462 research outputs found
"The breaking of fetters". Friedrich, Ludwig e la metodologia filosofica.
No full textIn questo lavoro vorrei prendere in considerazione il ruolo chiarificatore della filosofia e affrontarlo alla luce di uno degli aspetti comunemente riconosciuti dell’attività filosofica, citato da Warburton: il fatto che i filosofi spesso analizzano e chiariscono i concetti, ovvero, svolgono un’analisi concettuale, e che tale analisi è uno degli strumenti, o metodi, propri dell’attività filosofica. Porre l’analisi concettuale sotto la lente di ingrandimento è importante, credo, per due motivi: in primo luogo, essa, o per lo meno in alcune sue declinazioni, rappresenta emblematicamente un tipo di metodologia interamente teorica o, potremmo dire, a priori, ma che trova un campo di applicazione pratica molto esteso, dalla chiarificazione di concetti per scopi giuridici, alla chiarificazione di concetti cardine dell’ambito medico e biologico. In secondo luogo, l’analisi concettuale come praticata storicamente da alcuni esponenti della “svolta linguistica”, o “filosofia linguistica”, può fornire un bagaglio filosofico e metodologico utile al consulente filosofico sia per quanto riguarda la legittimazione teorica della pratica stessa, sia per quanto riguarda la pianificazione concreta della conduzione
Nel tempo e nello spazio. Linguaggio e natura nella filosofia di Ludwig Wittgenstein
No full textThe paper focuses on some naturalistic aspects of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. Wittgenstein has often been considered a radical anti-naturalist philosopher, mainly because he does not endorse the thesis of the continuity between philosophy and science. However, it will be argued that Wittgenstein’s later philosophy incorporates a kind of naturalism without naturalization, i.e., a liberal naturalism, in virtue of the relation between human nature and language. It will be concluded that Wittgenstein’s liberal naturalism provides an example of a naturalistic perspective on language which avoids the limits of an intellectualist approach without leading to scientism: this is meant to express the irreducibility of naturalism to the mere scientific version
La consulenza filosofica oggi tra formazione e ricerca
No full textIl volume raccoglie saggi e abstract, rielaborazioni di una selezione tra i lavori finali dei diplomati del Master di secondo livello in Consulenza Filosofica dell’Università Ca’ Foscari di Venezia nelle edizioni 2017-2019 e 2019-2021. Contribuiscono alla raccolta i testi scritti dalle curatrici e dal curatore, già membri delle commissioni valutatrici delle prove finali delle due edizioni – Filippo Batisti, Alice Morelli e Annalisa Rossi. La prefazione è di Luigi Perissinotto, che ha diretto il Master COFIL fino al 2021. In continuità con la raccolta di testi dalla prima edizione del master veneziano 2005-2007, già ospitata da questa collana, il volume presenta i risultati più aggiornati del percorso formativo in consulenza filosofica: tra riflessione teorica ed esperienze, ricostruzione storica e progettualità, e in dialogo con i modelli e gli strumenti più dibattuti nell’attuale panorama internazionale
A Wittgensteinian Perspective on Dispositions
No full textThis book investigates dispositions in grammatical-normative terms through a contrast between a naturalized paradigm and a Wittgenstein-inspired perspective. The book presents a conceptual analysis of the notion of disposition informed by Wittgenstein's and Ryle's philosophies to defend a normative notion of disposition.
The book opens with a presentation of the current naturalized paradigm on dispositions, focusing on its main presuppositions and limits. It then turns to the discussion of a Wittgensteinian-inspired dispositionalism of knowing and understanding, before filling the exegetical gap about Wittgenstein's own use of the notion of disposition. The author critically engages with the current paradigm using Ryle's notion of category mistake, before concluding with a presentation of some philosophical views where a notion of normative disposition is employed.
This book is essential reading for anyone searching for a new perspective on dispositions and will broaden the appeal of the Wittgensteinian tradition within contemporary analytic philosophy and, potentially, psychology as well
Experience and Grammar: Wittgenstein and James on the experience of meaning.
No full textThis paper focuses on Wittgenstein’s
philosophical engagement with James’ thought on the
experiential account of meaning and understanding.
