debt. The paper is structured as follows. Section 1 spells out the model, section 2 calculates the socially efficient and the post-default growth rates of the economy. Section 3 shows that the lenders, if they were to monitor the investment and the consumption strategy of the borrower, would choose a lower investment strategy than the socially efficient one. Section 4 shows how an optimum rescheduling can achieve the equilibrium described in section 3. Section 5 shows the dynamic inconsistency of the optimal strategy spelled out in section 4, and shows the link with the"debt overhang"literature. Section 6 investigates the empirical relevance of the"debt overhang".Economic Theory&Research,Banks&Banking Reform,Environmental Economics&Policies,Strategic Debt Management,Financial Intermediation
Aiming high, falling short: the Least Developed Country (LDC) category at 40
No full textWhy have 94% of LDCs not escaped poverty during the last four decades? This paper analyses the motivation behind the UN decision to establish the LDC category in 1971. The reviewed literature highlights the conflicting interests of the actors involved. It provides a historical account of the creation of the category and an international political economy analysis of that process. Based on this literature, I argue that the initial LDC identification process - which set a precedent for future LDC categorizations - was manipulated in order to generate a reduced list of small and economically and politically insignificant countries. Contrary to the LDC official narrative, this list served the interests of both donors (by undermining the UN's implicit effort to normalize international assistance) and other non-LDC developing countries (disturbed by the creation of a positive discrimination within the group, favoring the most disadvantaged among them). As a result of this manipulation, considerably less development-promoting efforts have been demanded from donors, which has, in turn, not significantly distressed the interests of other non-LDC developing countries. --LDCs,aid,trade,preferential treatment,graduation
The menu approach to developing country external debt : an analysis of commercial banks'choice behavior
No full textThis study provides evidence that bank characteristics are significant determinants of commercial-bank choice behavior when confronted with a menu of options. It develops a theoretical model of bank choice behavior and empirically tests its implications using data from the 1988 Brazilian financing package. The empirical results show that bank characteristics are capable of explaining over 80 percent of this choice. One of the main implications of the theoretical model is that under risk-neutrality assumption, financially stronger and more exposed banks prefer to exit. The findings have several important implications for the new debt reduction strategy. (i) First, larger debt reductions operated on a market basis are more costly, per unit of debt reduced. In order to increase debt reduction, weaker banks must be convinced to exit, increasing the needed exit price. (ii) Second, the exit price depends on the strength of the banking industry, and thus, the effectiveness of the present debt strategy is affected by changes in the world economy. In periods of booms, banks become stronger and exit prices are reduced. (iii) Third, regulators can affect the cost of debt reduction by altering the regulatory framework within which the banks operate. (iv) Fourth, LDC debt reductions are beneficial to the deposit insurance agencies of the major creditor nations.Financial Intermediation,Economic Theory&Research,Municipal Financial Management,Financial Crisis Management&Restructuring,Banks&Banking Reform
Arabic Treebank : Part 1 v 4.1
No full textArabic Treebank: Part 1 (ATB1) v 4.1, Linguistic Data Consortium (LDC) catalog number LDC2010T13 and isbn 1-58563-566-9, was developed at LDC. It consists of 734 newswire stories from Agence France Presse (AFP) with part-of-speech (POS), morphology, gloss and syntactic treebank annotation in accordance with the Penn Arabic Treebank (PATB) Guidelines developed in 2008 and 2009
Costs and benefits of debt and debt service reduction
No full textThe author evaluates the costs and benefits of debt and debt service reduction (DDSR) from the point of view of five countries that have concluded Brady deals: Costa Rica, Mexico, the Philippines, Uruguay, and Venezuela. He concludes that, contrary to widely held views, commercial banks have probably benefited from the operations. Commercial bank participation in DDSR is voluntary, so direct financial savings to the country are probably negative at present values. The benefit from DDSR is not that debt is bought at"bargain prices"at the expense of commercial banks. It appears difficult to justify a DDSR operation on purely financial grounds. A more realistic way to look at a DDSR operation is to view it as a"project"that involves a certain financial cost. The return on such a project is how the DDSR operation improves the macroeconomy, or contributes to development. The main purpose of DDSR is to establish a more efficient arrangement between debtor countries and commercial banks, leading to improved conditions for development. A DDSR operation that does not help development is costly and should not be undertaken. The impact of DDSR on development is usually measured by the increase in the growth rate of GDP, but it is too soon to measure that for these five countries. A suitable alternative is to look at the change in investment patterns. A strong policy framework is needed if debt and debt service reduction are to significantly improve development. In Mexico and, to a lesser extent, Venezuela, improved and sustained strong adjustment policies have generated the greatest development benefits. Gains have been less in smaller countries where policies were not as supportive. The author concludes that for a country to benefit from DDSR, it needs significant indirect benefits (such as increased domestic and foreign savings). Direct benefits are likely to be negative because of the commercial banks'financial gains and because DDSR operations are frontloaded. DDSR operations cannot be justified solely by direct benefits and savings in cash flow.Strategic Debt Management,Banks&Banking Reform,Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,Financial Intermediation
