63 research outputs found
Qatarization success Factors: A framework for organizations and policymakers
No full textState of Qatar has recently witnessed substantial economic growth. Responding to the rapidly increasing business activity, an influx of expatriate workers has been filling the gap between the limited supply and the large demand of skilled and unskilled workers. Faced with the challenge of sustaining its economy on the long run as well as preserving its national identity and culture, Qatar has sought to introduce and implement a workforce nationalization strategy called Qatarization.
Given the interdisciplinary nature of the issue, many factors come to play in impacting the success of a Qatarization program at both the macro-level and the micro-level. This paper aims to highlight the factors that have the most impact on the success of a Qatarization program being executed at the organizational level.
First, a literature review was focused on highlighting different factors and aspects that has been discussed or featured in previous studies from a variety of fields and disciplines. After executing four in-depth interviews with Qatarization experts, a Qatarization Success Factors model was developed containing 19 different aspects that were believed to have an impact on the success of a Qatarization program. Those aspects were categorized according to whether they fall under the direct influence (internal aspects) or indirect influence (external aspects) of an organization executing a Qatarization program.
A self-administrated structured questionnaire was then developed and distributed electronically targeting professionals in Qatar with experiences related to human resources, learning and development, management, or Qatarization. Respondents were asked to rate 19 different statements, each related to an aspect of the model, using a 7-point Likert Scale.
A total of 153 qualified responses were successfully collected and then analyzed using factors analysis. Upon performing the analysis, a total of five factors were extracted and then ranked according to the percentage of variances explained.
The findings of this paper found that factors and aspects related to internal organizational factors had the most impact on the success of the Qatarization program. Next to that were factors related to the national educational structures, followed by national policies, economic regulations, and social and cultural factors respectively
Essays in cooperative game theory and public finance
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Reason: ETDs are only available to UIUC Users without author permissionETDs are only available to UIUC Users without author permissionU of I OnlyThis dissertation is divided into three essays. The first essay focuses on the question of enfranchisement of groups of individuals. Existing research work in the area has not adequately addressed this question. Indeed, previous analyses have focused on the value of a vote for a single individual. We considered a totally different approach whereby the central players are groups of individuals rather than single individuals. Within this framework, we have provided an answer to the question as to why groups of individuals struggle to gain the right to vote. We also provided an explanation of why the group in power may voluntarily extend the franchise to groups which have conflicting preferences.The second essay introduces the concept of coalition structure value to differential information economies. This extends the work of Krasa and Yannelis (1994) who introduced the concept of private value allocation to measure the information superiority of agents in an economy with differential information. The coalition structure value allows us to analyze the implications of coalition structures on the value of information. Contrary to our expectations, we found that the bargaining strength of an agent with superior information does not decrease if the rest of the agents collude and bargain as a unit with him. This is in sharp contrast to the one seller and two buyers example in full information economies where the buyers are better off if they bargain as a unit with the seller.The third paper generalizes the crowding types model introduced by Conley and Wooders (1994a) by allowing variable usage of local public goods within jurisdictions. We investigate the possibility of anonymous decentralizations of core allocations. It turns out that it is possible to decentralize core allocations with anonymous admission prices. However these prices are infinite dimensional. This leads us to investigate Lindahl decentralization. While it is possible to get nonanonymous Lindahl decentralization, the core is generally larger than the set of anonymous Lindahl equilibria.Made available in DSpace on 2011-05-07T12:19:41Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2
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Previous issue date: 199
Does Altruism Mitigate Free-riding and Welfare Loss?
No full textA warm-glow motivation for charitable giving has recently been explored as a possible solution to the problem of inefficient private provision of public goods. However, the introduction of warm-glow affects both the efficient level of public good provision as well as the equilibrium level. Hence it is not clear whether warm-glow mitigates or exacerbates inefficiency. We revisit Andreoni's (1989) model of impure altruism and formally analyze this question. Cornes and Sandler''s (1986) index of easy riding and a version of Debreu''s (1951) coefficient of resource utilization are used as measures of free-riding and welfare loss.altruism
Lotteries, Group Size, and Public Good Provision
No full textWe analyze the effect of group size on public good provision under the Morgan (2000) lottery mechanism. For a pure public good, the lottery performs quite well as public good provision is found to increase in group size, even when the lottery prize is held constant. By contrast, for fully rival public goods, per capita provision is found to decrease in group size, even when the lottery prize is proportional to group size. Further, the per capita level of provision will approach zero when group size is sufficiently large. Copyright 2007 Blackwell Publishing, Inc..
An Extension of the Trade Restrictiveness Index to Large Economies
No full textThe Trade Restrictiveness Index (TRI) introduced by Anderson and Neary (1994 ) provided the first theoretically satisfying measure of a country's tariff structure by overcoming the problem of ad hoc specification of indexing weights and the related index number problem. We observe, however, that the TRI may not exist or may not be unique when countries are large. As a remedy, we propose a simple extension. Copyright � 2006 The Authors; Journal compilation � 2006 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
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