According to this account, meaning is characterized as a
state of mind of the subject, while understanding is
conceived as a kind of experience of the subject. This
paper argues that, although Wittgenstein criticizes the
experiential model as a tempting but deceptive
philosophical view, James’s account has a pervasive
positive influence on Wittgenstein’s thought. It will be
shown that, even though Wittgenstein argues against
the idea that meanings are experiences, the Jamesian
principle of the absence of the will act informs
Wittgenstein’s alternative conceptions of meaning as use
and understanding as mastery of a technique. Moreover,
Wittgenstein’s discussion of aspect-seeing in the second
part of the Philosophical Investigations follows the
discussion of the experiential account. Wittgenstein’s
discussion is presented as an instance of the distinction
between experience and grammar and as an example of
a broader engagement with James’s philosophy on the
concept of experience
Between Ethics and Aesthetics. Against the Myth of Reductive Therapeutism.
No full textMy paper is about Andronico’s work on the connection between Ethics and Aesthetics in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy. In particular, I will focus on the role that her ideas play against the therapeutic reading of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. I will argue that, contrary to such a reading, the ethical tone of Wittgenstein’s philosophy should be understood as a consequence of aesthetical e-ducation, that is, the sharpening of the eye in order to see differently. I will show that (1) philosophy is a specific kind of theory and that (2) Cavell’s notion of the rediscovery of the ordinary does not properly grasp the ethical force of Wittgenstein’s remarks
Is Defactoism a Kind of Naturalism?
No full textThis paper focuses on Fogelin’s defactoist interpretation of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, as it is
found in Taking Wittgenstein at his word (Fogelin 2009). Fogelin explicitly states that defactoism
must be distinguished from other labels. However, his defactoist reading seems reasonably akin to a
naturalistic reading. This paper argues that defactoism might be considered a form of liberal
naturalism and that the notion of liberal naturalism fits best with Wittgenstein’s overall later
philosophy. It will be shown that, although defactoism clearly accounts for Wittgenstein’s peculiar
treatment of traditional philosophical problems, it does not include important aspects of
Wittgenstein’s philosophy, such as the morphological method and the relevance of imaginary cases
as a non-metaphysical form of estrangement
Wittgenstein on dispositions as abilities. A de-naturalized perspective.
No full textThis paper focuses on Wittgenstein’s use of the notion of disposition. In the Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein characterizes understanding as a mastery of a technique. This is a dispositional notion and many scholars have rightly presented dispositional readings of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy in virtue of his remarks on meaning and understanding. Wittgenstein seems to suggest that understanding the meaning of a word is best characterized as having the disposition to correctly use that word, that is, as knowing how to employ the word. However, scholars think that the notion of disposition as an ability– even if it is correctly ‘applicable’ – is not endorsed by Wittgenstein, because they think that he had in mind a narrow and materialistic conception of disposition as a state of a physical apparatus. This paper argues that Wittgenstein does not endorse a materialistic and narrow conception of disposition. By contrast, Wittgenstein criticizes one particular misleading use of the concept and he actively employs a de-naturalised notion of disposition as acquired ability, or embodied practice
Is there a Wittgensteinian Legacy on Habit?
No full textThe paper focuses on the connection between Wittgenstein’s “post-Tractarian” philosophy and contemporary debates on the nature of habitual behaviour and its alleged automaticity by looking at the problem of the normativity of habits and the role of custom in changing and preventing dysfunctional habits. I argue that Wittgenstein’s philosophy can be an additional useful tool to engage in a re-consideration of habit as it has been advanced by the pragmatist tradition against an operational account. In particular, I argue that Wittgenstein’s conceptualization of habit and custom can be used to address the dichotomy between habit and intelligence, and the dichotomy between habituation and control. Firstly, I present Wittgenstein’s use of the notion of custom as Gepflogenheit to undermine the former dichotomy. Secondly, I present Wittgenstein’s use of the notion of custom as habituation (Gewohnheit) and its relation to sensibility to undermine the latter dichotomy. Finally, I apply Wittgenstein’s insights to the issue of habit crisis and change through a comparison with Dewey’s account in his Human Nature and Conduct
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