Lending booms, reserves, and the sustainability of short-term debt - inferences from the pricing of syndicated bank loans
No full textAcademics pay little attention to international bank lending, focusing instead on rapidly growing market segments such as the international bond market and derivative credit instruments. The authors argue for paying more attention to international bank lending. Why? Three reasons. First, the syndicated bank loan is one of the workhorses of international capital markets. Second, international bank lending is especially important for private-sector borrowers, whose participation in international capital markets will grow as capital markets are liberalized and state enterprises privatized. Sovereigns and other governmental borrowers rely more on the bond market, while private borrowers are disproportionately important to the market in international bank loans. Private-sector borrowers establish long-term relationships with banks to resolve information problems. The authors find that international banks provide more credit to smaller borrowers (about whom information is least complete) than bond markets do. Bank finance dominates that segment of international financial markets with the greatest information asymmetry. Third, spreads on syndicated bank loans show much less variation than spreads on international bonds. Are bank lenders properly pricing country and credit risk? Does spread compression on syndicated bank loans suggest excessive moral hazard in international bank lending? The authors warn against over-dependence on high levels of domestic debt. While growth in domestic debt reflects improved inter-mediation between savers and investors, rapid increases to high levels are viewed as unsustainable and raise the cost of international borrowing. They find evidence of growing bullishness among bank lenders to East Asia in the first half of the 1990s, which could reflect moral hazard, but the jury is still out on that issue. High external short-term debt can coexist with rapid growth for extended periods but is likely to unravel if perceptions of sustainability shift.Payment Systems&Infrastructure,Economic Theory&Research,Banks&Banking Reform,International Terrorism&Counterterrorism,Financial Intermediation,Housing Finance,Economic Adjustment and Lending,Banks&Banking Reform,Financial Intermediation,Economic Theory&Research
Political models of macroeconomic policy and fiscal reform
No full textThe author explains how recent developments in political economics improve our understanding of macroeconomic policy - especially the timing, design, and likelihood of stabilization's success through monetary and fiscal reform. The author reviews the literature on political business cycles and emphasizes several issues involving the relationship between the timing of elections and the timing of macroeconomic policies and outcomes. He also addresses how models can be useful in studying non-democratic systems. Two forces are crucial factors in both democratic and dictatorial systems, although they may manifest themselves differently: (1) the policymakers'incentive to retain power; and (2) society's polarization and the degree of social conflict. The author then analyzes why economic stabilization is delayed, even when it is obvious that sooner or later a stabilization program will have to be adopted. Some points made in the paper follow. Certain institutional characteristics make quick and successful stabilization more or less likely. The more unequal the distribution of stabilization's costs, the more likely that stabilization will be delayed. An increase in the cost of postponing stabilization reduces the delay. Political institutions that make it easier for small interest groups to veto legislation make delay more likely. If political and economic resources are unequally distributed, and it is obvious which group is stronger and has resources to wait longer, a war of attrition ends immediately, as there is no uncertainty about who will win it. Delay is more likely when information about who will bear the cost of delays is uncertain or unevenly distributed. Delay is also more likely when there is agreement about the need for fiscal change but a political stalemate about distribution - about how the burden of higher taxes or spending cuts should be allocated. Stabilization usually occurs when there is political consolidation. The burden of stabilization is sometimes unequal, with the politically weaker group (often the lower classes) bearing a larger burden (often regressive measures). If it is in the interest of the current government to do nothing for fear of failure because of government incompetence, the public may have no incentive to vote for the opposition because the opposition may also do nothing; the crucial factor here is how aware the government is of its own incompetence and thus its reasons for not attempting reform. Successful stabilization usually comes after several failed attempts, and the successful program is often very much like one that failed.Environmental Economics&Policies,Economic Theory&Research,National Governance,ICT Policy and Strategies,Health Economics&Finance
Linking development, trade, and debt strategies in highly indebted countries
No full textThis paper analyzes the determinants of the choice by debtor countries of a jointly optimal trade and debt strategy after the occurrence of some negative shocks. Choosing between export promotion and import substitution is a matter of determining whether it is more profitable to increase the credit ceiling to borrow more, or to reduce the credit ceiling below inherited debt so there is less to repay. Following the introduction, section 2 of the paper sets up a simple two period trade model. Section 3 analyzes the joint optimal debt and investment strategies, while section 4 discusses extensions. Section 5 reviews the welfare concerns and section 5 provides a conclusion.Economic Theory&Research,Environmental Economics&Policies,Strategic Debt Management,Banks&Banking Reform,Financial Intermediation
Chinese Treebank 7.0
No full textChinese Treebank 7.0, Linguistic Data Consortium (LDC) catalog number LDC2010T07 and isbn 1-58563-542-1, consists of over one million words of annotated and parsed text from Chinese newswire, magazine news, various broadcast news and broadcast conversation programs, web newsgroups and weblogs
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