1,721,137 research outputs found
Searching for Non-Monotonic Effects of Fiscal Policy: New Evidence
Data revisions and the availability of a longer sample offer the opportunity to reconsider the empirical findings that suggest that in the OECD countries national saving responds non-monotonically to fiscal policy. The paper confirms that the circumstance most likely to give rise to a non-monotonic response of national saving to a fiscal impulse is a “large and persistent impulse”, defined as one in which the full employment surplus, as a percent of potential output, changes by at least 1.5 percentage points per year over a two-year period. This particular circumstance remains the only statistically significant one even when we allow for non-monotonic responses to arise when public debt is growing rapidly or interest rate spreads are widening. We find that non-monotonic responses are similar for fiscal contractions and expansions. In particular, an increase in net taxes has no effect on national saving during large fiscal contractions or expansions. For government consumption there is a large, albeit in some specifications less then complete, offset during expansions or contractions.Fiscal policy, national saving
Searching for Non-Monotonic Effects of Fiscal Policy: New Evidence
Data revisions and the availability of a longer sample offer the opportunity to reconsider the empirical findings that suggest that in the OECD countries national saving responds non-monotonically to fiscal policy. The paper confirms that the circumstance most likely to give rise to a non-monotonic response of national saving to a fiscal impulse is a "large and persistent impulse", defined as one in which the full employment surplus, as a percent of potential output, changes by at least 1.5 percentage points per year over a two-year period. This particular circumstance remains the only statistically significant one even when we allow for non-monotonic responses to arise when public debt is growing rapidly or interest rate spreads are widening. We find that non-monotonic responses are similar for fiscal contractions and expansions. In particular, an increase in net taxes has no effect on national saving during large fiscal contractions or expansions. For government consumption there is a large, albeit in some specifications less then complete, offset during expansions or contractions.
The Electoral Consequences of Large Fiscal Adjustments
The conventional wisdom regarding the political consequences of large reductions of budget deficits is that they are very costly for the governments which implement them: they are punished by voters at the following elections. In the present paper, instead, we find no evidence that governments which quickly reduce budget deficits are systematically voted out of office in a sample of 19 OECD countries from 1975 to 2008. We also take into consideration issues of reverse causality, namely the possibility that only "strong and popular" governments can implement fiscal adjustments and thus they are not voted out of office "despite" having reduced the deficits. In the end we conclude that many governments can reduce deficits avoiding an electoral defeat.
The Impact of the Crisis on Budget Policy in Central and Eastern Europe
This paper describes the particular impacts of the financial and economic crisis on Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, studies pro-cyclicality of fiscal policies, discusses the impact of the crisis on fiscal policy, and the policy response of various governments. After drawing some lessons for fiscal policy from previous emerging market crises, the paper concludes with some thoughts on the appropriate policy response from a more normative perspective. The key message of the paper is that the crisis should be used as an opportunity to introduce reforms to avoid future pro-cyclical fiscal policies, to increase the quality of budgeting and to increase credibility. These reforms should include fiscal responsibility laws comprising medium-term fiscal frameworks, fiscal rules, and independent fiscal councils. When fiscal consolidation is accompanied by fiscal reforms that increase credibility, non-Keynesian effects may offset to some extent the contraction caused by the consolidation.budget policy, Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, financial and economic crisis
External deficits in the Baltics 1995 to 2007: Catching up or imbalances
This paper studies external deficits in the Baltics between 1995 and 2007.It uses a calibrated small-open-economy dynamic general equilibrium model incorporating a financial accelerator to assess to what extent deficits can be explained by productivity growth, fall in spreads and increasing access to credit.Results suggest that the external deficit and other key macroeconomic aggregates can be well fitted by the equilibrium response of the model economy. Real convergence is found to have been dominant in the first half of the sample. More reversible financial factors became increasingly important towards the end of the period pointing to growing vulnerability. Positive growth outlook is also likely to have played a significant role in the build up of the foreign debt. Reversal scenarios confirm the need for a sizable readjustment.Baltic States financial accelerator dynamic general equilibrium Roeger Lendvai External Deficits in the Baltics 1995 to 2007 Catching Up or Imbalances
Cross-Border Acquisitions, Multinationals and Wage Elasticities
The growing number of cross-border acquisitions has in many countries raised concerns about labor demand consequences. In this study, we use detailed firm level data to examine how increased internationalization and multinational activity affect the volatility of employment, or rather, the wage elasticity of labor demand. We analyze whether the wage elasticity of labor demand differs between multinational and non-multinational firms as well as between foreign-owned and domestic firms, and we are able to distinguish between different skill groups of employees. Moreover, we separate between an acquisition effect and a general ownership effect. Our results do not show any general difference in wage elasticities between different types of firms.FDI; Cross-Border Acquisitions; Multinational Enterprises; Foreign Ownership; Labor Demand; Skill Groups; GMM
Fiscal adjustment and economic growth in the European Union
The current world economic crisis induced countries to launch wide-scale
spending programmes all over the world. Member states of the European
Union have not been an exception to this trend. While deficit spending may
increase the aggregate demand, it can also accelerate indebtedness and make
the required spending cuts politically risky later on. However, deficit financing
is not a new phenomenon in the EU; it has been widely practiced in the last
couple of decades. As the crisis seems to come to an end, countries with huge
deficits should adopt exit strategies now, thereby reducing deficit and debt and
reintroducing fiscal discipline, a requirement laid down in the Stability and
Growth Pact. Nevertheless, former adjustment processes can provide ample evidence for successful and politically viable fiscal consolidations. In certain cases, even economic activity started to accelerate as a response to the welldesigned adjustment measures. Based on the previous experiences of EU
states, the aim of this paper is, therefore, to identify the conditions that may determine a fiscal consolidation to be successful in terms of a reduced debt ratio and a positive economic growth
Institutionalized Bailouts and Fiscal Policy: The Consequences of Soft Budget Constraints
States have soft budget constraints when they can expect a bailout by the federal government in the event of a financial crisis. This gives rise to incentives for unsound state fiscal policy. We test whether states with softer budget constraints have higher debt and deficits, receive more bailouts funds, spend funds less efficiently, and are more likely to allocate funds to programs benefiting special interests. Exogenous variation in soft budget constraints across states and over time allows the identification of budget constraint softness on state fiscal policy. We take advantage of the fact that in Germany, states’ political influence is exogenous because voting weights differ in the upper chamber of the German parliament. The stronger the political influence of states, the softer their budget constraints. We show that states with softer budget constraint have higher deficits and debts, and receive more bailouts funds. Further, overrepresented states are less efficient in spending public funds and are more prone to respond to rent seeking by interest groups.
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